Bar Ass'n of Baltimore City v. Siegel

• Decision Date: 14 July 1975
• Citation: 340 A.2d 710,275 Md. 521
• Parties: The BAR ASSOCIATION OF BALTIMORE CITY v. Maurice T. SIEGEL. Misc. (Subtitle BV) 12.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 521

275 Md. 521

340 A.2d 710

The BAR ASSOCIATION OF BALTIMORE CITY v. Maurice T. SIEGEL.

Misc. (Subtitle BV) 12.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 14, 1975.

Emanuel H. Horn, Baltimore, for respondent.

H. Russell Smouse, Baltimore, for petitioner.

Argued May 7, 1975 before MURPHY, C. J., and SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE and ELDRIDGE, JJ.

Reargued June 5, 1975 before MURPHY, C. J., SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE and ELDRIDGE, JJ., and CHARLES E. ORTH, Jr., Special Judge.

DIGGES, Judge.

In this disciplinary proceeding it becomes our unpleasant duty to disbar a long-standing member of the bar of this State, Maurice T. Siegel, the respondent, admitted on 12 November 1930 to the practice of law before this Court.

On 5 January 1971, the grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland returned a three-count felony indictment, each count charging, for the calendar years 1963, 1964 and 1965, respectively, Mr. Sigel with 'willfully and knowingly attempt(ing) to evade and defeat a large part of the income tax due and owing,' by filing with the Internal Revenue Service a false and fraudulent joint income tax return on behalf of himself and his wife, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. After communication with the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to prosecute the case, Mr. Siegel appeared in the district court on 14 April 1972, where he proffered a nolo contendere plea to the first count of that three-count indictment. Before acting on this offer Judge James R. Miller, Jr., fully interrogated the accused concerning, among other things, the voluntariness of his plea, his understanding of the charges, and his awareness of the consequences. It was only after the judge was completely satisfied with Mr. Siegel's answers to these inquiries, that he accepted the plea to this felony count, although he stated he seldom did this with such a charge. A few months later, on 1 September 1972, Judge Miller imposed a one-year prison sentence, but suspended the serving of all except thirty days of the period (subsequently reduced to twenty-two days), and the Assistant United States Attorney entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining two counts of the indictment. There is no contention that the entry of this plea is anything but a final judgment.

As a consequence of this judgment, entered after the acceptance of Mr. Siegel's nolo contendere plea, which judgment for disciplinary purposes is 'deemed to be a conviction,' Maryland Rule BV4 f 1, The Bar Association of Baltimore City, the petitioner in this proceeding, acting pursuant to Rule BV3 a, filed a 'Petition for Disciplinary Action' in this Court, which charged the respondent with 'professional misconduct, a crime involving moral turpitude, or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,' resulting from Siegel's 'Willful Evasion of Income Taxes.' So that the allegations could be heard and recommendations concerning their disposition be made, we transmitted this petition, as authorized by Rule BV3 b, to a three-judge panel of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, consisting of Chief Judge Dulany Foster and Judges Robert B. Watts and Robert L. Karwacki. On 22 November 1974, the respondent, by his answer to the charges, admitted the allegations contained in the petition, conceding among other things that he was convicted of criminal tax fraud by virtue of his nolo contendere plea, but urged, nonetheless, 'that he has not been guilty of professional misconduct, of a crime involving moral turpitude, nor conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.' Following a hearing the judicial panel found the charges to be sustained; nevertheless, by memorandum submitted to this Court, on 6 January 1975, it unanimously recommended: 'In light of . . . factors proffered in mitigation, we feel that the appropriate sanction in this case would be suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year.' The bar association and Mr. Siegel urge us to adopt the panel's sentiment.

After considering this recommendation from the panel and reviewing the record made at the hearing, both filed in accordance with Rule BV5 b, this Court, on 21 February 1975, ordered the respondent to 'show cause on or before the 31st day of March, 1975, why he should not be disbarred . . ..' Mr. Siegel timely responded and asserted that he 'should not be disbarred because of the most compelling extenuating circumstances existing in this unusual case.' The 'circumstances' relied on by the respondent, in our view, fall into one of two categories: (i) events surrounding the institution of the criminal charges and the entry of the nolo contendere plea, and (ii) Mr. Siegel's reputation as a member of the bar of this State.

Before probing the respondent's reasons as to why he should not be disbarred, we reiterate what has been well established by the previous decisions of this Court: 'willful tax evasion, proscribed by § 7201, is in that class of felonious crimes which involve moral turpitude and are infested with fraud, deceit, and dishonesty,' Maryland St. Bar Ass'n v. Callanan, 271 Md. 554, 556, 318 A.2d 809, 810 (1974); therefore, once a final judgment of conviction has been entered establishing that a member of the bar of this Court is guilty of this offense, that attorney will be disbarred unless he can 'demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a compelling reason to the contrary.' Maryland St. Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 551, 318 A.2d 811, 815 (1974); see Maryland St. Bar Ass'n v. Callanan, supra; Rheb v. Bar Ass'n of Baltimore, 186 Md. 200, 46 A.2d 289 (1946). The rationale for this conclusion has been previously and thoroughly discussed by this Court in the three cases cited above, making it unnecessary for us to re-examine it in this proceeding-especially since the present respondent raises no challenge concerning it. Therefore, the task here is to determine whether Mr. Siegel has offered a 'compelling exculpatory explanation' which would justify the imposition of less than the extreme sanction, Maryland St. Bar Ass'n v. Agnew, supra, 271 Md. at 550, 318 A.2d 811.

(i)

In an attempt to convince this Court that he should not be disbarred because of 'compelling extenuating circumstances,' citing Maryland St. Bar Ass'n. v. Agnew, supra at 553, 318 A.2d 811, Mr. Siegel requests that we scrutinize the various 'unusual' occurrences which led up to and influenced his plea of nolo contendere. He delineates these in his answer to the show cause order by quoting the following factors mentioned by the hearing panel in its memorandum and recommendation: 'his prosecution on the indictment filed against him . . . was recommended against by two United States Attorneys'; 'prosecution was overzealously pursued'; 'his plea of nolo contendere was necessitated by considerations for his inability (, due to to health reasons,) to undergo an extended trial.'

The first circumstance which the respondent proffers is the fact that two highly respected United States Attorneys, Stephen H. Sachs and George Beall, recommended to the appropriate authorities in the United States Department of Justice that the prosecution of Mr. Siegel under the three-count indictment be abandoned. By spotlighting the inclinations of these two reputable former federal prosecutors the respondent appears to be intimating that the case against him was so weak that it would have resulted in his acquittal had he maintained his protestation of innocence and stood trial. Even if the prosecution had a weak case, that is not a 'compelling extenuating circumstance' diminishing the degree of culpability inherent in his guilt. Moreover, on several occasions-before Judge Miller, before the three-judge panel, and before this Court-either the respondent or his counsel consistently agreed that the evidence available to the prosecutor for presentation at trial was at least sufficient to create a jury question. As Judge Miller said before he accepted the nolo contendere plea:

'The court is satisfied that the plea of nolo contendere to count one is entered by the defendant, Maurice T. Siegel, freely and voluntarily with full knowledge of the possible consequences thereof; . . . and that there is a basis for the charge that would, in the evidence that would be presented, at least, at the very least, present a jury question; and, that there is a reasonable possibility that a finding of guilt could be made by the jury in the event that count one went to trial on the plea of not guilty.'

In addition, if by focusing on the fact that two United States Attorneys for the District of Maryland recommended that the criminal charges against him be dropped, the respondent is urging that we consider their judgment rather than the assessment of their superiors in the Justice Department, he is asking us to ignore the chain of command within the federal prosecutorial system-something, absent a significant reason, we are reluctant to do.

The respondent next insists that the impetus behind the bringing of the charges against him in the tax fraud case was generated by the animosities of certain federal law enforcement officials who attempted, but failed, to have him convicted in another criminal matter relating to the operation of an illegal lottery, see State v. Siegel, 266 Md. 256, 292 A.2d 86 (1972). Beside the fact that this allegation is unsubstantiated by the respondent, we answer this suggestion by pointing out that impugning the motives of those who press charges does not erase the crime's occurrence or diminish the criminality of one's participation in it, if in fact it was perpetrated by the accused. In any event, the way to counteract the type of overreaching by government agents alleged here is to destroy their credibility at trial, before judge or jury, not by confessing to having committed the criminal act and complaining afterward that those who instigated the bringing of the charges were inspired by impure...