Bailey v. Bailey
| Decision Date | 20 September 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 73--826,73--826 |
| Citation | 300 So.2d 294 |
| Parties | Helen A. BAILEY, Appellant, v. Franklin W. BAILEY, Jr., Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
George Ritchie, Cocoa, for appellant.
Kendall T. Moran, Titusville, for appellee.
This suit for dissolution of marriage resulted in a final judgment (1) dissolving the marriage, (2) refusing to ratify a written separation agreement executed by the parties, and (3) awarding to appellant-wife rehabilitative alimony and suit money.
The parties separated after 28 years of marriage, the husband moving out of the marital home. Three days later he returned to discuss with his wife her needs for support and maintenance of the home. An agreement was reached which the wife put in her handwriting and the husband signed. Pursuant to the husband's instructions, the wife then retained a lawyer to have the agreement redrafted in proper legal form, the husband declining to retain separate counsel. A few days later, the attorney-drafted written agreement, consistent in all material respects with the original signed agreement, was presented to the husband and signed by him before a notary public.
At the time of the separation, the wife was 53 years of age, with a limited education and no special training or skills, and virtually no work experience during the marriage. She was suffering from a minor physical disability. The husband was gainfully employed by the Bendix Company in connection with the space program work at Cape Kennedy. He had a total monthly income from his employment and Air Force pension of approximately $1,070.00 a month. He had accumulated savings of some $16,000.00, of which he gave $9,000.00 to the wife. He also gave her title to the mobile home and one of the two automobiles which he owned. The separation agreement in its material parts provided that the husband (1) would give the wife $350.00 per month as alimony, (2) would give her the insurance policies on his life and not change the beneficiary thereof, (3) would leave her the sole beneficiary under his will, and (4) would sign such papers as necessary to allow the wife to continue use of post exchange and commissary privileges.
After the agreement was executed, the husband delivered to appellant-wife the mobile home, the automobile and the insurance policies, and arranged for her to have the post exchange and commissary privileges. He also commenced paying to her the monthly support payments of $350.00 each and continued to do so voluntarily for a full year thereafter. Then he filed the suit for dissolution of marriage. The wife counterclaimed for dissolution and ratification of the separation agreement.
In its final judgment the court, finding that the written separation agreement was a result of overreaching on the part of the wife and that the husband had not thoroughly read nor understood the provisions of the agreement, concluded that it would be unconscionable to approve such agreement. The court nonetheless found that at the time of final hearing the husband had the ability to pay alimony in the amount of $350.00 per month and the wife had need for alimony in such amount, and consequently ordered alimony in that amount for three months, and thereafter in declining amounts through the end of 1975.
In Posner v. Posner, Fla.1970, 233 So.2d 381, which involved an antenuptial agreement providing for a set amount of alimony in the event of divorce, the Supreme Court held such agreement to be valid and binding between the parties As to conditions existing at the time the agreement was made, provided the agreement was entered into under the conditions outlined in Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, Fla.1962, 143 So.2d 17. There is no reason why this same principle would not apply to a postnuptial agreement. Cf., Pemelman v. Pemelman, Fla.App.1966, 186 So.2d 552; Belcher v. Belcher, Fla.1972, 271 So.2d 7. It would seem that under the Posner rationale provisions for Alimony to the wife contained in postnuptial separation agreements executed by husband and wife, not tainted by fraud or overreaching and fairly entered into after full disclosure, are valid and binding as to conditions existing at the time the agreement was made, and are subject to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
McMahan v. McMahan
...separately or in toto, constitute coercion or duress. See Cronacher v. Cronacher, 508 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), Bailey v. Bailey, 300 So.2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), and Byrd v. Byrd, 324 So.2d 659 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (all reciting that tremendous emotional strain at the time of signing ......
-
Hahn v. Hahn, 84-473
...upset. That emotion is not grounds to set aside an otherwise duly-executed property settlement agreement. See Bailey v. Bailey, 300 So.2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). We hold, therefore, that the appellee herein was bound by her agreement, and that the trial court erred by rejecting that agreem......
-
Tenneboe v. Tenneboe
...(Fla.1972); Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla.1970); Singer v. Singer, 318 So.2d 438, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Bailey v. Bailey, 300 So.2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). See § 61.14, Fla.Stat. ...
-
Messina v. Messina
...DCA 1984); Wing v. Wing, 429 So.2d 782 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983); Garrison v. Garrison, 380 So.2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Bailey v. Bailey, 300 So.2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Traylor v. Traylor, 214 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968). Under the cases, retirement is just the sort of future contingency ......
-
Alternatives to physical and testimonial proof
...the Sky Lab launch and that the husband would likely be the victim of such expected changes in economic conditions. Bailey v. Bailey , 300 So.2d 294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). Hartung v. Bernhart The trial court erred when it took judicial notice of two DCF shelter orders pursuant to Chapters 90.......