Barton v. Barton, 1999-IA-01846-SCT.

• Decision Date: 19 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 1999-IA-01846-SCT.,1999-IA-01846-SCT.
• Citation: 790 So.2d 169
• Parties: Kellye Pogue BARTON v. Jon Bradley BARTON, Administrator of the Estate of William Jason Barton.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

790 So.2d 169

Kellye Pogue BARTON v. Jon Bradley BARTON, Administrator of the Estate of William Jason Barton.

No. 1999-IA-01846-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

April 19, 2001.

Rehearing Denied July 26, 2001.

Elizabeth F. Crosthwait, Houston, Tina M. Scott, for Appellant.

Jarret P. Nichols, Columbus, for Appellee.

EN BANC.

PITTMAN, Chief Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. The sole issue before this Court regards the binding effect of a Separation Agreement filed with a Joint Bill for Divorce. Is a Separation Agreement valid and binding as of its date of execution where the Agreement was executed and filed contemporaneously with a Joint Bill for Divorce on the basis of irreconcilable differences and:

(A) the Separation Agreement contained express language indicating each party's clear intention that the Agreement be valid and binding from the date of execution; and

(B) one of the parties to the agreement died prior to the running of the sixty (60) day statutory waiting period required before obtaining a final divorce decree incorporating the Separation Agreement, and

(C) the surviving party claims that reconciliation occurred due to the parties' resumption of cohabitation?

¶ 2. On July 1, 1999, Jon Bradley Barton ("Bradley") filed his complaint in the Webster County Chancery Court. Bradley, serving as Administrator of the Estate of William Jason Barton ("Decedent"), asked the court to find the Separation Agreement entered into by Kellye Pogue Barton ("Kellye") and the decedent to be valid and binding on the parties as of the date of execution, and requested that the parties comply with the terms of the Separation Agreement. On July 19, 1999, Kellye filed her motion to Dismiss the Complaint.

¶ 3. A hearing occurred on August 3, 1999, as a result of Kellye's Motion to Dismiss and the parties were briefed regarding their respective positions in the matter. On September 7, 1999, an order was entered by the Webster County Chancery Court denying Kellye's Motion to Dismiss and finding the Separation Agreement effective as of the date it was executed. The Webster County Chancery Court later entered an Order Amending Previous Order and Denying Certification for an Interlocutory Appeal. However, this Court granted Kellye Barton's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal pursuant to M.R.A.P.5.

FACTS

¶ 4. Kellye Barton and Decedent were married in Webster County, Mississippi, on June 15, 1996. On May 21, 1999, Kellye and Decedent executed a Joint Bill for Divorce based upon irreconcilable differences. At the same time, and in accordance with the requirements for obtaining an irreconcilable differences divorce in Mississippi, Kellye and Decedent executed a Separation Agreement which, with the Joint Bill for Divorce, was filed in the Webster County Chancery Clerk's office. The Separation Agreement, inter alia, contained terms where each party expressly agreed to completely relinquish rights to any claim whatsoever to the other's estate. This Agreement also expressly stated that each party acknowledged his/her intent that the Separation Agreement was valid and binding as of the date of execution, May 21, 1999.

¶ 5. Thereafter, according to testimony by Kellye, Kellye and Decedent resumed cohabitation in the marital home continuously through June 7, 1999, and then intermittently in the marital home, as well as in Kellye's temporary residence, until Decedent's death on June 21, 1999. Kellye testified that she and Decedent cohabited approximately six times after the filing of the Joint Bill for Divorce and the Separation Agreement. Testimony of witnesses from both parties confirmed that Kellye apparently had spent the night with the Decedent in the marital home and that they had been seen interacting as a couple after the Joint Bill for Divorce and Separation Agreement had been filed. Witnesses for Bradley testified that the Decedent had told them that Kellye was having an affair, that their marriage was over and that Decedent had stated the day he died that he was glad to be getting rid of his wife. The Chancellor determined that the evidence was insufficient to establish that reconciliation had occurred prior to Decedent's death.

¶ 6. Kellye did not execute a quitclaim deed transferring her interest in the marital home to Decedent prior to Decedent's death as agreed to in the Separation Agreement. Nor was there any withdrawal of the Joint Bill for Divorce prior to Decedent's death.

DISCUSSION

¶ 7. The Separation Agreement was executed on May 21, 1999. The Agreement clearly expresses the intentions of the parties to prevent one from asserting a claim against the other's estate and that the agreement be binding as of the date of execution. It states in pertinent part:

III. Subject to the provisions of this Separation Agreement, each party has released and discharged and by their agreement does for himself and herself, and his heirs or her heirs, legal representatives, executors, administrators and assigns, release and discharge the other of and from all causes of action, claims, rights or demands, whatsoever at law or equity, which either of the parties ever had or now has against the other, except for any and all cause or causes of action for divorce.

(9) The parties do hereby expressly revoke and cancel any provision, if any, in their respective wills, if any, or any other deed, contract or document that is in conflict with the terms and provisions hereof and each of the parties do hereby covenant with the other to totally refrain from asserting any claim against the estate of the other that is inconsistent with the terms and provisions of this agreement.

(10) This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs and legal representatives of the parties from and after the date hereof.

¶ 8. This Court has previously considered the validity of a separation agreement in a case substantially similar to the one at hand. Roberts v. Roberts, 381 So.2d 1333 (Miss.1980), dealt with a husband and wife who had executed a joint bill for divorce based upon irreconcilable differences and also executed a property settlement agreement. Less than forty-eight (48) hours after the execution of such documents the husband was killed in an automobile accident. Subsequently, the siblings of the decedent filed a petition asking the chancery court to adjudicate and determine the rights of inheritance regarding the estate of the decedent. After reviewing the language in the property settlement agreement, this Court determined that the wife had surrendered her rights to the estate. This Court stated in Roberts:

The rules applicable to the construction of written contracts in general are to be applied in construing a postnuptial agreement. Such a contract must be considered as a whole, and from such examination the intent of the parties must be gathered. Such construction should be given the agreement, if possible, as will render all its clauses harmonious, so as to carry into effect the actual purpose and intent of the parties as derived therefrom....

The rule is, as to a postnuptial agreement, that only such rights in the estate of the deceased spouse are barred as are expressly enumerated or reasonably inferable from the language employed therein....

We have carefully considered the separation and property settlement agreement entered into between the Roberts and are of the opinion that the provisions of that agreement, which we have discussed above, clearly manifests to us the parties intention to waive each other's right to inherit from the other, if either should die prior to a divorce being obtained.

Id. at 1335.

¶ 9. In Roberts, this Court determined that the agreement was enforceable despite there being less than forty-eight (48) hours between the time of its execution and the husband's death. In the present case, thirty (30) days passed without either party withdrawing the Joint Bill for Divorce. Kellye chose to withdraw the joint bill by filing an Affidavit For Withdrawal Of Joint Bill For Divorce in the Chancery Court of Webster County after Decedent had perished in the automobile accident.

¶ 10. Additional case law establishes that property settlement agreements are contractual in nature and are not subject to modification or contingent upon a final divorce decree. This Court, in Stone v. Stone, 385 So.2d 610 (Miss.1980), stated:

The property settlement entered into between the parties was not made subject to the approval of the chancery court; therefore, all of the provisions of the agreement except those pertaining to support of the wife, child support and custody retained a purely contractual nature. The provisions of the agreement pertaining to support of the wife and children and custody of the children were subject to modification by the chancery court in the divorce action, but the provisions pertaining to the conveyance and use of the land, the occupancy of the residence house by the wife, the duty of the husband to maintain the real property and the assignment of life insurance policies were permissible subjects of a contractual agreement.

Id. at 612. In Stone, this Court noted the difference between child support, child custody, support of the wife, and provisions dealing with property. While support and custody matters are clearly subject to modification and approval by the court after the sixty (60) day mandatory waiting period, such a period does not exist for agreements dealing with property.

¶ 11. This Court, in Crosby v. Peoples Bank of Indianola, 472 So.2d 951 (Miss. 1985), discussed the validity of separation agreements at the time of their execution:

Although a divorce action was filed by the Crosby's on June 9, 1982, along with the settlement agreement, we are of the opinion that the agreement was binding and effective upon the parties even though a divorce action, subsequently, may never have been filed or a decree of divorce entered. The parties could have lived separate and apart for the rest of their lives

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