Barrington School Committee v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 17 July 1978
• Docket Number: No. 76-93-M,76-93-M
• Citation: 388 A.2d 1369,120 R.I. 470
• Parties: , 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3083 BARRINGTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE v. RHODE ISLAND STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 1369

388 A.2d 1369

120 R.I. 470, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3083

BARRINGTON SCHOOL COMMITTEE v. RHODE ISLAND STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al.

No. 76-93-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 17, 1978.

[120 R.I. 480] Natale L. Urso, Westerly, Vincent F. Kane, Providence, for petitioner.

Tillinghast, Collins & Graham, James A. Jackson, Providence, for respondents.

OPINION

DORIS, Justice.

This is a petition for certiorari brought under the Administrative Procedures Act, G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 42-35-16, to review a judgment of the Superior Court reversing a decision and order of the State Labor Relations Board (the board). The board had found the Barrington School Committee (the committee) guilty of an unfair labor practice in refusing to negotiate the abolition of certain positions in the Barrington school system with the Barrington Teachers Association (the union). On appeal, a Superior Court justice found as a matter of law that the reorganization was not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining and in a judgment subsequently entered reversed the order of the board. The union and the board petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari to review the action of the Superior Court justice. We granted the petition and directed the parties to brief the issue of whether or not the board was a proper party to the proceedings.

At the hearing before the board, it was stipulated:

1. that the committee was eliminating 11 departmental chairmanships in the Barrington junior and senior high schools as of September 1, 1974;

2. that the committee was also abolishing the position of athletic director; and

3. that the committee refused to negotiate these matters with the union.

At the hearing, the union rested its case on the stipulations without additional testimony but introduced as exhibits the collective bargaining agreements for the years 1969 through 1974 in order to establish that the positions being abolished had been the subject of collective bargaining and had been included in contracts of previous years.

The committee attempted to introduce testimony by the school superintendent explaining the reasons for the abolition of the 12 positions. Upon the board's refusal to admit this testimony, counsel for the committee made an offer of proof. ¹ The board found that the committee's refusal to negotiate its actions with the union was an unfair labor practice and ordered the committee to "sit down and negotiate" with the union. The committee thereupon filed a complaint in Superior Court requesting review of the board's order under § 42-35-15.

Before we consider the substantive issues, we must determine whether or not the question has become moot. The changes ordered by the committee in the school system were to affect the conduct between the board and the union for the 1974-75 school year. Since the committee did not obtain a stay of the board's order from the Superior Court pending the appeal, the committee should have negotiated the matter of the eliminated positions with the union for that year's contract. However, subsequent to the board's order, the committee apparently refused to discuss the matter of the eliminated positions. By the time the Superior Court heard the appeal in February 1976, the contract year had expired and clearly was long past when the case came on to be heard by this court.

We have held that under normal circumstances, a case involving a contract for an expired school year is moot. Town of North Kingstown v. Teachers' Ass'n, 110 R.I. 698, 297 A.2d 342 (1972); Town of Scituate v. Teachers' Ass'n, 110 R.I. 679, 296 A.2d 466 (1972). There are, however, two exceptions to this rule:

1. when the parties stipulate that the "identical legal questions" apply to the present agreement as well as to the earlier contract. Town of North Kingstown v. Teachers' Ass'n, supra, or

2. when the court finds that the question is of significant public interest or that similar occurrences may evade review in the future. Town of Scituate v. Teachers' Ass'n, supra.

Certainly, we could find that significant public interest would require a decision in this case, but we refused to do so for an equally important issue in Town of Scituate. Further, the parties have not agreed that the issue is still vital in relation to this year's contract. However, if this court were to dismiss the case on the ground of mootness, the committee would be unjustly rewarded for its failure or refusal to comply with the board's order. Also the union in this case and in similar cases could be greatly disadvantaged if the committee were allowed simply to ignore the board's order and delay action beyond the contract year. Under the peculiar circumstances of this case we will therefore consider the substantive issues involved.

In our order granting the petition for the writ of certiorari, we directed the parties to brief the question of whether or not the board was a proper party to the proceedings. Attention was called by the court to the case of Hassell v. Zoning Board of Review, 108 R.I. 349, 275 A.2d 646 (1971).

In Hassell this court found that a zoning board of review did not have standing to seek Supreme Court review of a Superior Court judgment by means of the prerogative writ of certiorari. Standing in zoning cases is accorded only to applicants who are aggrieved by the judgment to be reviewed either personally or "in an official capacity as a representative of the public." Hassell v. Zoning Board of Review, supra at 351, 275 A.2d at 648. Zoning boards cannot claim to be aggrieved personally nor to represent the public in such matters since the statutory scheme delimiting the powers of zoning boards expressly provides that judicial aid in the enforcement of ordinances is to be sought only by cities or towns, acting through their solicitors, and not by zoning boards themselves. G.L.1956 (1970 Reenactment) §§ 45-24-6 and 45-24-7. Id. at 352-53, 275 A.2d at 648-49.

By contrast, the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Act, P.L.1941, ch. 1066, § 17, which created and defines the State Labor Relations Board, expressly authorizes the board itself to seek judicial aid in the enforcement of its orders and to initiate such actions in the Superior Court. G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 28-7-26; P.L.1941, ch. 1066, § 8. The passage of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), P.L.1962, ch. 112, § 1, (made applicable to proceedings before the State Labor Relations Board by § 42-35-18) further provided that "any party in interest" may petition this court for a writ of certiorari when aggrieved by a final judgment in the Superior Court in an action brought under the APA. G.L.1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 42-35-16.

It seems clear that just as a town solicitor properly represents the interest of the public in seeking judicial aid in a zoning matter including bringing a petition for a writ of certiorari to this court, Mauran v. Zoning Board of Review, 104 R.I. 604, 247 A.2d 853 (1968) so the labor relations board may represent the public in seeking judicial aid in a labor dispute and should have similar authority to petition this court for the issuance of a writ of certiorari. That being the case, there would appear to be no reason to bar the board as a proper party to these proceedings.

Both the union and the committee subscribe to this argument and further direct our attention to federal cases permitting the National Labor Relations Board to initiate certiorari proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, and also cite the Rhode Island case of Buffi v. Ferri, 106 R.I. 349, 259 A.2d 847 (1969), in support of their mutual conclusion that the State Labor Relations Board is, in fact, a proper party to these proceedings.

We therefore hold that the board is a proper party to these proceedings.

The fundamental substantive issue in this case is the reconciliation of § 16-2-18 with § 28-9.3-2. In other words, the question to be decided is whether the abolition by the committee of the 12 positions previously held by the teachers is a matter of educational policy and thus not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining or whether it is a term or condition of employment and thus subject to negotiation. Section 16-2-18 vests the town school committee with the "entire care, control, and management" of the public school interests, including the selection of teachers. The more recently enacted School Teachers' Arbitration Act in § 28-9.3-2 gives public school teachers the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining concerning "hours, salary, working conditions and all other terms and conditions of professional employment."

Here, the committee decided that the reorganization of the junior high school and high school systems, which consisted of the inclusion of grade 9 in the high school and a new interdisciplinary system in the junior high school mandated the elimination of 11 departmental chairmanship positions and that of athletic director. Four positions of "planning and development coordinators" were proposed to replace or consolidate the eliminated jobs. The committee proceeded to implement the changes without consulting the union because, it contended, the reorganization was a matter of educational policy completely within the exclusive, non-delegable jurisdiction of the committee according to § 16-2-18 and Dawson v. Clark, 93 R.I. 457, 176 A.2d 732 (1962). However, the teachers who had formerly been department chairmen had received extra compensation and additional released time in those positions; therefore, the union insisted that the "terms and conditions" of employment had been affected and that the matter was a subject for mandatory bargaining.

The Superior Court justice relying on cas...