McBride v. Meridian Public Imp. Corp.

Decision Date12 November 1998
Docket Number No. 97-CA-00814-SCT., No. 96-CA-01018-SCT
PartiesBill McBRIDE v. MERIDIAN PUBLIC IMPROVEMENT CORPORATION and the City of Meridian, Mississippi.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

John R. Reeves, Oklahoma City, OK, Attorney for Appellant.

Tommie Sullivan Cardin, Jackson, William C. Hammack, Meridian, Attorneys for Appellees.

Before PITTMAN, P.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ.

PITTMAN, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. In April, 1993, the mayor and city council of Meridian, Mississippi elected to finance the purchase of property and construction of a public improvement project identified as "The Downtown Plaza Project" through Mississippi's public "Lease-Purchase-Law", Miss.Code Ann. § 31-8-1 et seq. (1990) with the issuance of Certificates of Participation ("COPS"). In March 1994, the City elected to use the same financing mechanism for a public improvement project identified as "The Multi-Modal Project."

¶ 2. Pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 31-13-5 (1990), both transactions were submitted to the State's Bond Attorney who rendered his opinion on their compliance with the law. Subsequently, both transactions were presented to the Chancery Court of Lauderdale County for validation. On May 26, 1993, for the Downtown Plaza Project and on August 12, 1994, for the Multi-Modal Project, the Chancery Court entered a Decree of Validation affirming the Opinions of the State's Bond Attorney. After the validations, the COPS were issued.

¶ 3. On August 19, 1996, Bill McBride, a taxpayer of the City of Meridian, filed his complaint against the City and the Meridian Public Improvement Corporation ("MPIC") attacking the validity of the agreements entered into by the City with MPIC. McBride sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the City from paying any portion of any indebtedness incurred by or on behalf of MPIC, to enjoin the City from proceeding with the projects, to dissolve MPIC and enjoin it from conducting any business whatsoever, to have the COPS declared null and void, to have a judgment entered against the defendants for all sums of taxpayer money expended in violation of the law, and for attorney's fees and all costs of bringing the action.

¶ 4. On August 23, 1996, the City filed its Motion to Dismiss Complaint or in the alternative for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment and for Sanctions. The City maintained that McBride's Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and that all provisions and requirements of Miss.Code Ann. § 31-8-1 et seq. (1990) and other applicable laws had been met by the City and MPIC with regard to the subject transactions. On August 29, 1996, MPIC joined in the City's Motion.

¶ 5. On August 26, 1996, the City filed its Answer and Defenses essentially arguing the same issues presented in its Motion. The thrust of the City's Answer was that because the challenged COPS were properly validated pursuant to the provisions of Miss.Code Ann. § 31-13-3 (1990), without objection, McBride's action was barred. On September 3, 1996, MPIC joined in the City's Answer.

¶ 6. On September 4, 1996, McBride filed a Motion for Recusal requesting that Chancellor Springer recuse herself due to her prior employment with law firms which had previously represented the City and which at that time represented the City. McBride's Motion for Recusal was denied on that same day.

¶ 7. On September 6, 1997, the Chancellor dismissed McBride's Complaint pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 12(c), finding that the validation proceedings constituted res judicata on every issue raised in McBride's Complaint.

¶ 8. McBride timely filed his Notice of Appeal from the Chancellor's Opinion and Judgment granting the City's Motion to Dismiss on September 20, 1996.

¶ 9. On May 22, 1997, a subsequent hearing was conducted by the Chancellor on the City's Motion for Fees and Costs Pursuant to the Litigation Accountability Act of 1988. By Opinion and Judgment dated June 25, 1997, the Chancellor entered judgment in favor of the City against McBride's attorney, John R. Reeves, in the amount of $9778.93.

¶ 10. McBride and Reeves timely filed a Notice of Appeal on June 26, 1997. This appeal bears Cause No. 97-CA-00814-SCT. It has been consolidated with McBride's first appeal, Cause No. 96-CA-01018-SCT.

¶ 11. McBride raises the following alleged errors for this Court's consideration and review:

I. THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN FAILING TO RECUSE HERSELF.
II. THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO M.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) AND 12(c).
III. THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN HEARING THE MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AFTER A JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED AND THE CASE WAS APPEALED TO THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT.
IV. THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN ORDERING PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY TO PAY ATTORNEYS' FEES TO DEFENDANT UNDER THE LITIGATION ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1988.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

¶ 12. In April 1993 and March 1994, the City of Meridian's governing authorities elected to finance the purchase of property and the construction of two public improvement projects identified as the "The Downtown Plaza Project" and the "The Multi-Modal Project" through the use of Mississippi's "Lease-Purchase Law", Miss.Code Ann. § 31-8-1 et seq. (1990). Under the Lease-Purchase Law, the City owns the real property on which the project is to be constructed. The City then leases the property to a corporation, in this instance a non-profit corporation, the MPIC. The non-profit corporation commits to cause the construction of the project, and leases the project to the City. This is accomplished through a Lease and Option to Purchase Agreement, the terms of which are consistent with Miss.Code Ann. § 31-8-9 (1990). At the same time, the nonprofit corporation appoints the City, through an Agency Agreement, as its agent in connection with the "acquisition, construction, delivery and installation" of the project. This appointment is irrevocable and the City then constructs or causes the construction of the project, following the public bidding requirements.

¶ 13. Financing for the projects is provided through the issuance of COPS, which represent proportional interests in the Lease and Option to Purchase. In this case, Deposit Guaranty National Bank purchased the COPS to provide the proceeds to pay for the construction and financing costs for the Downtown Plaza Project. Three banks in Meridian did the same for the Multi-Modal Project. The proceeds were paid to Trustees. In the case of the Downtown Plaza Project, the amount of the COPS was $625,000 and for the Multi-Modal Project, $1,300,000. Thereafter, MPIC assigned all rights to rental proceeds to the banks.

¶ 14. Both transactions were submitted to the State's Bond Attorney and to the Chancery Court for approval and validation pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 31-13-3 et seq. (1990).

¶ 15. In both proceedings, the State's Bond Attorney opined that the issuance of the COPS "were conducted pursuant to lawful resolutions, order and proceedings, legally adopted and authorized, and were in strict accordance with the Constitution and laws of the State of Mississippi, including Miss.Code Ann. § 31-8-1 et seq. of the Mississippi Code of 1972, amended."

¶ 16. On May 26, 1993 and August 12, 1994, the Chancery Court entered Decrees of Validation affirming the Opinions of the State's Bond Attorney and declaring that the "[COPS] be, and the same hereby are, approved, confirmed and validated." Subsequent to validation, the COPS were issued for both projects.

DISCUSSION OF LAW— 96-CA-01018-SCT
I. THE CHANCELLOR ERRED IN FAILING TO RECUSE HERSELF.

¶ 17. On September 4, 1996, McBride filed a Motion for Recusal. His Motion was heard and ruled upon that same day. McBride sought to have Chancellor Springer recuse herself because he had discovered that she had worked for Tom Goldman, an attorney for the City who was involved with one of the projects involved in this litigation. McBride also pointed out that Chancellor Springer had worked for Bourdeaux & Jones, who was representing the City in the present case.

¶ 18. As it turns out, Chancellor Springer had worked for Bourdeaux & Jones for a few months prior to receiving her Mississippi license to practice law. She had been associated with the firm of Tom Goldman from 1985 to 1990 but neither of the projects in question had come into being at the time of the Chancellor's employment there.

¶ 19. The Chancellor considered the Motion carefully, and ruled that it should be denied.

¶ 20. Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides in pertinent part that:

(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;

¶ 21. This Court reviews a judge's refusal to recuse herself using the manifest error standard. Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So.2d 770, 774 (Miss.1997)(citing Davis v. Neshoba County Gen. Hosp., 611 So.2d 904, 905 (Miss.1992)). There is no contention that Chancellor Springer was disqualified by virtue of Miss.Code Ann. § 9-1-11 (1991), therefore we review McBride's challenge under Canon 3(C)(1).

¶ 22. As this Court explained in Green v. State, 631 So.2d 167, 177 (Miss.1994);

"[T]he Canon enjoys the status of law such that we enforce it rigorously, notwithstanding the lack of a litigant's specific demand." Collins v. Dixie Transport, Inc., 543 So.2d 160, 166 (Miss.1989).
The standard by which we determine if a judge should have disqualified himself is an objective
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9 cases
  • Payton v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • November 6, 2003
    ...of impartiality exists that a judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased. McBride v. Meridian Pub. Improvement Corp., 730 So.2d 548, 551 (Miss.1998). This Court presumes that a trial judge is qualified and unbiased, and this presumption may only be overcome by e......
  • Batiste v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • September 24, 2020
    ...impartiality "that a judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased." Id. (citing McBride v. Meridian Pub. Improvement Corp., 730 So. 2d 548, 551 (Miss. 1998)). When this Court is asked to review the denial of recusal, it "will look to the whole trial and pass upon ......
  • Summers v. St. Andrew's Episcopal School, Inc.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • May 11, 2000
    ...disqualified himself is an objective standard which this Court has adopted and is applied under Canon 3. McBride v. Meridian Public Improvement Corp., 730 So.2d 548, 551 (Miss.1998). A presumption of impartiality exists that a judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and u......
  • Rogers v. Morin, No. 1998-CA-01309-SCT.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • May 10, 2001
    ...held that a judge should recuse himself if a reasonable person would have doubts about his impartiality. McBride v. Meridian Pub. Improvement Corp., 730 So.2d 548, 551 (Miss.1998). Nothing in this record would make a reasonable person harbor any doubts about the chancellor's impartiality. F......
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