Barnett v. Behringer

• Decision Date: 27 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. M1999-01421-COA-R3-CV.,M1999-01421-COA-R3-CV.
• Parties: CYNTHIA MITCHELL BARNETT v. BARBARA NAN BEHRINGER, ET AL.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 1

CYNTHIA MITCHELL BARNETT v. BARBARA NAN BEHRINGER, ET AL.

No. M1999-01421-COA-R3-CV.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee at Nashville.

Filed May 27, 2003.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 98-1261-III, Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor.

Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed.

D. Kirk Shaffer and Christine J. Laird, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Cynthia Mitchell Barnett.

Beth A. Dunning, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Barbara Nan Behringer, Cheryl Williams, and Michael Williams.

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BEN H. CANTRELL, P.J., M.S., and WILLIAM B. CAIN, J., joined.

OPINION

I

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

This appeal involves a dispute between the owners of units in a duplex arising out of the plans of one owner's tenants to build a free-standing storage building on her lot. The owner who opposed the storage building filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking an injunction against violating restrictive covenants and zoning regulations, as well as damages for trespass. The trial court granted the defendant owner's and tenants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint. On this appeal, the owner who objected to the storage building asserts that material factual disputes should have prevented the trial court from granting the summary judgment and that her neighbor and her neighbor's tenants had not demonstrated that they were entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. We have determined, as a matter of law, that the proposed storage building does not violate the restrictive covenants or applicable zoning regulations and that the plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Cynthia M. Barnett and Barbara Behringer own adjoining units in a duplex in a residential subdivision called La-Belle Villa located in the Hillsboro Village community of Nashville. Neither Ms. Barnett nor Ms. Behringer lives in her unit. Ms. Behringer rents her unit to her daughter and son-in-law, Cheryl and Mike Williams. Mr. Williams is a self-employed carpenter. He and a partner operate Holland-Williams Residential Maintenance, a company specializing in building decks and fences and other small residential projects.

In early 1998, Mr. Williams decided to build a free-standing storage structure behind the duplex on Ms. Behringer's lot. He obtained a building permit and began construction in February 1998. When Ms. Barnett drove by the property on February 28, 1998, she discovered that Mr. Williams had bulldozed the building site, constructed a chain link fence and gravel drive on Ms. Behringer's side of the property, and poured a concrete foundation for the storage shed. The construction upset Ms. Barnett,¹ and within days, her lawyer wrote a letter to Ms. Behringer and Mr. Williams demanding that the construction stop because it violated La-Belle Villa's restrictive covenants.

Mr. Williams stopped construction and within a few days submitted plans to Ms. Barnett as she had requested. He also submitted the plans to Beginnings, Inc., La-Belle Villa's developer. Beginnings, Inc. approved the plans, but Ms. Barnett did not. In fact, after informing Mr. Williams that she did not approve the plans, Ms. Barnett filed suit against both Ms. Behringer and Mr. and Mrs. Williams in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking an injunction against "any activities on the . . . property in violation of the restrictive covenants, including, but not limited to operating a business on or out of the property." She also requested damages for injury to her property caused by Mr. Williams's trespass.

Ms. Behringer and the Williamses responded to Ms. Barnett's complaint by denying that the proposed structure violated any restrictive covenants or zoning restrictions and by asserting that the structure would "be built with the highest quality workmanship and materials, and [that] the exterior design . . . [would] be exactly the same as the existing structures on . . . the . . . property." They also counterclaimed for the money Ms. Barnett allegedly owed them for some driveway improvements and lawn work. Following some discovery, Ms. Behringer and the Williamses moved for a summary judgment with regard to Ms. Barnett's claims. Ms. Barnett opposed the motion. The trial court granted the summary judgment and dismissed Ms. Barnett's complaint. Ms. Barnett perfected this appeal. After Ms. Barnett appealed this case, Ms. Behringer and the Williamses voluntarily dismissed their counterclaims.

II.

The standards for reviewing summary judgments on appeal are well-settled. Summary judgments are proper in virtually any civil case that can be resolved on the basis of legal issues alone. Fruge v. Doe, 952 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1997); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993); Pendleton v. Mills, 73 S.W.3d 115, 121 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). They are not, however, appropriate when genuine disputes regarding material facts exist. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. Thus, a summary judgment should be granted only when the undisputed facts, and the inferences reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts, support one conclusion — that the party seeking the summary judgment is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614, 620 (Tenn. 2002); Webber v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 49 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tenn. 2001). The party seeking a summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Tenn. 2002); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tenn. 1998). To be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, the moving party must either affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party's claim or establish an affirmative defense that conclusively defeats the non-moving party's claim. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n. 5; Cherry v. Williams, 36 S.W.3d 78, 82-83 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000).

Once the moving party demonstrates that it has satisfied Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56's requirements, the non-moving party must demonstrate how these requirements have not been satisfied. Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997). Mere conclusory generalizations will not suffice. Cawood v. Davis, 680 S.W.2d 795, 796-97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). The non-moving party must convince the trial court that there are sufficient factual disputes to warrant a trial (1) by pointing to evidence either overlooked or ignored by the moving party that creates a factual dispute, (2) by rehabilitating evidence challenged by the moving party, (3) by producing additional evidence that creates a material factual dispute, or (4) by submitting an affidavit in accordance with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.07 requesting additional time for discovery. McCarley v. West Quality Food Serv., 960 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tenn. 1998); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 215 n. 6. A non-moving party who fails to carry its burden faces summary dismissal of the challenged claim because, as our courts have repeatedly observed, the "failure of proof concerning an essential element of the cause of action necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Alexander v. Memphis Individual Practice Ass'n, 870 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tenn. 1993).

Summary judgments enjoy no presumption of correctness on appeal. BellSouth Advertising & Publ'g Co. v. Johnson, 100 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tenn. 2003); Scott v. Ashland Healthcare Ctr., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Tenn. 2001). Accordingly, appellate courts must make a fresh determination that the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. Hunter v. Brown, 955 S.W.2d 49, 50-51 (Tenn. 1997). We must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and we must resolve all inferences in the non-moving party's favor. Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d at 695; Doe v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 46 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Tenn. 2001). When reviewing the evidence, we must determine first whether factual disputes exist. If a factual dispute exists, we must then determine whether the fact is material to the claim or defense upon which the summary judgment is predicated and whether the disputed fact creates a genuine issue for trial. Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d at 214; Rutherford v. Polar Tank Trailer, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

III.

We turn first to Ms. Barnett's assertion that the restrictive covenants governing La-Belle Villa do not permit the construction of a storage structure like the one Mr. Williams proposes to build. The fate of this claim depends on the proper construction of the restrictive covenants. This analysis is particularly amenable to being resolved by summary judgment because the construction of restrictive covenants, like any other written contract, is a question of law. New Covenant Baptist Church v. Sark, No. E2000-02930-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 313155, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2002), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 24, 2002); Maples Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. T & R Nashville Ltd. P'ship, 993 S.W.2d 36, 38-39 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

A.

We begin with the most basic of propositions. A property owner's right to own, use, and enjoy private property is fundamental. Nollan v. California Costal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145; Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 545-46, 92 S. Ct. 1113, 1118-19; McArthur v. East Tenn. Natural Gas Co., 813 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1991); State v. Gainer, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 39, 40. Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court, reflecting this country's respect for property rights later noted by Alexis de Tocqueville,² held that

every proprietor of land, where not restrained by covenant or custom, has the entire dominion of the soil and the space above and below to any extent he may choose to occupy it, and in this occupation he may use his land according to his own judgment,...