Barrows v. Farnum's Stage Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 January 1926
• Citation: 254 Mass. 240,150 N.E. 206
• Parties: BARROWS et al. v. FARNUM'S STAGE LINES, Inc.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

254 Mass. 240

150 N.E. 206

BARROWS et al.

v.FARNUM'S STAGE LINES, Inc.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Jan. 5, 1926.

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; H. T. Lummus, Judge.

Suit in equity by Walter A. Barrows and others against Farnum's Stage Lines, Inc., to restrain defendant from operating any motor vehicle on any public way for carriage of passengers for hire as a business between Boston and Worcester other than passengers en route via one of defendant's busses to or from a point outside the commonwealth. Suit reported on bill and demurrer, after entry of interlocutory decree overruling demurrer. Interlocutory decree affirmed.Joseph Wentworth, of Boston (L. S. Nicholson, of Boston, on the brief), for plaintiffs.

Van Thomason, of Boston, for defendant.

RUGG. C. J.

[1] This suit in equity has been reported for our consideration on the bill and demurrer, after the entry of an interlocutory decree overruling the demurrer. The allegations of the bill must be taken to be true for the purposes of this decision. The plaintiffs are ten citizens of the city of Newton affected by the violation of law set out in the bill. The defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the having a usual place of business within this commonwealth. It operates motor busses as a business for the carriage of passengers for hire over public ways through the city of Newton between Boston by way of Worcester, both in this commonwealth, and Providence in the state of Rhode Island, the route between Boston and Worcester lying wholly over public ways within this commonwealth. The defendant does a large business in transporting passengers regularly between Boston and Worcester and sells tickets therefor, such transportation being wholly within this commonwealth. The defendant's busses on the way from Boston to Providence make stops in Worcester to discharge passengers taken on at Boston, and busses on the way from Providence to Boston stop at Worcester to receive passengers for Boston. There are regular stopping places for the reception and discharge of passengers in Boston, Worcester and Providence. The defendant does this business between Boston and Worcester without having obtained a license therefor from the city council of the city of Newton and without having obtained the certificate from the department of public utilities and the permit from the division of highways of the department of public works, all in violation of G. L. c. 159, §§ 45 to 48b, both inclusive, as amended by St. 1925, c. 280.

[2][3][4] It is provided by St. 1925, c. 280, § 3, that the Supreme Judicial and the superior courts have jurisdiction in equity to restrain such violations of law as here are complained of upon the petition of ‘ten citizens of any city or town affected by such violation.’ It is plain that statutes requiring local licenses, certificates and permits for the transaction of the business within the state of transporting passengers for hire over the public ways are valid. The ground on which the validity of such statutes rests is that the Legislature has power, by virtue of public ownership of the easement of travel over highways, to exercise reasonable control over travel on them in the interest of the general welfare. They may also be justified under the general police power of the states. Commonwealth v. Slocum, 230 Mass. 180, 119 N. E. 687;Burgess v. Mayor and Aldermen of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 99, 126 N. E. 456;Opinion of Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 595, 596, 147 N. E. 681;Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 S. Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385. It is universally recognized that the expense imposed upon cities and towns for the maintenance of highways fit to accommodate the traffic of heavy motor vehicles like busses is very great. A municipality over whose public ways run motor busses whereby illegal business is conducted is ‘affected’ by such violation of law in the sense in which that word is used in said section 3.

[5][6][7] The state has power to confer jurisdiction upon its courts to consider suits at the instance of those who have very remote and even no personal interest in the subject-matter. It may invoke or permit the aid in law enforcement of one or of a group of private citizens, whose only purpose is the promotion of observance of law. There is no constitutional objection to this exercise of legislative power. A suit by one or more taxpayers to restrain an illegal appropriation of money by a municipality has been constantly held not within the general jurisdiction of a court of equity. A special statute was necessary to confer such jurisdiction. No serious question ever has been made of the power of the general court to confer authority to prosecute such a suit upon ten taxable inhabitants. Baldwin v. Wilbraham, 140 Mass. 459, 4 N. E. 829;Kelley v. Board of Health of Peabody, 248 Mass. 165, 143 N. E. 39. As an exercise of legislative power, jurisdiction to consider complaints against those who violate laws regulating motor traffic stands upon the same footing. A stated number of citizens or a single individual may be clothed by the Legislature with authority to invoke the aid of courts in the suppression of violations of law. Ashley v. Three Justices of the Superior Court, 228 Mass. 63, 74, 116 N. E. 961, 8 A. L. R. 1463;Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550, 22 N. E. 55,5 L. R. A. 193, 14 Am. St. Rep. 446;Chase v. Proprietors of Revere House, 232 Mass. 88, 94, 122 N. E. 162.

[8] The bill sets out ground for equitable relief as established by the statute. Prosecution for the commission of crime usually is left to the jurisdiction of common law courts. Equity will not ordinarily restrain the threatened commission of crime. The suppression of crime may be promoted under legislative authority by the preventive processes of a court of equity. It is not necessary when that is done that a petitioner have a private interest to subserve. He may be actuated exclusively by desire for the general welfare.

[9] The bill sets out a violation of the statute. The terms of St. 1925, c. 280, § 1, amending G. L. c. 159, § 45, to which reference is made in the bill, expressly and unequivocally forbid the operation of ‘any motor vehicle upon any public way, * * * for transporting passengers for hire as a business between fixed and regular termini, without first obtaining a license therefor’ from the city council of a city or the selectmen of a town in which such vehicle is so operated, with a proviso that such license shall not be required as to carriage or transportation exclusively interstate. Requirement with like proviso is found in St. 1925, c. 280, § 2, adding new sections to G. L. c. 159, §§ 48a and 48b, to the effect that a person operating a motor vehicle under a license granted under section 45 must also obtain from the department of public utilities ‘a certificate declaring that public convenience and necessity require such operation,’ which certificate must also be approved by the division of highways of the department of public works. It is too plain for discussion as matter of interpretation that the statute does not permit one engaged in interstate transportation by motor vehicle of passengers for hire, also to transport passengers for hire, the beginning and end of whose carriage is within the commonwealth. The exemption from the requirement for license and certificate is confined strictly and solely to those engaged in ‘such carriage as may be exclusively interstate.’ If an interstate carrier by motor vehicle desires at the same time to transport passengers for a journey wholly within the commonwealth, he cannot do so in conformity with the statute without first obtaining the specified licenses and certificate.

[10] The allegations of the bill show that, so far as concerns the transportation of those passengers for hire between Boston and Worcester alone, it is a business conducted ‘betweenfixed and regular termini.’ Boston and Worcester constitute the termini for such domestic business and for such local transportation. The defendant cannot by establishing routes for his motor vehicles extending beyond one or the other of those termini change the nature of that particular business as being between those termini. That is settled in principle by Commonwealth v. Theberge, 231 Mass. 386, 121 N. E. 30, and New York,New Haven & Hartford Railroad v. Deister, 252 Mass. --, 148 N. E. 590. This is the meaning of the statute as we interpret it. That seems to us to be the imperative requirement of its words.

[11][12][13] The statute as thus interpreted is not in our opinion violative of the interstate commerce clause of article 1, § 8, of the Constitution of the United States. For the determination of this point, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States afford the sole guide. Those engaged in interstate commerce cannot use the highways of this commonwealth except subject to such reasonable regulations in the interests of public safety as the statutes permit. Hendirck v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 S. Ct. 140, 59 L. Ed. 385;Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 37 S. Ct. 30, 61 L. Ed. 222;Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 S. Ct. 257, 68 L. Ed. 596. See Pawloski v. Hess, 250 Mass. 22, 144 N. E. 760, 35 A. L. R. 945. The statute here in question requires no license or certificate of those engaged exclusively in interstate commerce for the carriage of passengers for hire by motor vehicle. Such persons are expressly exempted from its provisions. But it requires those engaged in local business to conform to the statutory requirements as to that business. The statute as we have construed it has no direct relation to interstate commerce. It deals exclusively with domestic or local carriage of passengers for hire. This is not a case where the domestic transportation...