Bartley v. Allendale County Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 11 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 26960.,26960.
• Citation: 709 S.E.2d 619,392 S.C. 300
• Parties: Sandra BARTLEY, Claimant, Petitioner,v.ALLENDALE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Employer, and S.C. School Boards Insurance Trust, Carrier, Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

392 S.C. 300

709 S.E.2d 619

Sandra BARTLEY, Claimant, Petitioner,

v.ALLENDALE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Employer, and S.C. School Boards Insurance Trust, Carrier, Respondents.

No. 26960.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard March 1, 2011.Decided April 11, 2011.

Jonathan R. Hendrix, of Williams, Hendrix, Steigner & Brink, of Lexington, for Petitioner.Kirsten Leslie Barr, of Trask & Howell, of Mt. Pleasant, for Respondents.Justice BEATTY.

We granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to review Bartley v. Allendale County School District, 381 S.C. 262, 672 S.E.2d 809 (Ct.App.2009), in which the Court of Appeals held Sandra Bartley was entitled to benefits for an injury to her neck that resulted in a thirty percent permanent disability to her back, but denied all other benefits. On appeal, Bartley contends her physical injury combined with her pre-existing impairments ¹ resulted in a substantially greater disability that is compensable pursuant to Ellison v. Frigidaire Home Products, 371 S.C. 159, 638 S.E.2d 664 (2006). We reverse and remand.

I. FACTS

On September 26, 2002, Bartley was working as a special needs teacher with the Allendale County School District when a child accidently collided with her during recess and knocked her down while trying to give her a hug. Bartley fell onto a chain link fence and landed on the ground on top of some tree roots, and the child fell on top of her.

Bartley sought medical treatment and was thereafter referred to an orthopedic medical practice. Bartley told the orthopedic physician that she could not lift her arm and that she had pain in her right shoulder and her arm muscles, as those were the problems that most concerned her. The orthopedic physician noted in early April 2003 that Bartley's original physician had unfortunately misdiagnosed Bartley as having tendonitis bursitis of the shoulder and had referred her for physical therapy, which worsened the condition. ² However, the orthopedic physician stated an MRI confirmed Bartley had “severe foraminal stenosis at C5–6” ³ and that this was a “cervical radiculopathy type process rather than shoulder pathology” that was “clearly ... related to her original injury at work.”

On May 14, 2003, Bartley underwent surgery for a cervical fusion. After that, Bartley seemed to be doing better and believed that she could return to teaching. Bartley filed a Form 50 on July 18, 2003 noting injuries to her neck, right arm, right hand, and left knee, as well as the occurrence of migraine headaches.

In August 2003 Bartley began a new job teaching for Richland County School District One in Columbia. From August to October of 2003, Bartley began having more pain. Bartley attributed this to her teaching duties, which required her to work long hours and to lift a lot of equipment and other items. In October 2003, a student picked up a desk and threatened to throw it at Bartley. She was not physically harmed, but according to Bartley, the threat brought back memories of being injured in 2002 and made her fearful that she could be injured again.

Bartley's physician prescribed a medical leave of absence after October 2003, stating her “neuropathic parascapular pain” was “definitely related to the incident on September 26, 2002” and was “most likely going to result in temporary or total disability to perform her work as she did prior to these injuries.” Bartley returned to work briefly in January 2004 before her physician again prescribed a medical leave of absence.⁴

On December 10, 2004, Bartley filed a second Form 50 seeking a hearing. Bartley noted injuries to her cervical spine that resulted in pain, tingling and numbness down the right side of her body (including the neck/shoulder/arm/hand/buttocks/leg); dizziness; headaches; ringing in her ears; and emotional/mental problems (post-traumatic stress disorder).

A hearing was held in August 2005 before a commissioner of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission. Bartley submitted a “Psychological Discharge Summary” dated January 4, 2005 from Dr. Clay Drummond, a clinical psychologist, who diagnosed her as having a pain disorder associated with both psychological factors and a general medical condition, post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic intractable pain, and cognitive degradation. Dr. Drummond stated: “It is most psychologically probable that her disorders were either caused by or exacerbated by her at work accident.” Dr. Drummond found the “combination of [Bartley's] physical and emotional difficulties precludes her from doing any type of meaningful work” and that “[s]he will continue to need maintenance psychiatric medications and likely need periodic maintenance visits with a mental health professional.”

Bartley also submitted a February 28, 2005 assessment from Joel D. Leonard, a Vocational Consultant, who reported that Bartley's “work-related injury from September 26, 2002 has had a severe and adverse effect on her ability to perform gainful work activity” and that she “is ... totally disabled ... due to the combined implications of her physio-vocational and psycho-vocational status.” Leonard concluded “Bartley's work-related accident has had a catastrophic effect on her ability to access the open labor market and her ability to garner a weekly wage.”

The commissioner found Bartley had suffered an injury to her neck in the 2002 accident and a resulting thirty percent loss of use of her back, but that Bartley had failed to prove “that she suffered an injury to any body part other than her neck or that her psychological condition has worsened as a result of this injury.” The commissioner denied Bartley's “claims for benefits for the buttocks, low back, right leg, dizziness, ringing in the ears or psychological disorder” on the basis they were barred by the statute of limitations and “these conditions were not caused by [Bartley's] injury at work.” The commissioner stated that he “d[id] not doubt that the Claimant's future prospects of employment will be limited,” but that he was “not allowed to stack her personal ailments with her work injury to make a finding of disability,” citing Ellison v. Frigidaire Home Products, 360 S.C. 236, 600 S.E.2d 120 (Ct.App.2004) ( Ellison I ). The commissioner observed, “ It appears that Dr. Drummond and Joel Leonard have done exactly that in making their assessments of employability.”

The Appellate Panel affirmed the commissioner's order with certain amendments and adopted the commissioner's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specifically, the Appellate Panel affirmed the commissioner's finding that Bartley suffered a thirty percent permanent loss of use of her back as a result of her neck injury that occurred on September 26, 2002. The Appellate Panel found the claims for benefits for the buttocks, low back, right leg, dizziness, ringing in the ears, and psychological overlay were not barred by the statute of limitations in S.C.Code Ann. § 42–15–40, although it agreed with the commissioner's finding that these conditions were not caused by Bartley's work injury.⁵ The Appellate Panel found Bartley was not disabled from work because of her neck injury “since she began work with Richland School District One in August 2003.” The circuit court and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) provides the standard for judicial review of workers' compensation decisions. Pierre v. Seaside Farms, Inc., 386 S.C. 534, 689 S.E.2d 615 (2010); Lark v. Bi–Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981). Under the APA, this Court can reverse or modify the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission if the substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the decision is affected by an error of law or is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. tRansp. iNs. cO. v. SOuth cArolina sEcond iNjury fUnd, 389 s.C. 422, 427, 699 S.E.2d 687, 689–90 (2010) (citing S.C.Code Ann. § 1–23–380(5)(d), (e) (Supp. 2009)).

The Commission is the ultimate fact finder in workers' compensation cases. Jordan v. Kelly Co., 381 S.C. 483, 674 S.E.2d 166 (2009); Shealy v. Aiken County, 341 S.C. 448, 535 S.E.2d 438 (2000). As a general rule, this Court must affirm the findings of fact made by the Commission if they are supported by substantial evidence. Pierre, 386 S.C. at 541, 689 S.E.2d at 618. “Substantial evidence is that evidence which, in considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the Commission reached.” Hill v. Eagle Motor Lines, 373 S.C. 422, 436, 645 S.E.2d 424, 431 (2007). “The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the Commission's finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Id.

III. LAW/ANALYSIS

Bartley contends the Court of Appeals erred in failing to reverse and remand her case to the Commission in light of this Court's decision in Ellison v. Frigidaire Home Products, 371 S.C. 159, 638 S.E.2d 664 (2006) ( Ellison II ), which reversed the Ellison I case relied upon by the single commissioner and the Appellate Panel. Bartley contends she has suffered a greater disability than the specific injury to her neck. The Court of Appeals found Ellison II to be inapplicable.

Ellison fractured his leg while operating a forklift for Frigidaire and sustained a twenty percent impairment to his leg. Ellison v. Frigidaire, 360 S.C. 236, 238, 600 S.E.2d 120, 121 (Ct.App.2004). At the time of his accident, Ellison had been suffering for several years from hypertension and prostate cancer . Id. After his accident, Ellison was also diagnosed with sleep apnea, diabetes, and congestive heart failure. Id.

Ellison argued the combination of his accidental leg injury and his other medical ailments rendered him totally and permanently disabled. Id. Frigidaire, in contrast, argued Ellison was limited to the scheduled member benefits of a...