Proctor v. Payne
| Decision Date | 16 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-19-791,CV-19-791 |
| Parties | Terrance PROCTOR, Appellant v. Dexter PAYNE, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction, Appellee |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Lassiter & Cassinelli, by: Michael Kiel Kaiser, for appellant.
Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
Appellant Terrance Proctor appeals the Lincoln County Circuit Court’s order denying and dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-101. On appeal, Proctor argues that the circuit court erred in denying his petition on the basis that Proctor had previously raised the same arguments in a prior habeas petition. We affirm.
In 1982, Proctor committed a string of robberies when he was seventeen years old. Proctor pleaded guilty to ten counts of aggravated robbery and one count of robbery in the Pulaski County Circuit Court. In 1983, Proctor was sentenced to life imprisonment for one of the aggravated-robbery counts. As to the remaining counts, Proctor was sentenced to 200 years’ imprisonment with the sentences to be served consecutively to his life sentence.
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment "forbids a State from imposing a life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender." Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Subsequently, Proctor filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County Circuit Court and argued that pursuant to Graham , his sentence of life imprisonment for the nonhomicide offense of aggravated robbery was illegal. The circuit court granted Proctor’s habeas petition. Relying on Hobbs v. Turner , 2014 Ark. 19, 431 S.W.3d 283, the circuit court found that the remedy for a Graham violation is to reduce the petitioner’s life sentence to the maximum term-of-years sentence for the crime when it was committed. The circuit court reduced Proctor’s life sentence to a sentence of forty years and ordered his sentences to run consecutively. Accordingly, Proctor was sentenced to a 240-year cumulative sentence, which we affirmed in Proctor v. Hobbs , 2015 Ark. 42, 2015 WL 603211 ( Proctor I ).
In 2017, Proctor filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County Circuit Court and argued that his 240-year cumulative sentence is a de facto life sentence in violation of Graham . Additionally, Proctor argued that his sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crimes under an individualized Eighth Amendment analysis. The circuit court denied his petition, and we affirmed in Proctor v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 382, 562 S.W.3d 837 ( Proctor II ). In rejecting his de facto life-sentence argument, we held that Graham does not apply:
Graham itself cautions that "[t]he instant case concerns only those juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole solely for a nonhomicide offense." By its very terms, Graham applies only to sentences of life without parole. Further, Graham ’s use of the singular "solely for a nonhomicide offense" underscores the fact that Graham was sentenced to life in prison for a single offense. Proctor was sentenced on eleven separate crimes. Moreover, we considered Graham ’s application in our unanimous opinion, Turner , [2014 Ark. 19, 431 S.W.3d 283 ]. In Turner , a juvenile offender was sentenced to life imprisonment, and parole was not a possibility. After Graham , Turner was granted habeas relief, and the circuit court sentenced Turner to the maximum term of years available under the applicable statute. Turner appealed and argued that the circuit court erred in mechanically applying the maximum term of years instead of considering his youth at a resentencing hearing. In affirming the circuit court, we said that "[o]nce the circuit court imposed a nonlife sentence on Turner, its obligations under Graham were fulfilled." Turner , 2014 Ark. 19, at 11, 431 S.W.3d at 289. Here, Proctor has multiple sentences, but no individual sentence is a life sentence. Thus, Graham does not apply.
Id. at 7–8, 562 S.W.3d at 841–42.
In Proctor II , we acknowledged Proctor’s argument that his cumulative sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crimes he committed, but we declined to address this argument. We explained that the circuit court identified and ruled on only one of Proctor’s claims—"that a sentence of 240 years is a de facto life sentence which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment entitling him to relief under the principles established in Graham ." Id. at 9, 562 S.W.3d at 842. Thus, we held that Proctor’s failure to obtain a ruling on his gross-disproportionality argument precluded our review.
On August 6, 2019, Proctor filed a third petition for writ of habeas corpus, which is the subject of this appeal. Proctor argued that he is detained without lawful authority and that his 240-year cumulative sentence for nonhomicide offenses is disproportionate. Specifically, he argued that (1) his 240-year cumulative sentence foreclosed the possibility of release, (2) his 240-year cumulative sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime, and (3) the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act ("FSMA") 2017 Ark. Acts 539 must be applied retroactively.
On September 10, 2019, the circuit court entered its order denying and dismissing Proctor’s petition. The circuit court found that Proctor repeated the same arguments that were rejected in a prior petition. Specifically, the circuit court found: Proctor timely appealed on October 1, 2019. On appeal, Proctor argues that (1) the circuit court erred in denying his habeas petition based on a previous challenge to the FSMA; (2) the FSMA is retroactive; and (3) his 240-year cumulative sentence is void as it is an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment in violation of the United States Constitution.
A circuit court’s decision on a petition for writ of habeas corpus will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous. Hobbs v. Gordon , 2014 Ark. 225, 434 S.W.3d 364. A decision is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
Under our statute, a petitioner for the writ who does not allege his or her actual innocence and proceed under Act 1780 of 2001 must plead either the facial invalidity of the judgment or the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court and make a showing by affidavit or other evidence of probable cause to believe that he or she is being illegally detained. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2016); Garrison v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 8, 534 S.W.3d 136. Jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy. Baker v. Norris , 369 Ark. 405, 255 S.W.3d 466 (2007). A circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and determine cases involving violations of criminal statutes. Love v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 206, 548 S.W.3d 145. The burden is on the petitioner to establish with factual support that he or she is entitled to issuance of the writ. Breeden v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 299, 557 S.W.3d 264 ().
Proctor argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that he had previously raised his FSMA retroactivity claim in Proctor II . In Proctor II , we specifically explained:
We note that Proctor referenced in his brief Act 539, the Fair Sentencing of Minors Act (FSMA), which provides for parole eligibility for persons who were minors at the time of committing an offense "that was committed before, on, or after March 20, 2017." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-621 (Supp. 2017). Therein, the Arkansas General Assembly determined that twenty years is an appropriate maximum length of time a juvenile must serve for a nonhomicide offense before becoming eligible for parole. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-93-621(a)(1). However, Proctor does not argue that the FSMA’s parole provisions should apply retroactively to him, and as a result, we are precluded from addressing such.
Proctor , 2018 Ark. 382, at 9 n.4, 562 S.W.3d at 842 n.4. For the foregoing reasons, we declined to address Proctor’s FSMA argument and did not rule on this issue. Therefore, we agree that the circuit court clearly erred in determining that Proctor’s FSMA arguments were previously considered by this court in Proctor II . However, we may affirm a circuit court’s denial of habeas relief if the right result was reached for a different reason. Darrough v. Kelley , 2017 Ark. 314, 530 S.W.3d 332.
We turn to the crux of Proctor’s FSMA argument that the circuit court clearly erred in denying his claim that the parole provisions of the FSMA are retroactive. However, his argument regarding the FSMA’s parole-eligibility provisions are not cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Habeas proceedings do not extend to issues of parole eligibility and are limited to the questions of whether the petitioner is in custody pursuant to a valid judgment of conviction or whether the convicting court had proper jurisdiction.1 Watkins v. Kelley , 2018 Ark. 215, 549 S.W.3d 908. Parole eligibility falls clearly within the domain of the executive branch and specifically the ADC, as fixed by statute. Id. A question regarding parole eligibility is not properly raised in a habeas proceeding because it does not challenge the circuit court’s jurisdiction or the facial invalidity of the judgment. Id. Because Proctor’s challenge is to his parole eligibility, he fails to establish that the...
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