Barrett v. the State.

• Decision Date: 16 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. S11A0292.,S11A0292.
• Citation: 11 FCDR 1506,709 S.E.2d 816,289 Ga. 197
• Parties: BARRETTv.The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

289 Ga. 197

709 S.E.2d 816

11 FCDR 1506

BARRETT

v.The STATE.

No. S11A0292.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

May 16, 2011.

John Kent Edwards, Sr., Valene Thomas Bryant, Valdosta, for appellant.Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Tracy K. Chapman, Assistant District Attorney, J. David Miller, District Attorney, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.HINES, Justice.

On January 29, 2010, a Lowndes County grand jury returned an indictment charging Jonathan Keith Barrett with malice murder and concealing the death of another in connection with the July 21, 2009, killing of Brittany Wade, Barrett's girlfriend and the mother of his children. This Court granted Barrett an interlocutory appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Lowndes County, which denied his motion to suppress certain statements he made to law enforcement officers in order to consider whether the superior court erred in concluding that Barrett's waiver of his Miranda¹ rights was knowing and voluntary in light of the evidence of his mental disabilities. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the superior court's denial of suppression.

On July 22, 2009, the body of 17–year–old Brittany Wade was found partially buried in the back yard of the home of Marion Wells, who was Barrett's aunt, and with whom the 21–one–year–old Barrett lived. At the time of Wade's death, Wade and Barrett were involved in a romantic relationship and were the parents of two young sons.

Shortly after the discovery of Wade's body, a detective with the Valdosta City Police Department located Barrett at a development center; when the detective found Barrett, Barrett was filling out a job application. The detective asked Barrett if he would mind stepping outside and sitting in the front seat of the patrol car to talk, and Barrett agreed. Barrett was not placed under arrest. The detective told Barrett that Wade had been found dead in the back yard of Barrett's home, at which time Barrett “put his head down” and spontaneously stated, “It was an accident, it was an accident.” The detective read Barrett his Miranda rights, and Barrett acknowledged that he understood the rights read to him and that he wished to then talk to the detective. Barrett did not ask for an attorney, nor at any time did he indicate that he no longer wished to speak with the detective. Barrett agreed to go to the police station for further questioning. In an interview room at the police station, Barrett was again given his Miranda rights, and he executed a written waiver of those rights; Barrett wrote his initials on the indicated lines beside each right and his signature on the bottom of the document. During the resulting interview, which lasted approximately an hour, Barrett made further inculpatory statements.

After Barrett was taken to the police station, Wells contacted an attorney who had represented Barrett on a previous matter and asked the attorney to assist Barrett in the interrogation. The attorney went to the police station and asked to go into the interrogation room with Barrett. Barrett was unaware that Wells had hired an attorney. After consulting with an assistant district attorney, the police denied the attorney's request to be present at the interview because Barrett was 21 years old and had not requested an attorney.

A forensic psychologist evaluated Barrett and found him competent to stand trial. Following a hearing and review of Barrett's psychological evaluation, the superior court denied Barrett's motion to suppress.

1. Barrett contends that his statements should have been suppressed because his mental disabilities prevented him from voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waiving his Miranda rights.

Certainly, incriminating statements are admissible against the accused at trial only if they are voluntary, and the State has the burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. Canty v. State, 286 Ga. 608, 610, 690 S.E.2d 609 (2010). Inasmuch as the gravamen of Barrett's challenge to voluntariness is his claim of his inability to understand, and therefore to waive, his rights under Miranda, the examination must focus on evidence of Barrett's mental capacity. As the superior court noted in its detailed order, a defendant's alleged cognitive impairment is not dispositive on the question of voluntariness but is one factor for the trial court to consider in the context of the totality of the circumstances surrounding a statement and a waiver of Miranda rights. King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 260(3), 539 S.E.2d 783 (2000). The mere showing that a defendant who has confessed to a crime may have some mental disability is an insufficient basis upon which to exclude the defendant's statement. Griffin v. State, 285 Ga. 827, 828(2), 684 S.E.2d 621 (2009). Indeed, the fact that a defendant is of below average intelligence or even has moderate mental retardation does not, in and of itself, warrant the exclusion of the defendant's inculpatory statement; there must be additional and sufficient evidence that the defendant did not have the capacity to understand and knowingly waive his Miranda rights. Height v. State, 281 Ga. 727, 728(2), 642 S.E.2d 812 (2007). And, whether a defendant lacks the capacity to understand and waive such rights due to a mental deficiency or illiteracy is a question of fact for the trial court to determine. Billingsley v. State, 294 Ga.App. 661, 665(3), 669 S.E.2d 699 (2008).

The superior court found that Barrett's initial patrol car statement that the victim's death was an accident was made while Barrett was not in custody, and that Barrett's statement was not given in response to any questioning by the detective. A statement which is spontaneous and unsolicited as not made in response to any form of custodial interrogation is not bound by the strictures of Miranda and is admissible without the warnings having been given. Phillips v. State, 285 Ga. 213, 215(2), 675 S.E.2d 1 (2009). The issue of whether a statement was the result of an interrogation or was instead volunteered is a determination of fact for the trial court, and it will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. Velazquez v. State, 282 Ga. 871, 877(8), 655 S.E.2d 806 (2008). The superior court's finding that Barrett's initial statement was non-custodial and unsolicited is supported by the record; therefore, Barrett's capacity to understand the substance of his rights under Miranda in regard to this first statement is irrelevant.

As to Barrett's second statement, the superior court expressly found “from a preponderance of the evidence and under the totality of the circumstances” that Barrett was twice advised...