Baldwin v. City of Atlanta

Decision Date17 May 1917
Docket Number453.
PartiesBALDWIN v. CITY OF ATLANTA ET AL.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

Although the general rule is that a court of equity will not enjoin prosecutions for criminal offenses, and this rule applies both to violations of the criminal laws of the state and to quasi criminal proceedings under municipal ordinances, yet there are cases in which equity will enjoin such prosecutions. Paulk v. Sycamore, 104 Ga. 24, 30 S.E 417, 41 L.R.A. 772, 69 Am.St.Rep. 128; Georgia Ry. & El Co. v. Oakland City, 129 Ga. 576, 59 S.E. 296; White v. Tifton, 129 Ga. 582, 59 S.E. 299; Rowland v Commissioners, 133 Ga. 190, 65 S.E. 404; Mayor etc., of Jonesboro v. Central Ry. Co., 134 Ga. 190, 67 S.E. 716; Mayor, etc., of Shellman v. Saxon, 134 Ga 29, 67 S.E. 438, 27 L.R.A. (N. S.) 452; Starnes v. Atlanta, 139 Ga. 531, 77 S.E. 381; In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 211, 8 S.Ct. 482, 31 L.Ed. 402.

Under the petition as amended, which alleges, in substance, that the prosecution of the plaintiff by the municipality, and the threatened continued prosecutions until she desisted from her efforts to pursue her employment as soliciting agent, has destroyed her right to take orders for goods, and that she has no remedy unless the defendants are restrained, this case falls within the exception to the general rule; and the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the petition as amended. Gould v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 679; 5 Pom. Eq. Jur. 635, § 554; City of Atlanta v. Gate City Gaslight Co., 71 Ga. 106(5); Southern Express Co. v. Ty Ty, 141 Ga. 421, 81 S.E. 114; Peginis v. Atlanta, 132 Ga. 302, 63 S.E. 857, 35 L.R.A. (N. S.) 716.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; J. T. Pendleton, Judge.

Suit for injunction by Miss M. V. Baldwin against the City of Atlanta and others. Demurrer to petition sustained, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

Miss M V. Baldwin filed her petition against the city of Atlanta, W. M. Mayo, chief of police, and Charles L. Woodwall, license inspector of Atlanta, and alleged substantially as follows: She is an employé of the Gus Mayer Company, of New Orleans, La., a corporation. She came to Atlanta with a line of samples of women's goods owned by her employers, and engaged rooms in a hotel in Atlanta for the purpose of taking orders from such persons as might desire to purchase goods from her employers at New Orleans by means of any of the samples. She did not own any of the samples or the goods to be ordered, and was not engaged in selling any goods or making delivery of any, but was merely taking orders by samples to be submitted to her employers, the goods thereafter to be shipped out by her employers directly to the purchasers in cases where the orders were approved. She was engaged in interstate commerce, and was not amenable to any license laws of the state of Georgia or of the city of Atlanta. She at no time delivered any goods to any purchasers, nor received any money from them for goods, and owned no interest in the goods ordered by sample. On March 4, 1916, the license inspector for the city of Atlanta made a case against her in the recorder's court, for a claimed violation of section 18 of the tax ordinance of the city, which provides that all persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise, other than registered merchants of the city in that particular line of goods offered, shall be required to take out a license and pay the sum of $300, and "this tax...

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