Batts v. State, s. 31951

Decision Date21 April 1977
Docket Number31952,Nos. 31951,s. 31951
Citation235 S.E.2d 377,238 Ga. 664
PartiesVirgil BATTS v. The STATE (two cases).
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

M. Stan Ballew, Jim L. Wilson, Tifton, for appellant.

Thomas H. Pittman, Dist. Atty., Fred W. Ridgon, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Tifton, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Daryl A. Robinson, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant was found guilty of two armed robberies which arose out of the same occurrence and was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal he contends that the procedure followed in Georgia for determining the voluntariness of a confession is unconstitutional.

The Georgia procedure for determining the voluntariness of a confession is not unconstitutional for any reason assigned.

Judgment affirmed.

NICHOLS, C. J., UNDERCOFLER, P. J., and JORDAN, INGRAM and HALL, JJ., concur.

HILL, J., concurs specially.

HILL, Justice, concurring specially.

The defendant contends that the procedure followed in Georgia for determining the voluntariness of a confession violates the due process clause of the 14th Amendment as well as the Georgia requirement that in criminal cases the jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts (Code Ann. § 2-201). He argues that to satisfy the Georgia requirement the jury must determine the voluntariness of the confession and that in order for there to be the reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness required by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), the jury must return a special verdict disclosing its finding on that issue. The state cites Watson v. State, 227 Ga. 698, 182 S.E.2d 446 (1971), and urges that no objection was made to admission of the confession and hence there was no issue as to voluntariness. In my view this appeal involves the sufficiency of the charge of the court and thus no objection at trial was necessary. Sims v. State, 234 Ga. 177, 214 S.E.2d 902 (1975).

At trial the state initiated on its own motion a Jackson-Denno hearing during which an officer testified as to the warnings given to the defendant and to the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession. At the conclusion of this nonjury testimony, the defendant made no objection or motion and he called no witnesses. The trial court expressly found that the proper foundation for admission of the officer's testimony as to the defendant's statement had been laid. The jury returned and the defendant's statement was recounted.

When the defendant took the stand he testified that he did not remember a Miranda warning and that his confession was involuntary. The trial court did not instruct the jury concerning the confession and there was no request to charge upon that subject.

In New York, prior to Jackson v. Denno, trial judges were required to make a preliminary determination regarding a confession. They could exclude a confession only if the confession could not be deemed voluntary under any circumstances. If voluntariness was debatable, the jury then passed upon voluntariness and if it found the confession to be involuntary it ignored it in determining guilt. If on the other hand the jury found the confession to be voluntary, it was free to consider its truth or falsity in determining guilt or innocence. This procedure was found to be constitutionally defective because the defendant never received a clear-cut determination that the confession used against him was in fact voluntary.

In Jackson v. Denno, the Court mentioned, without criticism, the two other widely used procedures but gave no clear indication of a preference for one over the other. Under the "orthodox rule" the trial judge alone makes the determination of the voluntariness of the confession; the jury is not instructed that if it finds the confession was given involuntarily it is to be disregarded. The "Massachusetts rule" requires the judge first to determine voluntariness and if the confession is deemed voluntary it is heard by the jury which makes its own determination of voluntariness. The Massachusetts rule escaped criticism because the trial judge made a...

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10 cases
  • Rogers v. State, 60211
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 16, 1980
    ...on admissibility and then submits, upon request, the final issue to the jury-with appropriate instructions. See Batts v. State, 238 Ga. 664, 667, 235 S.E.2d 377; Mitchell v. State, 239 Ga. 456, 238 S.E.2d The two motions are not the same-either procedurally or substantively. Although both m......
  • Serrano v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 14, 1978
    ...12 L.Ed.2d 908 and does not deprive the defendant of a trial by jury. Jackson v. State, 239 Ga. 449, 450, 238 S.E.2d 31; Batts v. State, 238 Ga. 664, 235 S.E.2d 377. This record contains no such requested instruction. We find as a matter of fact and law that the trial court's determination ......
  • Ambles v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • September 11, 1989
    ...required in some situations. See, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Batts v. State, 238 Ga. 664, 235 S.E.2d 377 (1977). Although competency statutes have undergone extensive revision nationwide and have been challenged frequently in recent years, the part......
  • Williams v. State, 59006
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 12, 1980
    ...758. Since defendant did not request a charge on voluntariness, there was no error in failing to give such a charge. Batts v. State, 238 Ga. 664, 667, 235 S.E.2d 377. 3. Defendant contends the chain of custody of the drugs purchased was not established sufficiently to show there was a reaso......
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