Barnes v. State
Decision Date | 29 August 1986 |
Docket Number | No. 13-85-428-CR,13-85-428-CR |
Citation | 716 S.W.2d 684 |
Parties | Roger BARNES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Robert Weathers, Corpus Christi, for appellant.
Grant Jones, Dist. Atty., Corpus Christi, for appellee.
Before NYE, C.J., and KENNEDY, and SEERDEN, JJ.
This is an appeal from a murder conviction, enhanced by proof of a prior felony conviction. Appellant, Roger Lee Barnes was found guilty by a jury of his peers and sentenced by them to ninety-nine years in the Texas Department of Corrections. Appellant Barnes urges four grounds of error on appeal.
His first ground of error complains that the prosecutor commented on his failure to testify at the guilt/innocence stage of trial. Appellant's second and third grounds of error contend that the trial court should have granted a directed verdict, because the evidence conclusively demonstrated that appellant could not have killed the murder victim. His fourth ground challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.
The general rules regarding prosecutorial comments on the failure of an accused to testify are well settled. Such comments offend both our state and federal constitutions. Jones v. State, 693 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); Escort v. State, 713 S.W.2d 733 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi, 1986, no pet.). Also, TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 38.08 (Vernon 1978) expressly prohibits a prosecutor from alluding to or commenting on an accused's exercise of the right not to testify. Owen v. State, 656 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Tex.Crim.App.1983); Bird v. State, 527 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). This prohibition is mandatory, and the adverse effect of a reference to the accused's failure to testify is not generally cured by an instruction to the jury to disregard it. Jones, 693 S.W.2d at 407; Overstreet v. State, 470 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex.Crim.App.1971).
The test employed is also well settled. The language used must be viewed from the standpoint of the jury, and the language must be manifestly intended as a comment on the failure to testify, or the implication must be so clear that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it as such a comment. It is not sufficient that the prosecutor's words might be construed as an implied or indirect allusion to the accused's silence. Bird, 527 S.W.2d at 894; Koller v. State, 518 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Ramos v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359, 367 (Tex.Crim.App.1967).
Appellant's ground of error is directed to the following portion of the prosecutor's final argument at the guilt/innocence portion of trial. The complained-of language is emphasized.
We find that the prosecutor's argument was not manifestly intended as a comment on the accused's failure to testify at trial, nor was the argument such that the jury necessarily took it as such. Although the language used might have been construed that way by the jury, it is more likely that the jury saw that portion of the prosecutor's argument as a reference to the accused's failure to speak to the police or the State's witnesses after the shooting incident but before his arrest. See Short v. State, 671 S.W.2d 888, 890-91 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); Yates v. State, 488 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). This is especially true because the prosecutor had already argued to the jury that both sides had prepared the jury panel for a case of self-defense since voir dire, but that the testimony of the victim's companion at the time of the shooting destroyed that defense. Furthermore, the prosecutor promptly explained his argument to the trial court and the jury.
We also note that the proper method of preserving error in cases of prosecutorial misconduct is to 1) object on specific grounds; 2) request an instruction that the jury disregard the comment; 3) move for a mistrial. Koller v. State, 518 S.W.2d 373, 375 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). Although the general rule is that a reference to the accused's failure to testify is not cured by a jury instruction, this rule is, in rare cases, subject to the harmless error rule. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-28, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Garrett v. State, 632 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Granton v. State, 415 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex.Crim.App.1967); Rushton v. State, 698 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1985, pet. filed). Appellant's counsel should have given the trial court the opportunity to cure any harm in the prosecutor's statements. See Bird v. State, 527 S.W.2d 891, 893-94 (Tex.Crim.App.1975).
The remainder of appellant's grounds of error challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court looks at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict or judgment and determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Houston v. State, 663 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). In the above case, the Court of Criminal Appeals specifically rejected the proposition, urged by appellant, that the correct standard of review in circumstantial evidence cases is to review the evidence in light of the presumption that the accused is innocent. See Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).
Appellant put on no witnesses, relying instead on cross-examination of the State's witnesses. The State presented the testimony of several police officers involved in the shooting, which occurred in the 1200 block of North Staples Street in Corpus Christi. Officer Revis testified that he and two other officers were dispatched to investigate the shooting about 3:45 on the morning of March 17, 1985. They found the victim, Willie Roy Hines, on Chipito Street, some seventy yards from the newsstand 1 where he had been shot. He was bleeding from his right side.
Officer Revis went to the scene of the shooting within half an hour and found that the newsstand was completely locked. He then went to the residence of the manager, Jeffery Griffin, woke him, and Mr. Griffin accompanied him to unlock the door of his business. Officer Revis and another officer investigated inside and outside the business, but found no trace of the shooting and no weapons. However, he questioned Mr. Griffin as to the identity of a suspect named Roger. Griffin stated that he had employed "Roger" for about three months, and that Roger had closed the business that morning. Officer Revis found a brown wallet containing a driver's license, identification card, and social security card belonging to the appellant, Roger Lee Barnes. A photograph of appellant was also obtained from the wall of the newsstand. Mr. Griffin confirmed that Roger Lee Barnes was the man who worked for him.
Officer Tryon, after corroborating much of Officer Revis' testimony, testified that he contacted at the scene a witness to the shooting. Officer Tryon testified that one Hezekiah Johnson told him that a person named Roger Barnes shot Mr. Hines in the back as the victim was leaving the...
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...S.W.2d 305, 313 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). It also violates Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.08 (Vernon 1979). Barnes v. State, 716 S.W.2d 684, 685 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1986, pet. ref'd). However, a prosecutor's closing argument which refers to the defendant's failure to testify is permissibl......
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