Bailey v. United States, C09-2004-LRR
Decision Date | 05 January 2012 |
Docket Number | No. C09-2004-LRR,No. CR06-2013-LRR,C09-2004-LRR,CR06-2013-LRR |
Parties | ROBERT BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
This matter appears before the court on Robert Bailey's motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (docket no. 1) and motion to toll the statute of limitation (docket no. 2). Robert Bailey ("the movant") filed both motions on January 21, 2009. For the following reasons, the movant's motion to toll the statute of limitation and his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion shall be denied.1 Additionally, a certificate of appealability shall be denied.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 allows a prisoner in custody under sentence of a federal court to move the sentencing court to vacate, set aside or correct a sentence. To obtain relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner must establish: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
Although it appears to be broad, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 does not provide a remedy for "all claimed errors in conviction and sentencing." United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979). Rather, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is intended to redress only "fundamental defect[s] which inherently [result] in a complete miscarriage of justice" and "omission[s] inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Hill, 368 U.S. at 428; see also United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) () (citing Poor Thunder v. United States, 810 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1987)). A collateral challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is not interchangeable or substitutable for a direct appeal. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982) ( ). Consequently, "[a]n error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In addition, movants ordinarily are precluded from asserting claims they failed to raise on direct appeal. See McNeal v. United States, 249 F.3d 747, 749 (8th Cir. 2001). "A [movant] who has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review may raise the claim in a [28 U.S.C. §] 2255 proceeding only by demonstrating cause for the default and prejudice or actual innocence." Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998)); see also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003) (). "'[C]ause' under the cause and prejudice test must be something external to the [movant], something that cannot be fairly attributed to him." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991) (emphasis in original). If a movant fails to show cause, a court need not consider whether actual prejudice exists. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 501, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1991). Actual innocence under the actual innocence test "means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623-24; see also McNeal, 249 F.3d at 749 ().2
The AEDPA contains a one year period of limitation during which a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion must be filed.3 The statute of limitation begins to run from the latest of fourcircumstances. The first of these circumstances is the date on which the judgment of conviction became final. Here, the movant's conviction became "final" on January 7, 2008, that is, the date that the Supreme Court denied the movant's petition for a writ of certiorari. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527, 123 S. Ct. 1072, 155 L. Ed. 2d 88 (2003) (); see also Diaz-Diaz v. United States, 297 Fed. App'x 574, 575 (8th Cir. 2008) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1)). Given such date, the movant needed to file his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion by no later than January 7, 2009. The movant did not file his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion until January 13, 2009, which is several days too late. Further, the movant's situation does not fall under any of the remaining three timeliness provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motions. United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089, 1092-93 (8th Cir. 2005). However, equitable tolling only applies "where 'extraordinarycircumstances' beyond a prisoner's control prevent timely filing." Id. at 1093 ( ). "Ineffective assistance of counsel, where it is due to an attorney's negligence or mistake, has not generally been considered an extraordinary circumstance in this regard." Id. ( ); see also Kreutzer, 231 F.3d at 463 ( ). Although he asks the court for more time to file, the movant does not offer a valid excuse for failing to timely file his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. The movant does not account for the year that he had to file his action, that is, he does not explain why he waited until nearly the entire period had expired. And, he does not explain why he did not exercise prudence and verify the court's correct address before submitting his documents. Therefore, the court finds that the movant's situation does not fall within the limitation period allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
In sum, the claim that the movant asserts could have been asserted before a judgment of conviction was entered, on direct appeal or in a timely 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. "'The one year period provided him with reasonable opportunity to file for relief; and if that time period has expired, it is the result of his own doing and not due to any inadequacy in the statute.'" United States v. Lurie, 207 F.3d 1075, 1078 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 1999)). Although this is a harsh rule, it is the law. Accordingly, the movant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion shall be denied as untimely.
Alternatively, the court thoroughly reviewed the record and finds that the denial of the movant's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion results in no "miscarriage of justice" and is consistent with the "rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Hill v. United States, 368U.S. 424, 428, 82 S. Ct. 468, 7 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1962); see also United States v. Apfel, 97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996) . The court concludes that the movant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty. See Walker v. United States, 115 F.3d 603, 604 (8th Cir. 1997) (); United States v. Jennings, 12 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 1994) ( ). Further, because the court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals already determined that the movant qualified as a career offender, those determinations cannot be disturbed. See, e.g., United States v. Wiley, 245 F.3d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Issues raised and decided on direct appeal cannot ordinarily be relitigated in a collateral proceeding based on 28 U.S.C. § 2255." (citing United States v. McGee, 201 F.3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2000)); Dall v. United States, 957 F.2d 571, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1992) ( ); United States v. Kraemer, 810 F.2d 173, 177 (8th Cir. 1987) ( ); United States v. Shabazz, 657 F.2d 189, 190 (8th Cir. 1981) (); Butler v. United States, 340 F.2d 63, 64 (8th Cir. 1965) ( ).4 Lastly, the court concludes that the conduct of counsel fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Strickland v....
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