Barnes v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div.

• Decision Date: 16 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-1243,85-1243
• Citation: 385 N.W.2d 260
• Parties: Richard Allen BARNES, Appellee, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 260

385 N.W.2d 260

Richard Allen BARNES, Appellee, v. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Appellant.

No. 85-1243.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 16, 1986.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Lester A. Paff, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Dan Perkins and Mark Hunacek, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant.

Matthew J. Devlin and Arthur F. Gilloon of Norman & Gilloon, Dubuque, for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and UHLENHOPP, McGIVERIN, CARTER, and LAVORATO, JJ.

CARTER, Justice.

The Iowa Department of Transportation (the Department) appeals from an order of the district court refusing to limit eligibility for a temporary restricted license under Iowa Code section 321B.13 (1985) (refusal to take chemical test) to persons who have entered pleas of guilty to an underlying OWI offense. We conclude that the statute does so limit eligibility for temporary restricted licenses where revocation is based on refusal to submit to chemical testing. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court.

The driver's license of Richard Allen Barnes was revoked by the Department on September 8, 1984, on the ground that he had refused to submit to a chemical test which was requested in accordance with the provisions of Iowa Code section 321B.4 (1985). Barnes was arrested for OWI on September 8, 1984. He does not dispute that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to request that he submit to a chemical test. Moreover, he concedes that his license was properly revoked as a result of his refusal to submit to such a test. He urges, however, that, based upon his showing that his occupation required him to drive a motor vehicle, he should have been granted a temporary restricted license during the period of revocation.

Pursuant to a plea bargain, the OWI charge against Barnes for the September 8, 1984 incident was subsequently dismissed. The plea bargain provided that, in exchange for such dismissal, Barnes would plead guilty to three simple misdemeanor charges. He did plead guilty to said charges which were public intoxication, failure to maintain control of his vehicle, and disorderly conduct. He was fined a total of $353 for these violations.

Barnes applied to the Department for a temporary restricted license. His application was denied based on the Department's interpretation of Iowa Code section 321B.13 (1985) which provides in part:

If a person refuses to submit to the chemical testing, a test shall not be given, but the department, upon the receipt of a sworn report of the peace officer that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been operating a motor vehicle in violation of section 321.281, that specified conditions existed for chemical testing pursuant to section 321B.4, and that the person had refused to submit to the chemical testing, shall revoke the person's license or permit to drive and any nonresident operating privilege for a period of two hundred forty days....

....

The department may, on application, issue a temporary restricted license to a person whose license has been revoked under this section and who has entered a plea of guilty to a charge under section 321.281 when the person's regular employment includes the operation of a motor vehicle or who cannot perform the person's regular occupation without the use of a motor vehicle, or when the person's use of a motor vehicle is necessary to attend evaluation, treatment or educational services for alcohol or drug dependency, or to attend court ordered community service, but the person shall not operate a vehicle for pleasure while holding a restricted license.

The Department determined that, where revocation is based on refusal to submit to a chemical test, section 321B.13 limits eligibility for a temporary restricted license to persons who have entered a plea of guilty to a charge under section 321.281 (1985).

Barnes filed a petition for judicial review challenging the final agency determination on this issue. He asserts that the agency action denying his eligibility for a temporary restricted license was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. In the alternative, he asserts that, in the event section 321B.13 is interpreted as the Department suggests, the limiting provisions contained in the statute deny him due process of law and equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.

In ruling on Barnes' petition for judicial review, the district court determined that the Department's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious to the extent that it denied him a temporary restricted license solely because he had not entered a plea of guilty to a violation of section 321.281. It ordered that the agency's order be set aside and remanded the matter to the agency for a reconsideration of Barnes' application based on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances including "circumstances leading to petitioner having failed to plead guilty to a violation of section 321.281." The district court did not reach the constitutional claims which Barnes has asserted.

I. Review of Judicial Review Decisions Which Remand Proceedings for Further Agency Action.

Although the district court's decision did not finally resolve the issue of Barnes' entitlement to a temporary restricted license and contemplated further proceedings before the agency in order to reach that determination, the Department is entitled, as of right, to appeal at this stage. Section 17A.20 (1985) provides:

An aggrieved or adversely affected party to the judicial review proceeding may obtain a review of any final judgment of the district court under this chapter by appeal.

In Continental Telephone Co. v. Colton, 348 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Iowa 1984), we held that a district court decision providing for remand to the agency for further proceedings is a final judgment for purposes of appeal under this statute. The agency has been aggrieved by the district court's decision reopening an issue which the agency had finally determined, and the denial of an effective right of appellate review at this stage could result in further prejudice.

II. Finding of Unreasonable, Arbitrary, and Capricious Action by the Agency.

The district court essentially resolved Barnes' petition for judicial review under the provisions of section 17A.19(8)(g) (1985) which provides that a court may grant appropriate relief from agency action when that action is "[u]nreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." In Churchill Truck Lines v. Transportation Regulation Board, 274 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Iowa 1979), we concluded that the terms "arbitrary" and "capricious," when applied to test the propriety of agency action, suggest action taken without regard to established rules or standards. These criteria are more fully developed in Frank v. Iowa Department of Transportation, --- N.W.2d ----, ---- (Iowa 1986).

In challenging the district court's determination that its actions were arbitrary or capricious, the Department asserts that agency determinations which are required by controlling statutory law cannot be determined to be arbitrary or capricious. Where licenses have been revoked for refusal to submit to chemical testing, the Department views section 321B.13 as limiting eligibility for a temporary restricted license to only those persons subsequently pleading guilty to an OWI offense based on the circumstances which prompted a peace officer to request the test.

We agree that the determination of whether the Department's action in the present case was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious turns on the interpretation of section 321B.13. The Department may only grant a temporary restricted license where allowed by statute. Janssen v. Sellers, 207 N.W.2d 746, 747 (Iowa 1973). If its denial of Barnes' application was mandatory under controlling statutory provisions, there was no room for arbitrary or capricious action. See Hensley v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 336 N.W.2d 448, 451 (Iowa 1983) ("we find no basis upon which to conclude that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously in acting upon those facts before it which indicated that disqualification was mandated by the appropriate statutes.").

Our reading of section 321B.13 convinces us that the Department's interpretation of the statute is correct. In the field of statutory interpretation, legislative intent is expressed by omission as well as by inclusion. The express mention of certain conditions of entitlement implies the exclusion of others. In re Estate of Wilson, 202 N.W.2d 41, 44 (Iowa 1972); North Iowa Steel Co. v. Staley, 253 Iowa 355, 357, 112 N.W.2d 364, 365 (1961). During license revocations for refusal of chemical testing, the legislature has tied the granting of temporary restricted licenses to specific circumstances. We find this linkage expresses an intention to deny such entitlement in the absence of such circumstances.

Our conclusion is buttressed, we believe, when the prior legislation and administrative regulations on this subject are considered. Prior to July 1, 1984, there was no statutory authorization for a temporary restricted license for persons whose licenses were revoked based on refusal of chemical testing. Regulations of the Department...