Balloli v. New Haven Police Dep't
Decision Date | 27 December 2016 |
Docket Number | SC 19584 |
Citation | 324 Conn. 14,151 A.3d 367 |
Parties | Peter BALLOLI v. NEW HAVEN POLICE DEPARTMENT et al. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Andrew J. Morrissey, with whom was David J. Morrissey, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Jason M. Dodge, with whom, on the brief, was Katherine E. Abel, for the appellees (defendants).
Rogers, C.J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Robinson and Vertefeuille, Js.*
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff, Peter Balloli, who was employed by the named defendant, the New Haven Police Department,1 had departed his "place of abode" when he was injured, thus entitling him to workers' compensation benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31–275 (1) (A) (i) of the Workers' Compensation Act (act).2 The plaintiff appeals3 from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Review Board (board), which affirmed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Third District (commissioner) dismissing the plaintiff's claim. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that he is entitled to workers' compensation benefits because he had departed his "place of abode" for duty as a police officer. We agree with the plaintiff.
The following facts, as found by the commissioner, and procedural history are relevant to the disposition of this appeal. The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a police officer on October 25, 2012. The plaintiff was scheduled to perform an extra duty job as a police officer for the defendant beginning at 7 a.m. on that date.
The plaintiff moved his vehicle out of his driveway at approximately 5:30 a.m. on that morning so that his son could move another vehicle out of the driveway.
After moving his vehicle, the plaintiff parked it in the street directly in front of his house. The vehicle was parked so that the passenger side of the vehicle was facing the house and the driver's side of the vehicle was facing the street. After parking his vehicle on the street, the plaintiff went back into his home and finished getting ready for work.
At approximately 6 a.m., the plaintiff walked through his breezeway, down the driveway and to the driver's side door of his vehicle, which was still parked on the street. While standing on the street at the driver's side door, the plaintiff dropped his keys. The keys ricocheted off his foot and landed underneath his vehicle. The plaintiff squatted down and twisted to pick up his keys, injuring his lumbar spine.
The commissioner dismissed the plaintiff's claim, concluding that The plaintiff appealed to the board, which affirmed the decision of the commissioner. This appeal followed.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Estate of Rock v. University of Connecticut , 323 Conn. 26, 30, 144 A.3d 420 (2016).
In the present case, the plaintiff does not challenge the factual findings of the commissioner, but instead asserts that the board improperly affirmed the commissioner's incorrect interpretation of the term "place of abode" in § 31–275 (1) (A) (i). Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim raises an issue of statutory construction. "When interpreting the statutory provisions at issue in the present case, we are mindful of the proposition that all workers' compensation legislation, because of its remedial nature, should be broadly construed in favor of disabled employees." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ciarlelli v. Hamden , 299 Conn. 265, 277, 8 A.3d 1093 (2010). (Footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vincent v. New Haven , 285 Conn. 778, 784–85, 941 A.2d 932 (2008).
Furthermore, (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sullins v. United Parcel Service, Inc. , 315 Conn. 543, 550–51, 108 A.3d 1110 (2015).
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) McMorris v. New Haven Police Dept. , 156 Conn.App. 822, 830, 115 A.3d 491, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 911, 115 A.3d 1106 (2015).
The plaintiff's claim, therefore, requires us to determine the meaning of "place of abode" as used in § 31–275 (1) (A) (i). Section 31–275 (1) (A) (i) provides as follows: "For a police officer or firefighter, ‘in the course of his employment’ encompasses such individual's departure from such individual's place of abode to duty, such individual's duty, and the return to such individual's place of abode after duty ...." Section 31–275 (1) (A) (i) does not define the term "place of abode" and this court has never had an opportunity to address the meaning of that term.
Both the plaintiff and the defendant rely on the Appellate Court's interpretation of § 31–275 (1) (A) (i) in Perun v. Danbury , 143 Conn.App. 313, 67 A.3d 1018 (2013), to support their positions in the present case. Specifically, the defendant asserts that the Appellate Court adopted a broad definition of the term " ‘place of abode’ " in Perun , and that the broad definition would include the area on the public street in front of the plaintiff's house in the present case. On the other hand, the plaintiff asserts that, unlike the plaintiff in Perun , he had crossed the demarcation line of his abode when he entered the public street in front of his house.
In Perun , the plaintiff, a police officer, slipped and fell on a patch of ice in his driveway as he approached his vehicle to depart for work. Perun v. Danbury , supra, 143 Conn.App. at 314, 67 A.3d 1018. The commissioner granted the plaintiff's claim, finding that the injury occurred during his departure to work. The board reversed the commissioner's decision, relying on § 31–275 (1) (E) and (F). Id., at 315, 67 A.3d 1018. The board concluded that the plaintiff's injury did not arise out of and in the scope of his employment, and was not compensable under § 31–275 (1) (E) (i) because the injury occurred at the plaintiff's place of abode. Id. The Appellate Court affirmed the board's dismissal, reasoning that ...
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