Bailey v. Mars

• Decision Date: 18 March 1952
• Citation: 138 Conn. 593,87 A.2d 388
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BAILEY v. MARS et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 388

87 A.2d 388

138 Conn. 593

BAILEY v. MARS et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 18, 1952.

Samuel H. Aron, Hartford, with whom was Nathan Aaron, Hartford for the appellants (defendants).

Joseph J. Fauliso, Hartford, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Ernest H. Halstedt, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was George C. Conway, Atty. Gen., as amicus curiae.

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN and INGLIS, JJ.

BROWN, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the defendants from a judgment of the Superior Court in Hartford County setting aside an interlocutory decree of the Probate Court for the district of Hartford. The decree approved a valid written agreement between the defendants and the plaintiff whereby the latter as natural parent gave to the former her minor illegitimate child in adoption. The question for determination is whether the plaintiff, who, pursuant to § 6866 of the General Statutes, had voluntarily joined in the agreement, had the legal right at any time prior to a decree of adoption entered upon an application under § 6867 to withdraw her consent and thereby deprive the Probate Court of jurisdiction.

These pertinent facts found by the trial court are undisputed: In January, 1949, the plaintiff, an unmarried woman residing in Hartford, became concerned and emotionally upset upon learning that she was pregnant and that there was no possibility of assistance from the father upon the birth of the child. Pursuant to the suggestion and persuasion of the physician attending her, she later conferred with an attorney representing the defendants concerning the giving of the child to them in adoption. Shortly thereafter, on June 15, 1949, she gave birth to a daughter at the Hartford Hospital. Nine days later, at the office of the attorney, after he had fully explained the nature of the documents, she signed an agreement of adoption, a waiver of notice of the hearing thereon and a consent to adoption of the child applicable to the defendants as foster parents. Her consent to the adoption by the defendants so expressed was freely given and was not void because of any fraud or duress. On June 27, 1949, the instruments were filed in the Probate Court. On July 15, 1949, the plaintiff told a state welfare investigator, unequivocally, that she did not want to give up her child and that she was withdrawing her consent. Formal written notice to this effect was filed with the Probate Court on September 22, 1949, and when the adoption hearing was held on March 24, 1950, the plaintiff and her counsel objected to the approval of the application. On May 5, 1950, the Probate Court entered the interlocutory decree approving the adoption. The plaintiff duly appealed to the Superior Court.

On June 26, 1949, the defendants, with the plaintiff's approval and consent, took the baby from the hospital and have cared for her ever since. They have provided a suitable home for her and are in a position to give her a proper upbringing in a normal home atmosphere. Besides the probate expenses, they paid bills totaling $650 for the doctor, the attorney and the hospital. They have paid nothing to the plaintiff. The court concluded (1) that although the plaintiff's original consent to the adoption was valid and freely given she had the legal right to withdraw it at any time before the Probate Court made a decree of adoption, and (2) that when she withdrew her consent, before any hearing or decree by the Probate Court, that court was thereafter without power or jurisdiction to proceed further with the matter and the decree later rendered by it was invalid and void.

'Adoption is the establishment of the legal relationship of parent and child between persons not so related by nature.' 2 Locke & Kohn, Conn. Probate Practice, § 685. It results in a status that was unknown to the common law. Woodward's Appeal, 81 Conn. 152, 165, 70 A. 453. 'Being of purely statutory origin, a legal adoption results if the statutory procedure is followed, but fails if any essential requirement of the statute is not complied with.' Goshkarian's Appeal, 110 Conn. 463, 465, 148 A. 379, 380.

The statutes directly involved in this appeal are §§ 6866 and 6867. Section 6866 provides, that among other persons specified, the mother of any child born out of wedlock may, by written agreement, subject to the approval of the Court of Probate as provided, give in adoption to any person any minor child in her charge. Section 6867, so far as it is material in this case, prescribes the following procedure: Each adoption matter must be instituted by filing an application, together with the written agreement of adoption, in duplicate in the Probate Court for the district where the natural parent resides. The application must be signed by at least one of the parties to the agreement, who may waive notice of any hearing thereon. One of the duplicates must be sent to the commissioner of welfare for an investigation and report within ninety days. This report 'shall indicate the physical and mental status of the child and shall contain such facts as may be relevant to determine whether the proposed adoption will be for the welfare of the child, including the physical, mental, social and financial condition of the parties to the agreement'. After receipt of the report, the court must set a day for a hearing upon the agreement and give reasonable notice thereof. At this hearing it may deny the application, order a further investigation, enter an interlocutory decree approving the adoption until a final decree is rendered upon a hearing not less than twelve nor more than thirteen months after the filing of the application, or enter a final decree of approval. No approval can be decreed unless the court is satisfied that 'such adoption is for the best interest of the child'. So long as the interlocutory decree is in effect, the child is deemed for all purposes to have been adopted.

Section 6867 contains no express provision permitting one who has joined in an agreement to give her child in adoption to withdraw her consent after the filing of the application in the Probate Court. Whether such a right of withdrawal exists by implication depends upon the interpretation and construction properly to be accorded the statute. The question for the court 'is never, what did the legislature actually intend * * * but, what intention has it expressed?' Lee Bros. Furniture Co. v. Cram, 63 Conn. 433, 438, 28 A. 540, 541; Finoia v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 130 Conn. 381, 385, 34 A.2d 636; Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 295, 301, 57 A.2d 128; Mad River Co. v. Wolcott, 137 Conn. 680, 686, 81 A.2d 119. The court may not, by construction, supply omissions in a statute or add exceptions or qualifications, merely because it opines that good reason exists for so doing. State ex rel. Heimov v. Thomson, 131 Conn. 8, 12, 37 A.2d 689. This is especially so where it appears that the omission was intentional. State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 416, 11 A.2d 856. In such a situation, the remedy lies not with the court but with the General Assembly. Davis v. Margolis, 108 Conn. 645, 649, 144 A. 665.

The statutory provisions prescribe an adoption procedure which, though simple, is stated with precision. After the parties have joined in the written adoption agreement, the proceeding is 'instituted' by filing this in the Probate Court together with an application for the court's approval of the adoption. The court is then required to ascertain, by the investigation prescribed, the facts 'relevant to determine whether the proposed adoption will be for the welfare of the child'. At the hearing thereafter held, if the court is satisfied that the adoption 'will be for the best interest of the child,' it may enter an interlocutory decree of approval subject to final determination later, or, 'if it is satisfied that such adoption is for the best interest of the child,' it may enter a final decree approving the adoption. The thrice-repeated reference in the words quoted to the welfare or best interest of the child, particularly in the absence of any mention of a similar nature with relation to either of the parties to the adoption agreement, indicates very clearly that the primary purpose of the legislature as expressed in the statute is to insure the welfare of the child. This finds confirmation in the history of this legislation.

Under the original statute, enacted in 1864, approval of an adoption agreement by the Probate Court was made dependent upon its finding that this would 'be for the welfare' of the child. Public Acts, 1864, c. 85, § 2. Similar phraseology has appeared in every subsequent revision of the General Statutes, including that of 1949 above quoted. The further provision for an investigation and a report to the Probate Court of the relevant facts concerning whether the adoption would be 'for the welfare of the child,' first enacted in 1943, was designed to guarantee this result. Sup.1943, § 649g. The same is true of § 650g, now § 6870 of the General Statutes, establishing the confidential status of probate court records in adoption cases, and of § 580, which safeguards the birth and adoption information in the records of registrars of vital satistics. Other legislation is also indicative of a primary concern on the part of the legislature for the welfare of minor children. The provision for the removal of parents as guardians, § 6850, and the legislation relating to the Juvenile Court, c. 126, are instances. This legislative consistency is in accord with the principles of our common law. We have repeatedly held in actions for the custody of a child that his welfare must be the controlling consideration. Claffey v. Claffey, 135 Conn. 374, 377, 64 A.2d 540; Hunt v. Hunt, 116 Conn. 701, 702, 163 A. 608. We have pointed out that this principle is determinative even at the expense of depriving a parent of custody. Don v. Frankel, 136...