Baldwin v. Corcoran

• Decision Date: 20 July 1928
• Docket Number: No. 26693.,26693.
• Citation: 7 S.W.2d 967
• Parties: EMMETT BALDWIN, Doing Business under Firm Name of BALDWIN REALTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. WILLIAM H. CORCORAN. Executor of Estate of ANNIE L. BRADLEY.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

7 S.W.2d 967

EMMETT BALDWIN, Doing Business under Firm Name of BALDWIN REALTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. WILLIAM H. CORCORAN. Executor of Estate of ANNIE L. BRADLEY.

No. 26693.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division Two.

July 20, 1928.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis. — Hon. Victor H. Falkenhainer, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Henry H. Oberschelp for appellant.

(1) Annie L. Bradley executed the contract long before she was declared a person of unsound mind. Therefore plaintiff is not affected by that probate court adjudication. Rhoades v. Fuller, 139 Mo. 179. (2) Previous to a probate court adjudication of insanity a person is presumed to be sane. There was no need of plaintiff proving Annie L. Bradley was sane when she executed the contract. Chadwell v. Reed, 198 Mo. 359; Rhoades v. Fuller, 139 Mo. 186. (3) The burden was on defendants to prove that she was mentally incapable of executing the contract in question. Chadwell v. Reed, 198 Mo. 359; Rhoades v. Fuller, 139 Mo. 179; Cutler v. Zollinger, 117 Mo. 92. (4) The mental test was her capacity to understand the particular matter in hand and the effect of that transaction. Chadwell v. Reed, 198 Mo. 359; Rhoades v. Fuller, 139 Mo. 179; Cutler v. Zollinger, 117 Mo. 92; Brann v. Mo. State Life, 226 S.W. 50. Defendant failed to prove defendant Annie L. Bradley was at the time mentally incapable of executing the contract in question according to said test. (5) Even if Annie L. Bradley had been proven to be thus mentally incapable at the time of executing that contract, it was also necessary for defendant to prove the charge in defendant's answer, "that at said time plaintiff well knew that defendant was a person of unsound mind," to defeat plaintiff's rights. Rhoades v. Fuller, 139 Mo. 188. That charge was not proven. Plaintiff believed defendant Annie L. Bradley was of sound mind, and that she knew what she was doing. (6) This being an equity suit, this appellate court will examine the entire case anew for itself and render its own judgment. Chadwell v. Reed, 198 Mo. 359; Rhoades v. Fuller, 139 Mo. 179; McClure v. Bank, 263 Mo. 128. (7) Appellant is entitled to a judgment and decree in his favor enforcing the contract. Chadwell v. Reed, 198 Mo. 359; Rhoades v. Fuller, 139 Mo. 179; Cutler v. Zollinger, 117 Mo. 92.

Oliver J. Miller and Holland, Lashly & Donnell for respondents.

(1) The option contract attempted to be enforced is wholly incapable of enforcement by specific performance because of the uncertainty of the terms of the deferred payment. Lackawanna Coal Co. v. Long, 231 Mo. 605; Krum v. Chamberlain, 57 Neb. 220; Moon v. Gallupo, 65 N.J. Eq. 194; Barry v. Wortham, 96 Va. 87; Schmeling v. Kriesel. 45 Wis. 325; Henry v. Adkins, 194 S.W. (Mo.) 264; Heller v. Jentzich, 260 S.W. (Mo.) 979; 36 Cyc. 597. (2) The contract coming within the terms of the Statute of Frauds parol evidence is not admissible to piece out the incomplete writing. Kelley v. Thuey, 143 Mo. 436; Ringer v. Holtselaw, 112 Mo. 519; Reigard v. Coal Co., 217 Mo. 160. (3) The only evidence attempted to be introduced to explain or piece out the written instrument herein was given by the other party to the contract, who was incompetent at the time to testify because of the insanity of Annie L. Bradley. Sec. 5410, R.S. 1919; McClure v. Clement, 161 Mo. App. 23; Hunter v. Briggs, 254 Mo. 28; Allen Estate v. Boeke & Sons, 254 S.W. 864. (4) In specific performance there must be a strict correspondence between the alleged terms of the contract in the petition and the proof by which it is sought to be established. Variance will not be tolerated. Wendover v. Baker, 121 Mo. 290. (5) The court below found Annie L. Bradley to be a person of unsound mind and capacity. There was sufficient evidence upon which such a finding could be made. It is the rule in equity cases to defer to the decision of the lower court on issues of fact, since the court below faced the witnesses and was in a better position to judge the credit to be given them. Gibson v. Shull, 251 Mo. 480; Becker v. Fillingham, 209 Mo. 583. It is only when a result is manifestly wrong that this court will set aside the finding of fact of the trial court. Tinker v. Kier, 195 Mo. 203; Huffman v. Huffman, 217 Mo. 182; McKensie v. Donnell, 151 Mo. 461. (6) Where the contract is wholly executory, the reluctance of the courts to void a contract where one party is mentally incompetent because of the uncertainty of placing the parties in status quo has no application. Matthews v. Nash, 151 Iowa, 125; Achatz v. Bailey, 187 N.W. 641; Wirebach v. First Natl. Bank, 97 Pa. 543. (7) The option contract is wholly incapable of enforcement by specific performance, because of the uncertainty of the terms of the deferred payment. Terry v. Michalak, 3 S.W. (2d) 703.

Henry H. Oberschelp for appellant in reply.

(1) Respondent is in error in claiming the contract provided for a deferred payment with uncertainty as to maturity. As there was no time for payment expressed it was payable on demand and thus enforcible as a demand obligation. Collins v. Trotter, 81 Mo. 275. (2) Therefore, the contract can be specifically enforced. No parol evidence is needed, and it is unnecessary to determine whether or not plaintiff could testify with reference thereto. (3) In alleging in the petition that the money was payable in three years with semiannual interest the attorney drafting the petition must have been relying on the custom in such real estate transactions making that the usual time and believing the parties were bound by that custom. 17 C.J. 467, sec. 30; 23 C.J. 61. (4) The attorney's view of the subject does not change the contract or the parties' rights thereunder. There was only one contract, the execution of which is admitted by respondent, the same which respondent set forth and sought to annul in the answer and cross-bill. Under these circumstances there should be no claim of variation. Certainly no substantial rights were in anywise affected thereby. If the court deems advisable correction can readily be made to satisfy and criticism. Secs. 1276, 1277, R.S. 1919. The contract being binding and enforcible, appellant is entitled to its enforcement. Chadwell v. Reed, 198 Mo. 383; Rhoades v. Fuller, 139 Mo. 179; Cutler v. Zollinger, 117 Mo. 102.

HENWOOD, C.

This is a suit in equity, filed in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, for the specific performance of a written contract, dated August 19, 1922, covering an optional purchase of certain real estate. The suit was filed on July 19, 1923, and on September 25, 1923, Annie L. Bradley, the original defendant, was adjudged to be a person of unsound mind, and William H. Corcoran was appointed as the guardian of her person and estate, by the Probate Court of the City of St. Louis. In her answer and cross-bill, filed by her guardian, the defendant, among other defenses, pleads her mental incapacity at the time of the execution of the alleged contract, and prays that the same be canceled and for naught held. The reply admits the appointment of defendant's guardian and his authority to act as such, and denies all other affirmative allegations of the answer and cross-bill. The chancellor, after hearing evidence on the issues as framed by the pleadings, dismissed the plaintiff's petition and the defendant's cross-bill, and rendered judgment accordingly. In compliance with plaintiff's request, the chancellor filed his findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which he says, in substance, that he finds that the defendant was mentally unsound and incapable of making the contract in question, and that he, therefore, concludes that the plaintiff's petition is without merit. The case is here for review on plaintiff's appeal from the adverse judgment on his petition. The defendant requested no special findings of fact on her cross-bill, and took no appeal from the judgment rendered against her thereon. Since the granting of plaintiff's appeal, the death of Annie L. Bradley, the defendant, has been suggested and the cause revived, in this court, in the name of William II. Corcoran, executor of her estate, and the executor has entered his appearance herein.

The contract which plaintiff seeks to have specifically performed will be quoted in full, as follows:

"PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT A.

Selling Option.

                                                      "August 19, 1922
                

Received of Emmett Baldwin the sum of One Dollar in consideration of which I agree to sell to him real estate situated in the City of St. Louis, State of Missouri, described as follows:

Northwest corner of Kingshighway and Garfield Avenue, 133' 6 5/8" on Garfield Avenue by 156' 0 5/8" on Kingshighway Boulevard, at purchase price of Fifteen thousand ($15000) Dollars net. Terms of sale as follows:

Five thousand dollars ($5000) cash less the amount above receipted for, and the remainder as follows:

Ten thousand ($10,000) dollars first deed of trust with interest at six per cent.

I agree to convey the property to him, or his assigns by warranty deed, free from all liens and encumbrances, except taxes adjusted to date of sale.

Said Emmett Baldwin is allowed one year time in which to have the title investigated and to close purchase of the property on the above terms. In the event he fails to close said purchase within that time, this agreement shall be null and void without further notice from the undersigned, and without any further right whatever on his part to a return of the money herewith receipted for. Emmett Baldwin. MRS. A.L. BRADLEY." (Italics ours.)

While the only reference made in the contract to the deferred payment on the...