Barton v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 25 January 1921
• Docket Number: 16050.
• Citation: 114 Wash. 331,194 P. 961
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: BARTON et ux. v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

194 P. 961

114 Wash. 331

BARTON et ux. v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

No. 16050.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 25, 1921

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; J. T. Renald, Judge.

Action by F. M. Barton and wife against the City of Seattle. Judgment for defendant and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

John F Murphy, of Seattle, for appellants.

Walter F. Meier and Frank S. Griffith, both of Seattle, for respondent.

BRIDGES J.

Plaintiffs have appealed from the judgment of the lower court dismissing their action against the city of Seattle, wherein they sought to recover damages because of personal injuries to the plaintiff, Martha J. Barton, received on April 8, 1919. The only question involved here is the sufficiency of the notice given by the appellants to the city, of the injury to Mrs Barton. The case was dismissed because the notice did not state the residence of the claimants, or either of them, for six months immediately prior to the time the claim for damages accrued.

The charter of the city of Seattle provides that all claims for damages against the city must be presented to the city council and filed with the clerk within 30 days after the time such claim for damages accrues, and that no action shall be maintained against the city for such damages until such claim or notice has been filed. Section 7995, Rem. Code, provides that whenever a claim for damages against any city of the first class shall be presented and filed 'such claim must contain, in addition to the valid requirements of such city charter relating thereto, a statement of the actual residence of such claimant, by street and number, at the date of presenting and filing such claim and also a statement of the 'actual residence of such claimant for six months immediately prior to the time such claim for damages accrued.' Section 7997, Rem. Code, is to the effect that----

'Compliance with the provisions of this act is hereby declared to be mandatory upon all such claimants presenting and filing any such claims for damages.'

The notice given to the city gave the residence of Mrs. Barton at the time of the filing of the claim, but did not give her residence for the preceding six months.

This court has on many occasions had this statute before it, but only in one or two cases has the exact question here presented been involved. We have held that this statute should be liberally construed, and that a part of its purpose was to put the city in position to make investigations, and that when the notice is of such character as to accomplish these purposes it is sufficient. Frasier v. Cowlitz County, 67 Wash. 312, 121 P. 459; Lindquist v. Seattle, 67 Wash. 230, 121 P. 449, and cases there cited.

We have also held that, where there has been a bona fide attempt to comply with the city ordinance or statute with reference to notice, and nothing therein is misleading, the notice will be held sufficient. Lindquist v. Seattle, supra.

In Maggs v. Seattle, 86 Wash. 427, 150 P. 612, the notice gave the claimants residence at the date of the verification thereof, and for at least six months prior thereto, and we held that the notice was sufficient, although it did not state the residence of the claimant at the date of presenting and filing the claim, because the presumption would be that the residence remained the same until the date of filing.

In the case of Wagner v. Seattle, 84 Wash. 275, 146 P. 621, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 720, we held that a claim which gave the residence of the injured person as No. 218 of a certain street in the city of Seattle was not defective because his actual residence was No. 208 of the same street. We there said that there had been a bona fide effort to comply with the statute, and that the city had not been misled.

In the case of Collins v. Spokane, 64 Wash. 153, 116 P. 663, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 840, we held that compliance with this statute is mandatory, and a condition precedent to the bringing of the action, and that the giving of the notice in substantial compliance with the statute must be alleged.

In Hammock v. Tacoma, 40 Wash. 539, 82 P. 893, construing an ordinance requiring the claim for damages to give the place of the injury, we held that a notice describing the injury as having occurred on J street, between Forty-First street and Forty-Second street is sufficient, although the injury occurred between Forty-First street and Forty-Third street, there being no Forty-Second street intersection of J street. To the same effect see Mulligan v. Seattle, 42 Wash. 264, 84 P. 721; Ellis v. Seattle, 47 Wash. 578, 92 P. 431.

The only two cases out of this court which directly involve the question in this case are Collins v. Spokane, supra and ...