Transp. Ins. Co. And Flagstar Corp. v. South Carolina Second Injury Fund, 26880.
| Decision Date | 13 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 26880.,26880. |
| Citation | 699 S.E.2d 687,389 S.C. 422 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE COMPANY AND FLAGSTAR CORPORATION, Carrier/Respondent,v.SOUTH CAROLINA SECOND INJURY FUND, Appellant.Travelers Insurance Company and Barclays American, Carrier/Respondent,v.South Carolina Second Injury Fund, Appellant.Travelers Insurance Company and It's Fashion, Carrier/Respondent,v.South Carolina Second Injury Fund, Appellant.Great American Insurance Co. and Yuasa Exide, Inc., Carrier/Respondent,v.South Carolina Second Injury Fund, Appellant.Travelers Insurance Company and Marc Knapp DBA, Carrier/Respondent,v.South Carolina Second Injury Fund, Appellant.Travelers Insurance Company and All American Termite & Pest, Carrier/Respondent,v.South Carolina Second Injury Fund, Appellant. |
Latonya Dilligard Edwards, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Deborah Casey Brown and Kyle A. Hougham, both of Gallivan, White & Boyd, Jason Alexander Griggs, of Wilson, Jones, Carter & Baxley, and Vernon F. Dunbar, of Turner, Padget, Graham & Laney, all of Greenville; Stephen L. Brown, William L. Howard, and Russell G. Hines, all of Young, Clement & Rivers, of Charleston, for Respondents.
We granted South Carolina Second Injury Fund's (Fund) motion to transfer several appeals from the circuit court to this Court. We reverse the decisions of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission.
On June 20, 2007, the South Carolina General Assembly passed the Workers' Compensation Reform Act (Reform Act), which provides for the winding down of the Fund by June 30, 2013. See S.C.Code Ann. § 42-7-320(A) (Supp.2009). Subsequent to the passage of the Reform Act, several carriers requested reimbursement for claims in which more than ten years had passed since the claimant was injured. The Fund denied reimbursement in those cases based on the general ten-year statute of limitations, which provides “[a]n action for relief not provided for in this chapter must be commenced within ten years after the cause of action shall have accrued.” S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-600 (2005). Carriers in the present action pursued reimbursement in cases in which more than ten years passed since claimant's date of injury.
Travelers Insurance Company (Travelers) insured four of the six employers involved in this action. The four employers insured by Travelers are Barclay's American, It's Fashions, All American Termite & Pest, and Marc Knapp.1 Travelers is requesting reimbursement for claimants with the following dates of injury: December 19, 1989; July 18, 1994; August 19, 1996; and August 8, 1997. Travelers provided timely and proper notice to the Fund pursuant to South Carolina Code Ann. § 42-9-400 (Supp.2009) in all four of these claims.
Transportation Insurance Company (Transportation) insures Flagstar Corporation and is seeking reimbursement for a claimant with a March 19, 1993 date of injury. Transportation provided proper notice of a possible claim to the Fund pursuant to section 42-9-400.
Great American Insurance Company (Great American) insures Yuasa Exide, Inc., which is now known as EnerSys Corporation. Great American is seeking reimbursement for a January 1, 1996 date of injury.2 Great American provided proper notice of a possible claim to the Fund pursuant to section 42-9-400.
The cases referenced above have been adjudicated by the Workers' Compensation Commission, which ultimately determined the statute of limitations found in section 15-3-600 did not apply to reimbursement cases. The Fund appealed these cases to the circuit court. However, while the appeals were pending, the Fund sought review by this Court and we transferred the appeals from the circuit court to this Court.
I. Does the statute of limitations provision in section 15-3-600 apply to reimbursement cases pursued against the Fund?
II. When does time begin to accrue for claims brought under section 42-9-400?
Statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review. Town of Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662 S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008) (citation omitted). “The construction of a statute by the agency charged with its administration will be accorded the most respectful consideration and will not be overruled absent compelling reasons.” Dunton v. S.C. Bd. of Exam'rs In Optometry, 291 S.C. 221, 223, 353 S.E.2d 132, 133 (1987) (citations omitted). The Administrative Procedures Act governs judicial review of the Workers' Compensation Commission's decisions. See Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981). This Court can modify the commission's decision in this case only if the Fund's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the decision is affected by an error of law or is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. See S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5)(d), (e) (Supp.2009); see also Shealy v. Aiken County, 341 S.C. 448, 454-55, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000). “Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor evidence viewed from one side, but such evidence, when the whole record is considered, as would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the Full Commission reached.” Shealy, 341 S.C. at 455, 535 S.E.2d at 442 (citation omitted).
The Fund argues the ten-year statute of limitations period outlined in section 15-3-600 applies to reimbursement cases brought pursuant to section 42-9-400. We agree.
“Statutes of limitations are not simply technicalities.” Moates v. Bobb, 322 S.C. 172, 176, 470 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct.App.1996). “Statutes of limitations embody important public policy considerations in that they stimulate activity, punish negligence, and promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs.” Id. (citation omitted). Statutes of limitations relieve courts of the burden of trying stale claims of those who have slept on their rights. See McKinney v. CSX Transp., Inc., 298 S.C. 47, 49-50, 378 S.E.2d 69, 70 (Ct.App.1989). “The purpose of statutes of limitation is to ensure litigation is ‘brought within a reasonable time in order that evidence be reasonably available and there be some end to litigation.’ ” Hooper v. Ebenezer Senior Servs. & Rehab. Ctr., 377 S.C. 217, 227, 659 S.E.2d 213, 218 (Ct.App.2008) (quoting City of North Myrtle Beach v. Lewis-Davis, 360 S.C. 225, 231, 599 S.E.2d 462, 464 (Ct.App.2004)).
Section 15-3-600 is found in chapter 3 of title 15 which addresses “Limitations of Civil Actions.” Section 15-3-600 states, “An action for relief not provided for in this chapter must be commenced within ten years after the cause of action shall have accrued.” So that other unnamed civil actions were not excluded from having a limitations period, the legislature created this ten-year default statute of limitations provision for other causes of action not specifically enumerated in title 15. South Carolina Code Ann. § 15-3-20(A) (2005) provides, “Civil actions may only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title after the cause of action has accrued except when, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute.”
When reading a workers' compensation statute this Court will strictly construe its terms, leaving it to the legislature to amend and define any ambiguities. Wigfall v. Tideland Utils., Inc., 354 S.C. 100, 110, 580 S.E.2d 100, 105 (2003). “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (citation omitted). The text of a statute as drafted by the legislature is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. See id. “If a statute's language is plain, unambiguous, and conveys a clear meaning, then the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and a court has no right to impose another meaning.” Strickland v. Strickland, 375 S.C. 76, 88, 650 S.E.2d 465, 472 (2007) (citation omitted). “The Court will give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and will not resort to a subtle or forced construction that would limit or expand the statute's operation.” Harris v. Anderson County Sheriff's Office, 381 S.C. 357, 362, 673 S.E.2d 423, 425 (2009) (citation omitted).
Section 42-9-400 is plain and unambiguous. Section 42-9-400(f) states in pertinent part:
An employer or his carrier must notify the Workers' Compensation Commission and the Director of the Second Injury Fund in writing of any possible claim against the fund as soon as practicable but in no event later than after the payment of the first seventy-eight weeks of compensation.... Failure to comply with the provisions of this subsection shall bar an employer or his carrier from recovery from the fund.
This is not a statute of limitations, but a notice requirement. Moreover, there is no statute of limitations in title 42 that applies to claims for reimbursement. Reimbursement actions are actions “for relief not provided for in this chapter.” S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-600 (2005). Hence, sections 15-3-20(A) and 15-3-600 mandate that reimbursement actions must commence within ten years after the cause of action shall have accrued. If this were not so, then so long as the notice requirement of 42-9-400(f) was met, these actions could theoretically extend endlessly into the future, thwarting the intent of the legislature's passing of section 15-3-600.
In Greenwood Mills, Inc. v. Second Injury Fund, 315 S.C. 256, 433 S.E.2d 846 (1993), this Court rejected the contention that the two-year statute of limitations for employees' workers' compensation claims contained in S.C.Code Ann. § 42-15-40 (Supp.2009) also governed...
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