Banuelos v. Waste Connections, Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | 1:12-CV- 1012 AWI SAB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | RICARDO BANUELOS, Plaintiff, v. WASTE CONNECTIONS, INC., Defendant. |
This was a civil rights case brought by Plaintiff Ricardo Banuelos ("Banuelos") against his former employer, Waste Connections, Inc. ("WCI"). Banuelos alleged discrimination, retaliation, and harassment claims under 29 U.S.C. § 671 (the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and California Government Code § 12940 (the California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA")). In January 2013, the Court granted WCI's motion for summary judgment. WCI later moved for an award of attorney's fees under state and federal statutes and the Court's inherent authority. That motion is now before the Court. For the reasons that follow, WCI's motion will be denied.
On December 28, 2012, WCI filed a motion for summary judgment. WCI argued that application of judicial estoppel entitled it to summary judgment on each of Banuelos's claims. See Banuelos v. Waste Connections, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13810, *5-*6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2013). Specifically, WCI argued that Banuelos had successfully completed bankruptcy and had been discharged from his debts. See id. Even though the causes of action alleged in this Complaint all accrued prior to the bankruptcy discharge, Banuelos never disclosed those causesof action to the Bankruptcy Court. See id. Banuelos filed neither an opposition nor a notice of non-opposition to WCI's motion. After examining the arguments and evidence, the Court found that judicial estoppel applied and granted WCI summary judgment. See id. at *8-*10.
WCI argues that attorney's fees are appropriate because Banuelos brought this action in complete disregard of his disclosure obligations in the bankruptcy proceeding. Banuelos testified about his bankruptcy during his deposition, and even claimed to still be in bankruptcy. Banuelos and his counsel knew, or should have known, that he was judicially estopped from pursuing any of his case because he did not disclose them to the Bankruptcy Court. Instead of dropping the case, Banuelos pursued the matter through summary judgment.
WCI also argues that the Complaint contained factual inaccuracies that required litigation. Contrary to the allegations in Paragraph 9, Banuelos admitted that he did not recall any "ageist" comments made to him by Patrick Fenton, and that Fenton did not make comments to him about race or national origin. In fact, improper comments were made to Banuelos by other Hispanic co-workers, and the comments were made before Fenton became the district manager. Banuelos admitted that he had not seen the Complaint before it was filed, and it is apparent that Banuelos's counsel did not conduct a reasonable investigation. Further, after Paragraph 9's deficiencies were highlighted during deposition, Banuelos continued to litigate, including propounding substantial discovery.
WCI also argues that Banuelos violated the scheduling order by failing to meet and confer about summary judgment. WCI's counsel made repeated unsuccessful attempts to meet and confer, and informed Banuelos's counsel that summary judgment would be based solely on judicial estoppel. However, Banuelos's counsel was essentially non-responsive. This conduct prolonged litigation and caused additional expense to be incurred.
Finally, WCI argues that Banuelos violated Local Rule 230 by failing to file an opposition or statement of non-opposition. Such conduct shows bad faith because it reflects abandonmentof the case without filing a dismissal or notifying counsel.
WCI argues that the fees incurred through February 2013 total $82,568.00, and that costs total $4,342.50. These fees are based on an hourly rate for paralegal services of $180 per hour, an hourly rater for attorney services of $325 per hour through 2012, and a rate of $350 per hour as of 2013. Also, WCI requests an addition $3,610 for fees associated with filing their reply.
Banuelos argues that neither attorney's fees nor sanctions are appropriate in this case. This case was not frivolous when filed and was not prosecuted in bad faith. Banuelos argues that this case was dismissed on a technicality, and that he was able to make a prima facie case of age discrimination, national origin discrimination, retaliation, and harassment. First, he was 48 years old, he was replaced by a substantially younger individual, and the termination memo mentioned only staff reductions. It was only after litigation began that performance was identified as a criteria in determining staff reduction. There may have been a triable issue of fact as to the adequacy of Banuelos's job performance. Additionally, Banuelos was constantly referred to as being "too slow" by supervisors and co-workers, which was a euphemism to disguise bias. Second, Banuelos is a Mexican-American, he was terminated, and there was no indication that he was unqualified for the job. Again, WCI's additional reasons for termination indicate pre-text. Third, Banuelos complained of discriminatory conduct to manager Michelle Erwin, and he was then terminated 10 days later. The proximity in time indicates retaliation. Finally, Banuelos was called derogatory names such as 'guarachudo' and 'majado' to the point his working conditions were altered.
Banuelos also argues that the "meet and confer" process does not indicate bad faith. One of Banuelos's counsel was relocating his office, while the other was in the middle of criminal trial and could not meet with defense counsel. Further, counsel was unable to contact Banuelos and explain the basis for dismissal, and Banuelos lived 4 hours away from his counsel. Further, the "meet and confer" process was hindered in that there was relatively short period of time between December 17 (the date the first "meet and confer" e-mail was sent) and December 28 (the date the summary judgment motion was filed).
Banuelos also argues that many of WCI's arguments are disingenuous. WCI questioned Banuelos early in his first deposition on November 7, 2012 (page 32 of 171), including showing Banuelos a copy of the bankruptcy discharge. Banuelos did not have copy of these bankruptcy papers, and did not produce them during discovery. Because WCI presumably knew about the bankruptcy from at least November 7, and knew that a summary judgment motion would be filed, any actions by WCI after November 7 were unnecessary. WCI could have sent a "meet and confer" e-mail on November 7 to discuss the implications of judicial estoppel. After being served with the summary judgment papers, Banuelos did not litigate the matter further.
With respect to the failure to file an opposition, Banuelos argues that the lack of opposition does not show bad faith. If an opposition had been filed, it would have only increased the litigation expenses.
Finally, in the event that fees or sanctions are found to be appropriate, the award should be from December 17, 2012, and not from the initial filing.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a court in its discretion may award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); Miller v. Los Angeles Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 617, 619 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987). A court may award a prevailing defendant fees if the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless/without foundation at the time the complaint was filed, or if the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978); Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d 644, 647 (9th Cir. 2005). Subjective bad faith is not necessary. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. However, under the Christiansburg standard, "an unsuccessful plaintiff who acted in good faith is generally not at risk of having to pay the other side's attorney's fees." Akiak Native Cmty. v. United States EPA, 625 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010). An action is "frivolous" if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Jones v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 467 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1007 (S.D. Cal. 2006); Peters v. Winco Foods, Inc., 320 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1037 (E.D. Cal. 2004). A case is also frivolous whenthe result appears obvious or the arguments are wholly without merit. Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007). However, the Supreme Court has directed courts to "resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22; EEOC v. Bruno's Restaurant, 13 F.3d 285, 287 (9th Cir. 1992). Such hindsight reasoning can have a chilling effect upon potential plaintiffs and discourage all but those plaintiffs who have airtight cases from bringing lawsuits. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422; Bruno's, 13 F.3d at 287. Further, courts are also to be mindful of the potential that the expense of defending a frivolous claim may act as a disincentive for defendants to exercise their legal rights. See Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 423 n.20; Bruno's, 13 F.3d at 287-88.
FEHA § 12965 provides that a court, "in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees and costs . . . ." Cal. Gov. Code § 12965(b); Chavez v. City of Los Angeles, 47 Cal.4th 970, 984 (2010). A prevailing defendant in a FEHA case may obtain attorney's fees and costs under § 12965(b) if the Christiansburg criteria is met. See Chavez, 47 Cal.4th at 984-87; Williams v. Chino Valley Indep. Fire Dist., 218 Cal.App.4th 73, 81 (2013); Baker v. Mulholland Security & Patrol, Inc., 204 Cal.App.4th 776,...
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