Lindquist v. City of Seattle

• Decision Date: 16 February 1912
• Citation: 121 P. 449,67 Wash. 230
• Parties: LINDQUIST et ux. v. CITY OF SEATTLE.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

121 P. 449

67 Wash. 230

LINDQUIST et ux. v. CITY OF SEATTLE.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 16, 1912

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; J. T. Ronald Judge.

Action by C. N. Lindquist and wife against the City of Seattle. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Scott Calhoun and James E. Bradford, for appellant.

Brady &amp Rummens and Elmore Winkler, for respondents.

ELLIS J.

Action for personal injuries to the plaintiff C. N. Lindquist caused by a fall through a defective sidewalk on Harrison street, near the alley between Sixth and Seventh Avenues North, in the city of Seattle. Harrison street runs in an easterly and westerly direction, and is crossed by Sixth and Seventh avenues, running north and south. From Sixth avenue eastward to the alley, the sidewalk lay upon stringers on the ground. These stringers were decayed, and many boards were loose, so that they rattled under the feet. From the alley towards Seventh avenue, the sidewalk was raised on a trestle some seven feet above the ground. The evidence shows that this also was in a generally bad condition, and had been so for at least six months. This part of the sidewalk, however, was more solid than that which lay upon the ground. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon of July 31, 1910, the plaintiff husband and his wife were walking eastward on Harrison street, and had passed over the sidewalk from Sixth avenue to the alley, and for about one-third of the distance from the alley to Seventh avenue, when he stepped upon the end of a plank which gave way beneath him letting him fall through the sidewalk to the ground below, causing the injuries complained of. Trial was had to a jury, and at the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the defendant challenged its sufficiency by motion, which was overruled. The city rested its case without offer of evidence. The jury returned a verdict of $1,000. Motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict were made and overruled. The judgment was then entered, from which the defendant city has appealed.

1. The first error assigned is based upon the admission of evidence of a sprained ankle, causing permanent injury. It is urged that the claim filed with the city in compliance with a requirement of the city charter was insufficient to admit of such proof, since the sprain was known to the claimant when he filed the claim. The notice of claim described the injury as follows: 'That by reason of the claimant falling violently through the opening, as aforesaid, the said claimant's leg was fractured and bruised to such an extent that he was compelled to undergo a surgical operation, and will be disabled for many months to come. That in falling the claimant was bruised about the arms, and has suffered great pain and anguish.' The description of the injury in the complaint was couched in similar terms.

Section 29 of article 4 of the charter of Seattle, prescribing such claims, provides as follows: 'All such claims for damages must accurately locate and describe the defect that caused the injury, accurately describe the injury, give the residence for one year last past of claimant, contain the items of damages claimed, and be sworn to by the claimant.'

It will be noted that the charter requires no more specific description of the injury than of the defect which caused the injury. The obvious purpose of the charter provision is to insure such notice as will enable the city, through its proper officials, to investigate the cause and character of the injury while the facts are comparatively recent, and thus protect itself against fraudulent or exaggerated claims. This court, in common with many others, has held that, where there is a bona fide effort to comply with the law, and the notice filed actually accomplished the purpose of notice as to the place and character of the defect in the street, it is sufficient, though defective, if the deficiencies therein are not such as to be actually misleading. Ellis v. Seattle, 47 Wash. 578, 92 P. 431; Hammock v. Tacoma, 40 Wash. 539, 82 P. 893; Falldin v. Seattle, 50 Wash. 561, 97 P. 658. This court has also held that claims of this character are to be viewed with at least that liberality which is accorded to a pleading. Hase v. Seattle, 51 Wash. 174, 98 P. 370, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 938.

These and many other decisions which might be cited, show that this court has never adopted that draconic strictness of construction which would sacrifice the just and reasonable purpose of the law to a technical exactness of terms, making it a pitfall for the ignorant and unskillful, rather than a reasonable protection against the fraudulent and designing. 'It is a sound view that such a notice is sufficient when couched in general terms that cannot be misunderstood, and that technical accuracy and nicety of particularization are not necessary.' 5 Thompson, Com. on Law of Neg. § 6328. The same rule applies in stating the nature and extent of the injury. 'Where the statute requires such a notice to state the nature of the injury, it will be sufficient if the statement be made in general terms which cannot be misunderstod. As in the case of statements touching the place and cause of the injury,...