Barnhardt v. Morrison
Decision Date | 03 December 1919 |
Docket Number | 475. |
Parties | BARNHARDT v. MORRISON. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Cabarrus County; Harding, Judge.
Action by W. T. Barnhardt against E. W. Morrison. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. No error.
This is a proceeding for the partition of lands, in which the plaintiff contends that he is the owner of a one-third interest as the devisee of his wife, Margaret Barnhardt, and that the defendant is the owner of a two-thirds interest as a purchaser from the two sisters of Margaret, Minnie, and Lula.
Margaret Ellis, Sr., was originally the owner of the land. She died intestate, leaving her surviving her husband, D. R. Ellis who had a life estate in the land as tenant by the curtesy and three daughters, as her only heirs, Margaret, who married the plaintiff, Minnie, unmarried, and Lula, who married J. P Gibbs.
Mrs. Gibbs and Minnie Ellis bought the life estate of their father in 1895. Margaret died in 1898, leaving a will in which she devised her interest in the land to the plaintiff, but this will was not probated until February 12, 1917. She left no children.
Neither of the sisters nor the defendant knew of this will, and after the death of Margaret the sisters divided the land, and in 1908 sold the same, including the life estate, to the defendant, who has been in possession since that time.
D. R. Ellis, the life tenant, died April 11, 1917. The plaintiff lived in 10 or 12 miles of the land, but there is no evidence that he knew of the division of the lands or of the sale to the defendant. This proceeding was commenced September 14, 1917.
His honor held that the plaintiff was the owner of one-third of the land, and rendered judgment accordingly, and the defendant excepted and appealed, contending that he is the sole owner of the land.
L. T. Hartsell and J. L. Crowell, both of Concord, for appellant.
Maness & Armfield, of Monroe, and A. H. Price, of Salisbury, for appellee.
Under the statute in force when the testatrix of the plaintiff died (Rev. § 3139), and up to 1915, covering the period when the defendant bought the land in controversy, there was no limitation as to the time when a will could be probated and recorded (Steadman v. Steadman, 143 N.C. 345, 55 S.E. 784), the ordinary registration acts had no application to wills (Harris v. Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 631, 61 S.E. 604; Bell v. Couch, 132 N.C. 346, 43 S.E. 911), and when probated and recorded, without regard to time, the will became effective from the death of the testator, passing the title from that date, and "avoiding all dispositions or conveyances * * * by the heirs contrary to the provisions of the will," unless those claiming against the will were "protected by the statute of limitations or some recognized equitable principle" (Cooley v. Lee, 170 N.C. 22, 86 S.E. 720).
In this case there is no statute of limitations, which will perfect the title of the defendant by adverse possession, because he was the owner of the life estate of D. R. Ellis, who did not die until April 11, 1917, and the possession of the life tenant is not adverse to the remainderman (Norcum v. Savage, 140 N.C. 474, 53 S.E. 289), nor can the defendant invoke the equitable principles of an estoppel in pais, upon which he relies, upon the evidence in this record.
Boddie v. Bond, 154 N.C. 365, 70 S.E. 824.
Collier v. Miller et al., 137 N.Y. 339, 33 N.E. 374.
There is no evidence that the plaintiff knew of the partition of the lands among the surviving sisters, or of the purchase by the defendant, nor is there any evidence of any act or declaration of the plaintiff calculated to mislead the defendant. He was merely silent, and withheld the will from probate in the exercise of a legal right, which gave him unlimited time within which to probate and record the will, and he was not required to speak.
The defendant says, however, he is protected by the amendment to section 3139 of the Revisal, which became effective March 9, 1915 (chapter 219, Laws 1915), and is as follows:
"Provided, that the probate and registration of any last will and testament shall not affect the rights of innocent purchasers for value from the heirs at law of the testator when such purchase is made more than two years after the death of such testator, unless the said last will and testament has been fraudulently withheld from probate."
The contention of the defendant is that this amendment is retrospective in its operation, and as he bought from the heirs more than 2 years after the death of the testatrix, the amendatory statute had the effect of establishing his title against the plaintiff at the time of its enactment, or at most the plaintiff could only have a reasonable time to probate the will, and that a delay until February 12, 1917, when the will was probated, 23 months and 3 days after the adoption of the amendment, was unreasonable.
There is language in the proviso, such as "any last will," "is made," "has been," which give indication that it was intended to have a retroactive effect, but this construction ought not to be adopted, and thereby summarily destroy an existing right unless the language is clear and unmistakable.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 306, 28 S.Ct. 537, 52 L.Ed. 804.
Merwin v. Ballard, 66 N.C. 399, approved in Waddill v. Masten, 172 N.C. 585, 90 S.E. 694.
A great number of cases are cited and commented on in support of the same principles in the notes. 4 Ann. Cases, 166; Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1041.
Again, if we should adopt the view of the defendant that the Legislature intended the proviso to operate retrospectively, as he had bought from the heirs more than 2 years after the death of the testatrix, he was at once protected against the claim of the plaintiff, and we would run counter to the principle-- "That while a statute of limitations affects the remedy only, and takes away no vested rights, it is not competent for the Legislature to cut off the remedy entirely, as this would amount to a denial of justice." Tipton v. Smythe, 78 Ark. 392, 94 S.W. 678, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 714, 115 Am. St. Rep. 44, 8 Ann. Cas. 525, and note, in which decisions from 31 states and from the Supreme Court of the United States are cited in support of the text.
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