Rhoades v. Fuller
| Decision Date | 11 May 1897 |
| Parties | Rhoades et al.; Carter, Guardian, v. Fuller, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Mercer Circuit Court. -- Hon. P. C. Stepp, Judge.
Reversed.
Ira B Hyde and H. G. Orton for appellant.
(1) Inquest had in the probate court having been subsequent to the transaction in question, was not competent evidence of the insanity of Mr. Rhoades. Bank v. Moore, 78 Pa St. 407; Hovey v. Chose, 83 Am. Dec. 517; Jackson v. King, 15 Am. Dec. 357. (2) In order to invalidate a deed executed by an insane grantor, it must appear that the grantor was subject to insane delusions at the time of the execution of the deed, and that the insane delusion influenced him to do the act, or that he had lost the power of intelligently reasoning. The incapacity must be such as prevented him from understanding the nature of the transaction entered into. 11 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 147 cases cited; Jackson v. King, 15 Am. Dec. 361; Tolson v. Garner, 15 Mo. 498; Cutler v. Zollinger, 117 Mo. 101; Benoist v. Marvin, 58 Mo. 307; Hovey v. Chose, 52 Me. 304; 83 Am. Dec. 514; Wells v. Benefit Association, 126 Mo. 637. (3) There was no evidence that the defendant had any knowledge or knew any fact that would lead him to suppose Rhoades was not competent to transact business. Wells v. Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 126 Mo. 637. (4) There is not a word of evidence that defendant took any advantage in the trade. Even admitting that the farm was worth more than Fuller gave for it, to one who could redeem it and pay off the incumbrances, yet to Mr. Rhoades, who could not do so, the house and lot was worth more to him than the farm burdened with the incumbrances under which it was about to be sold. (5) Before a witness should be allowed to give his opinion as to the capacity of a party, it should appear that he had adequate opportunity of observing and judging of his capacity, and should give the facts on which he bases such opinion. Baldwin v. State, 12 Mo. 223; Moore v. Moore, 67 Mo. 192; Crowe v. Peters, 63 Mo. 434; Sharp v. Railroad, 114 Mo. 100; State v. Williamson, 106 Mo. 170; State v. Crisp, 126 Mo. 609. (6) The wife of plaintiff, who knew all the facts, and who must have seen the correspondence with the mortgagees and acquiesced in this trade, now seeks to rescind the trade which she could have prevented by speaking out at the time. So far as she is interested she is estopped. Rash v. Fenton, 29 Am. Rep. 413, and cases cited on page 416.
H. J. Alley and M. Read for respondents.
(1) The inquest in the probate court was competent, first, to prove that he was under guardianship; second, to prove that he was insane at the time of the inquiry. Besides the objection to the testimony was withdrawn by the defendant. (2) As to the opinion of non-expert witnesses, we submit that any person acquainted with the insane party, that from his acts and conduct knows his condition, may give their opinion as to his sanity or insanity. State v. Bryant, 93 Mo. 299; Crowe, Adm'r, v. Peters, 63 Mo. 429; Appleby v. Brock, 76 Mo. 314. (3) A court of equity will scrutinize closely and carefully all instruments executed or brought about by persons standing in the relation of parent and child, guardian and ward, physician and patient, attorney and client, and the various relations in which one party is so situated as to exercise control over the will, conduct and interest of another. Harvey et al. v. Sullens, 46 Mo. 147; Garvin, Adm'r, v. Williams et al., 44 Mo. 465. (4) In order to avoid the contract of an insane person, it is not necessary that he be a lunatic or an idiot, but only that he be so mentally weak as not to be able to comprehend or know the value of the property conveyed. 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence [2 Ed.], secs. 947, 948; Brinkman v. Rueggesick, 71 Mo. 553. (5) A person purchasing property of an insane person, innocently and in good faith, paying a due compensation therefor, will be protected, provided the insane party is not able to put him in the same condition as before the contract, but otherwise where the wronged party is able to and offers to rescind the trade and return the property. 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence [2 Ed.], secs. 946, 947, 948; 1 Devlin on Deeds, secs. 69, 75, 76; Bishop on Contracts [Enlarged Ed.], secs. 964, 973; 11 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, page 136, and note; 1 Parsons on Contracts [8 Ed.], page 386; Wells v. Mutual Benefit Association, 126 Mo. 630. In this case the proof shows that the plaintiff was dealing in the transaction with both Fuller and Hyde, and the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses show that plaintiff lost about $ 600 in the trade.
This is a suit in equity by Jesse B. Rhoades, who sues by his guardian, T. I. Carter, and Rebecca Rhoades, the wife of said Jesse, against defendant, to rescind the contract for the exchange of a farm in Mercer county, Missouri, conveyed by said Rhoades and wife to said defendant Fuller for a house and lot in Princeton, in said county, upon the ground of the insanity of said Rhoades at the time of the trade or exchange.
The petition alleges that Rhoades is an insane person and that before the commencement of this suit T. I. Carter had been duly appointed and qualified as his guardian.
That on November 1, 1893, plaintiff Rhoades was the owner of one hundred and twenty-five acres of land in Mercer county, which was incumbered by a mortgage of $ 1,000 to Deering & Company and the Omaha Loan and Trust Company. That the said Rhoades had long been an insane person, that the defendant and his attorney falsely represented to said Rhoades that his farm was about to be sold under the said mortgages, and by said representations induced Rhoades and his wife to exchange said lands subject to said mortgage for a house and lot in Princeton, which house and lot it is alleged was falsely represented by the defendant to be of the value of $ 750, when in fact it was not worth more than $ 150. That the said Rhoades was at the time of making the trade incompetent to transact business by reason of insanity.
It also alleged that the defendant with the intent to cheat and defraud plaintiff Rhoades and to get his land at less than its value, falsely and fraudulently stated and represented to him that said land would be sold within two days thereafter, under said mortgages, unless he arranged to pay them off.
The petition alleges that plaintiffs offered to reconvey the house and lot to defendant, to refund to him all moneys paid out by him on the mortgages, and prayed that the contract for the exchange of the properties, and the deed from Rhoades and wife to defendant for the farm, be canceled.
The answer denied the allegations in the petition, and alleged that at the time of the exchange of the farm for the house and lot there were three mortgages or deeds of trust on said farm, two of which, and the interest on the other, were then past due, and that said Rhoades stated to the defendant that the same were about to be foreclosed. That defendant on the twenty-fifth day of November, 1893, paid Deering & Company on their said mortgage the sum of $ 32.34, being the amount then due on the same, and on the thirteenth day of November, 1893, he paid on the Omaha Loan and Trust Company deed of trust, interest due thereon amounting to $ 30.40. That he also on the sixteenth day of November, 1893, paid the principal and interest of another mortgage, held by the Omaha Loan & Trust Company amounting to $ 81, and at the request of said Rhoades he paid a judgment against him amounting to $ 4.39.
Rhoades bought the land in question in 1890 for $ 1,400. He borrowed nearly all of the money to pay for it, giving a mortgage on the land to secure the borrowed money. At the time of the trade there was about $ 1,000 against it. There was one mortgage for about $ 80; and the interest on the mortgage to the Omaha company, and also the principal mortgage which became due on account of default having been made in the payment of interest when it became due, all due at the time of the trade. The holders of the mortgages were demanding payment, and the Omaha company had on November 1, 1893, notified Rhoades that unless the amount due upon its loan was paid within thirty days or earlier, the land would be advertised for sale as provided for in such circumstances under their mortgage. Rhoades then began to look around for a purchaser for his farm, and through E. C. Hyde arranged a meeting with defendant and finally made the trade with him.
Rhoades made a personal examination of the house and lot, and agreed to take them in exchange for the land, defendant assuming the payment of the incumbrances against it. The amount paid out by defendant, up to the time of the institution of this suit on the liens, was $ 191.91. This, however, included other liens upon the land, not known to exist at the time of the trade, amounting to the sum of $ 43, which defendant paid off, and plaintiff Rhoades executed to him a mortgage on the house and lot to secure the payment of that sum.
The evidence as to the values of the properties exchanged was conflicting. The value of the farm was variously estimated by the witnesses at from $ 1,200 to $ 2,000, and the house and lot at from $ 125 to $ 400.
Rhoades had for three years next preceding the trade lived in Mercer county, and during that time had managed his farm and transacted his business, and, while somewhat eccentric manifested no evidences of insanity, until about the time of, or shortly before, the trade. A few days thereafter, to wit, November 22, 1893, his wife and co-plaintiff, Rebecca Rhoades, filed an information with the judge of the probate court of said county,...
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