Klein v. University of Maine System
| Decision Date | 15 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Kno-21-56 |
| Parties | Karen S. KLEIN v. UNIVERSITY OF MAINE SYSTEM et al. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
William C. Herbert, III, Esq., and Sean V. Walton, Esq. (orally), Hardy Wolf & Downing, P.A., Lewiston, for appellant Karen S. Klein
Christopher C. Dinan, Esq., and Laura A. Maher, Esq. (orally), Monaghan Leahy, LLP, Portland, for appellees University of Maine System and University of Maine
Panel: STANFILL, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, HORTON, and CONNORS, JJ.
[¶1] Karen S. Klein appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Knox County, Mallonee, J .) in favor of the University of Maine System and the University of Maine (collectively, the University) on her complaint asserting negligent maintenance and operation of a parking lot located on the University of Maine's Orono campus. Klein contends that the court erred in determining that the parking lot was not an appurtenance to a public building as that term is used in 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2) (2021) of the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and, therefore, that no exception to the immunity conferred on governmental entities by the MTCA applied. We affirm the judgment.
[¶2] The following facts are undisputed. See McDonald v. City of Portland , 2020 ME 119, ¶ 2, 239 A.3d 662. On or about January 6, 2019, Klein drove her vehicle to the University of Maine's Orono campus for the purpose of conducting business at Fogler Library. Klein was instructed by the University to use a parking lot contiguous to Holmes Hall. Fogler Library is located across Moosehead Road from Holmes Hall. The parking lot is used primarily by faculty and staff working at Holmes Hall and by faculty, staff, and visitors using Fogler Library.
[¶3] After parking her vehicle, Klein walked through the parking lot, crossed Moosehead Road, and entered Fogler Library. A few hours later, Klein exited Fogler Library, walked across Moosehead Road, and walked into the parking lot, where she slipped and fell on a patch of untreated ice and sustained injuries. No road construction, street cleaning, or repair was being performed at the parking lot, and the University has no insurance that would cover the incident. See 14 M.R.S. § 8116 (2021).
[¶4] After her fall, Klein filed a complaint in the Superior Court alleging that the University was negligent in its maintenance and operation of the parking lot. The University filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming immunity from Klein's suit pursuant to the MTCA. Klein opposed the motion, arguing that the parking lot fell within the "public building exception" to the MTCA's otherwise comprehensive grant of immunity. See 14 M.R.S. §§ 8103(1), 8104-A(2) (2021). On February 5, 2021, the court entered an order granting the University's summary judgment motion on the grounds that the parking lot was not an appurtenance as that term is used in section 8104-A(2) and therefore that no exception to governmental immunity applied. Klein timely appealed. See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 (2021) ; M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).
[¶5] Klein argues that the court erred by granting the University's motion for summary judgment based on immunity. She contends that the undisputed facts show that the parking lot where she fell was an appurtenance to Holmes Hall and Fogler Library and therefore falls within the "public building exception" to immunity provided by section 8104-A(2).
[¶6] We review a grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Picher v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Portland , 2009 ME 67, ¶ 7, 974 A.2d 286. A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the undisputed facts show that the prevailing party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. "A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence to require a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial." Id. (quotation marks omitted). "Absent a dispute of material fact, whether or not a governmental entity is entitled to immunity is a question of law that we review de novo." McDonald , 2020 ME 119, ¶ 11, 239 A.3d 662.
[¶7] Our main objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the will of the Legislature. See Est. of Stone v. Hanson , 621 A.2d 852, 853 (Me. 1993). In determining the Legislature's intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute. Adoption of Patricia S. , 2009 ME 76, ¶ 11, 976 A.2d 966. In considering the plain language, however, A.S. v. LincolnHealth , 2021 ME 6, ¶ 15, 246 A.3d 157 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
[¶8] Governmental immunity is the sole subject of the MTCA, 14 M.R.S. §§ 8101 - 8118 (2021). The MTCA expressly provides that, as a general rule, governmental entities are immune from suit on any and all tort claims seeking recovery of damages. Reid v. Town of Mount Vernon , 2007 ME 125, ¶ 20, 932 A.2d 539 ; 14 M.R.S. § 8103(1). The MTCA does, however, include in section 8104-A "a cautious waiver of sovereign immunity by the Legislature in certain carefully circumscribed circumstances." Searle v. Town of Bucksport , 2010 ME 89, ¶ 27, 3 A.3d 390. We construe this waiver strictly in order to adhere to the Legislature's directive that immunity for a governmental entity remains the general rule. See Est. of Fortier v. City of Lewiston , 2010 ME 50, ¶ 8, 997 A.2d 84 .
[¶9] The public building exception to immunity provides that "[a] governmental entity is liable for its negligent acts or omissions in the construction, operation or maintenance of any public building or the appurtenances to any public building." 14 M.R.S. § 8104-A(2). The MTCA does not define the term "appurtenance," and we have adopted a restrictive definition of the term, in accordance with "the exacting approach we follow when construing the exceptions to immunity under the MTCA." Sanford v. Town of Shapleigh , 2004 ME 73, ¶ 10, 850 A.2d 325. "[F]or purposes of section 8104-A(2), an appurtenance is an object or thing that belongs or is attached to a public building." Id. ¶ 11. "In determining whether something ‘belongs’ to a building ... we have rejected a function-based approach in favor of using the ‘well-established definition of a fixture to determine whether an object [is] an appurtenance.’ " McDonald , 2020 ME 119, ¶ 15, 239 A.3d 662 (quoting Searle , 2010 ME 89, ¶¶ 13-14, 3 A.3d 390 ). Thus, to be an appurtenance under section 8104-A(2), the object in question must be "(1) physically annexed to the realty, (2) adapted to the realty, and (3) intended to be irremovable from the realty." McDonald , 2020 ME 119, ¶ 15, 239 A.3d 662.
[¶10] Klein relies on our recent decision in McDonald1 to support her argument that the parking lot is an appurtenance to Holmes Hall or Fogler Library.2 Id . ¶¶ 15-16. In McDonald , we held that a paved brick plaza leading to the entrance of the Portland Police Department headquarters building was an appurtenance to a public building under section 8104-A(2). Id. ¶¶ 16, 22. Applying the three-part definition of a fixture to the facts of that case, we concluded, first, that the plaza was "annexed to the Department building because it serve[d] as the roof to the portion of the building underneath it and [could not] be freely moved or relocated." Id. ¶ 16. Second, we concluded that the plaza was "adapted to the unique needs of the Department building" because "the building's lobby would be wholly inaccessible without [it]." Id . Third, we concluded that the "annexation and essential nature of the plaza" displayed the City's intent to make it "an irremovable part of the Department building." Id. (quotation marks omitted). The fact that the plaza was physically annexed to—formed the roof of a portion of—the Portland Police Department headquarters building was critical to the outcome in McDonald . See id. ¶ 16.
[¶11] The uncontroverted facts demonstrate that the parking lot here is materially distinguishable from the plaza in McDonald because although the parking lot is contiguous to Holmes Hall—in that the parking lot shares a common border with Holmes Hall—the parking lot is not an object or thing that is "physically annexed to" Holmes Hall or Fogler Library. Id. ¶ 15 ; see also Annex , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining "annex" as "[s]omething that is attached to something else, such as ... an addition to a building"). The parking lot is not attached to either Holmes Hall or Fogler Library nor is it incorporated into these public buildings in any way. Cf. Rodriguez v. Town of Moose River, 2007 ME 68, ¶¶ 8, 28 n.3, 38, 922 A.2d 484 (); Donovan v. City of Portland , 2004 ME 70, ¶ 15, 850 A.2d 319 ().
[¶12] Because the parking lot is not annexed to either Holmes Hall or Fogler Library, it cannot be "an irremovable part of the ... building." McDonald , 2020 ME 119, ¶ 16, 239 A.3d 662 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, there is no evidence to support two of the three necessary factors.
[¶13] Even if the parking lot were annexed to one of the public buildings, however, it would not satisfy the remaining factor necessary to the definition of a fixture. The parking lot is not "adapted...
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