Baker-Matthews Manufacturing Co. v. Grayling Lumber Company

• Decision Date: 27 May 1918
• Docket Number: 1
• Citation: 203 S.W. 1021,134 Ark. 351
• Parties: BAKER-MATTHEWS MANUFACTURING CO. v. GRAYLING LUMBER COMPANY
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

203 S.W. 1021

BAKER-MATTHEWS MANUFACTURING CO. v. GRAYLING LUMBER COMPANY

134 Ark. 351

No. 1

Supreme Court of Arkansas

May 27, 1918

Appeal from Desha Chancery Court; Z. T. Wood, Chancellor; affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

E. E Hopson and J. W. & J. W. House, Jr., for appellants.

1. The suit is barred by the statute of limitations. The statute was not waived by the letters or acts of appellant. 91 Ark. 162; 10 Id. 134; 11 Id. 666; 26 Id 540; 76 A. 716; 57 Ark. 583; 85 Id. 584. It was an unliquidated claim and not a debt. The amount was never agreed upon. There was no estoppel or waiver.

2. The chancery court had no jurisdiction, this being a law action. 85 Ark. 208, 211; 65 Id. 600; 43 Id. 485; 30 Mich. 345; 6 Pom. Eq. §§ 857-8; 53 N.Y. 185; 104 Ark. 154; 94 Id. 306.

3. Appellee is not entitled to recover either at law or in equity. 85 Ark. 208; 76 Id. 426; 94 Id 115; 30 Mich. 345; 11 Cush. 433; 33 S.E. 696; 89 N.W. 976; 56 S.W. 525; 64 Id. 620; 79 P. 14; 48 N.Y.S. 496; 54 S.E. 539; 54 N.W. 718; 20 So. 952; 44 N.W. 257. Trespass does not run with the land. Appellee had no title nor possession at the time the trespass was committed.

Jack Bernhardt and Sam'l Frauenthal, for appellee.

1. The appellee is not barred because (1) appellant is estopped by its promises, letters and conduct. 17 R. C. L. 884, § 243; 1 Wood on Lim. (4 ed.), p. 355, note 20; 65 Mo.App. 55; 1 A. 204; 63 L. R. A. 193, 198 note.

By letters appellant acknowledged its liability within the three years. 25 Cyc. 1337, 1342, 1353; 17 R. C. L. 896, § 255; 1 Wood on Lim. (4 ed.) 361, 362, 372; 77 Ark. 228; 22 Id. 291.

Appellee did not discover that the timber had been cut until December, 1912, within three years. 25 Cyc. 1211.

2. The chancery court had jurisdiction. Appellee succeeded to all the rights of the Desha Land & Timber Co., and appellee was its successor. 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. (3 ed.) § 1275; 1 Id. § 368; 29 Cyc. 1625; 176 F. 772; 127 S.W. 1152; 85 Ark. 208; 53 N.Y. 185.

Appellee was the only real party in interest. Kirby's Dig., § 5999; 93 Ark. 215; 99 Id. 386.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, C. J.

Appellee instituted this action against appellant in the chancery court of Desha County to recover the value of timber alleged to have been cut by appellant on a certain tract of land in that county.

It is alleged in the complaint that the trespass was committed in July, 1911, but that appellee did not become aware of it until March 22, 1913, and that thereupon appellee entered into correspondence with appellant looking to a settlement of the claim, and that appellant by its written statements concerning the settlement led the agents of appellee to believe that the claim would be paid without any necessity for a suit, and thereby induced appellee to refrain from commencing an action until the bar of the statute of limitations had attached.

The jurisdiction of the court of equity was invoked on the ground that there was no adequate remedy at law to escape the statute bar. There was a demurrer to the complaint, which the court overruled, and appellant also filed a motion to transfer the cause to the circuit court, which motion was overruled. Appellant filed an answer denying that appellee was the owner of the tract of land on which the timber stood, and denying that appellant cut the timber, or authorized its agents to do so. The answer also contained a plea of the statute of limitations. The cause was heard upon the depositions of the witnesses, and the court found in favor of appellee for recovery of the sum of $ 1,833, and rendered a decision accordingly.

The facts of the case, according to the testimony adduced, are as follows:

The tract of land on which the timber is said to have been cut by appellant was originally the property of Desha Land & Timber Company, a foreign corporation, and in February, 1911, negotiations were commenced between that corporation and appellee for the sale of that tract and other tracts of land in the same locality. The negotiations between the two corporations resulted in an agreement for the sale of all the lands of the Desha Land & Timber Company in that locality to appellee prior to July of that year, but the deed was not executed until September 8, 1911, when the Desha Land & Timber Company executed a deed of conveyance to appellee conveying this tract and all other tracts in that locality owned by the first named corporation. Shortly thereafter Desha Land & Timber Company surrendered its charter in the State of its domicile and ceased to do business. During the negotiations the quantity, quality and value of timber on the land was carefully estimated by employes of appellee in order to appraise the market value of the land, which was chiefly valuable on account of the timber, and the estimates thus made formed the basis of the purchase price agreed on by appellee with Desha Land & Timber Company. When the sale was consummated by the execution of the deed neither of the parties was aware of the fact that large quantities of the timber had, in the meantime, been removed by trespassers. The timber was cut by appellant's employees in the latter part of June and the early part of July, 1911. The proof adduced by appellee shows that the timber taken from the land amounted to 533,250 feet, and was of a market value of $ 6 per thousand feet, making a total valuation of $ 3,199.50, the amount claimed by appellee in this action. The proof adduced by appellant tended to show that only about 200,000 feet of timber was cut and that it was of very poor quality, not worth more than $ 2.50 per thousand. It is not contended that the preponderance of the evidence is against the finding of the chancellor as to the amount of recovery.

It is insisted, however, that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover for the trespass for the reason that it was not the owner of the lands and timber at the time the trespass was committed; that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations before the commencement of the action, and also that the action was improperly brought in the chancery court, and that the court erred in refusing to transfer the cause to the law court for trial.

The evidence is sufficient to justify the finding that appellant, in its negotiations with appellee looking to a settlement of the claim, wrongfully induced the agents of appellee to believe that an amicable adjustment of the claim would be made without suit, and that appellee was thereby induced to refrain from instituting an action in time to prevent the statute bar from attaching. It is a well-recognized principle in the law that a debtor may be estopped by his own conduct from setting up as a defense the statute of limitations, and this rule has often been applied where the debtor has misled the creditor and induced him to refrain from bringing an action within the statutory period. The rule is correctly stated in 17 R. C. L., p. 884, as follows:

"A debtor has frequently been held to be estopped from relying on the statute as a defense where, by acts of a fraudulent character, he has misled the creditor and induced him to refrain from bringing suit within the statutory period. And if a defendant intentionally or negligently misleads a plaintiff by his misrepresentations, and causes him to delay suing until the statutory bar has fallen, the defendant will be estopped from pleading the statute of limitations. And the prevailing view seems to be that the doctrine of estoppel applies where the creditor, before the debt is barred, is lulled into security by the oral promises of the debtor that he will not avail himself of the statute of limitations, and suit is delayed by reason thereof. It is not necessary that the debtor should intend to mislead, but, if his declarations are such as are calculated to mislead the creditor, who acts upon them in good faith, an estoppel will be created."

Many cases are cited in support of the above text.

The undisputed testimony establishes the fact that though the sale by the Desha Land & Timber Company to appellee was not consummated until after the trespass was committed by appellant and the timber removed, the effect of the sale as consummated was to transfer to appellee all of the rights of the other corporations here in Arkansas connected with the land as it stood at the time the negotiations were begun, and that such was the intention of the parties to the sale and conveyance. In other words, the evidence shows that the Desha Land & Timber Company, in anticipation of the surrender of its charter rights, sold out and transferred to appellee all of its rights here concerning the lands owned by that company, and that appellee became the...