Barth v. Canyon County, 21892

• Decision Date: 23 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 21892,21892
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: , 3 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 723 Steven G. BARTH, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. CANYON COUNTY, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent. Boise, February 1996 Term

Page 576

918 P.2d 576

128 Idaho 707, 3 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 723

Steven G. BARTH, Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant, v. CANYON COUNTY, Defendant-Appellant-Cross Respondent.

No. 21892.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Boise, February 1996 Term.

May 23, 1996.

Moore, Baskin & Parker, Boise, for appellant. Michael W. Moore argued.

William B. Latta, Jr., Boise, for respondent.

JOHNSON, Justice.

This is a wage claim case which also involves issues of state constitutional law. We conclude:

1. A sheriff's deputy may not recover additional wages against the county based on quantum meruit for a position not authorized by the county commissioners.

2. Once the county commissioners have empowered a sheriff to appoint a deputy, the commissioners may not limit the sheriff's authority in appointing the deputy.

3. An award of treble damages to an employee because of the employer's failure to pay the amount of wages due is not a penalty.

4. A demand by an employee for payment of unpaid wages does not constitute a demand for the purposes of awarding attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 45-615 if the demand indicates that the employee will not accept the amount demanded, if it is tendered.

I. THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Steven G. Barth sued Canyon County (the county) under Idaho's wage claim law (the wage claim law) (I.C. §§ 45-601 to -617 (Supp.1995)) and based on quantum meruit seeking unpaid wages for services performed while he was employed by the county sheriff.

Barth applied for a law enforcement position with the sheriff in October 1992. The county commissioners (the commissioners) approved the hiring of Barth as a deputy sheriff on February 10, 1993. His starting salary was $18,756. This increased to $19,318 when he received a three percent cost of living raise on April 12, 1993.

Before Barth was hired, the commissioners created a personnel manual (the manual) that became effective on January 29, 1993. The manual established a comprehensive personnel system, including a classification plan, a compensation plan, an equal employment opportunity policy, employee selection procedures, vacancy procedures, hiring procedures, background inquiry procedures, post-selection procedures, probation procedures, job performance procedures, leave policies, an ethical conduct policy, and disciplinary procedures. The manual divided employees into two types--classified, to whom all of the rules applied, and nonclassified, to whom none of the rules except those concerning personal leave applied.

On January 26, 1993, the commissioners created the position of director of operations (the director), to be supervised by the sheriff, who was to prepare the director's job description. The commissioners stated that the director's duties included the administration, supervision, and management of the jail. As originally created, the director was a nonclassified employee.

The commissioners approved the sheriff's appointment of another individual as the first director (the first director) on February 1, 1993 at an annual salary of $29,863. The first director resigned on April 18, 1993 because of a dispute with the sheriff. In return for the first director's resignation, the sheriff agreed to pay the first director thirty days severance pay and allowed him approximately 450 hours of personal leave. The first director continued to receive the director's salary but did not actually work during the period of personal leave. Based on this arrangement, the effective date of the first director's resignation was September 15, 1993.

On April 20, 1993, the sheriff promoted Barth to the position of "acting lieutenant/jail commander." The sheriff directed Barth to assume the duties of the director because the first director was no longer actually working. The commissioners did not approve this promotion and did not increase Barth's salary.

On August 24, 1993, the commissioners amended the manual by changing the director position from nonclassified to classified, making the position subject to all the manual rules.

On September 30, 1993, the sheriff wrote to the commissioners informing them that Barth had functioned as director since May 1993. The sheriff requested that Barth be appointed, effective October 1, 1993, as the director.

On October 5, 1993, the sheriff appointed Barth as the director, thereby promoting Barth to the rank of captain. The next day, the sheriff submitted a salary rate request to the commissioners requesting approval of Barth's appointment with a corresponding pay increase to $30,170. The commissioners did not approve the salary request. Barth's appointment as the director did not meet the requirements of the manual or the standards approved by the commissioners, including the requirements for becoming a captain.

Barth sued the county seeking unpaid wages, treble damages, and attorney fees. The commissioners defended on the following grounds: (1) under article XVIII, section 6 of the Idaho Constitution, the sheriff had no authority to promote Barth or increase his salary; (2) only the commissioners could approve salary increases; and (3) Barth's appointment as the director did not comply with the manual.

The trial court granted summary judgment denying Barth any additional wages for the period prior to October 5, 1993, but granting Barth compensation as the director after that date. The trial court also denied Barth treble damages and attorney fees. The commissioners appealed. Barth cross-appealed.

II.

BARTH IS NOT ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL WAGES BASED ON QUANTUM MERUIT.

Barth asserts that he is entitled to additional wages for the period prior to October 5, 1993 based on quantum meruit. We disagree.

The Idaho Constitution states:

The sheriff, county assessor, county treasurer, and ex-officio tax collector, auditor and recorder and clerk of the district court shall be empowered by the county commissioners to appoint such deputies and clerical assistants as the business of their office may require, said deputies and clerical assistants to receive such compensation as may be fixed by the county commissioners.

Idaho Const. art. XVIII, § 6. This Court has ruled that this section grants the authority to decide if a county officer requires a deputy only to the commissioners. Clayton v. Barnes, 52 Idaho 418, 425, 16 P.2d 1056, 1059 (1932); Taylor v. Canyon County, 6 Idaho 466, 470, 56 P. 168, 169-70 (1899); Campbell v. Board of Comm'rs, 5 Idaho 53, 55, 46 P. 1022, 1022 (1896). In the present case, the commissioners had not created or approved the position "acting lieutenant/jail commander" to which the sheriff appointed Barth on April 20, 1993.

Quantum meruit is part of the doctrine of contracts implied in law. A contract implied in law "is not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and equity without reference to the intent or the agreement of Clayton v. Barnes, 52 Idaho 418, 16 P.2d 1056 (1932) eliminates quantum meruit as a basis for recovery by Barth. In Clayton, the county assessor sought to recover the attorney fees he incurred in an earlier suit against the Bonneville County commissioners. In the earlier suit, the county assessor asked for a writ of mandate commanding the commissioners to provide him with emergency employees even though it would exceed his budget. The court issued the writ and no appeal followed. The county assessor subsequently sued the commissioners for attorney fees incurred in connection with getting the writ. The trial court denied the attorney fees and the county assessor appealed. This Court denied the county assessor's claim because the commissioners had not approved the position of the attorney to represent the assessor and because the assessor was not authorized to appoint the attorney. The Court stated:

the parties." Continental Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974). To recover on a contract implied in law, the claimant must show that the services were rendered with the reasonable expectation that the person who benefited from them would pay for them. Nagele v. Miller, 73 Idaho 441, 444, 253 P.2d 233, 235 (1953). The recipient may not have requested the services, but if the recipient knowingly and voluntarily accepts the benefits under circumstances where it would be unjust if the recipient did not pay for them, the courts will impose an obligation to pay. Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 666, 619 P.2d 1116, 1119 (1980); Weber v. Eastern Idaho Packing Corp., 94 Idaho 694, 697, 496 P.2d 693, 696 (1972), overruled on other grounds by Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 45, 539 P.2d 590, 597 (1975); Shurrum v. Watts, 80 Idaho 44, 51, 324 P.2d 380, 384 (1958); Reddy v. Johnston, 77 Idaho 402, 406, 293 P.2d 945, 947 (1956); Nagele, 73 Idaho at 444, 253 P.2d at 235.

[O]ne who demands payment of a claim against a county must show some constitutional or statutory authority therefore, or that it arises from some contract, express or implied, which finds authority in law. It is also a well-settled rule that the payment of such claim cannot be allowed upon the theory that the services performed for which compensation is claimed were beneficial to the county. It is well established that the right of an officer to demand expenses incurred by him in the performance of an official duty must be found in the Constitution or the statutes confirming it, either directly or by necessary implication.

Id. at 423, 16 P.2d at 1058 (citations omitted).

Applying Clayton to this case, Barth must show that his appointment was authorized by either the constitution or a statute. The sheriff had no constitutional or statutory authority to appoint Barth to the position of "acting lieutenant/jail commander" because the commissioners had not approved the creation of the position. In addition, Clayton rejects Barth's argument that his equity theory allows him to circumvent the requirement that he...