Baughman v. Dept. of Pub. Safety Motor Vehicle Salvage

• Decision Date: 07 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96CA2410,96CA2410
• Citation: 118 Ohio App.3d 564,693 N.E.2d 851
• Parties: BAUGHMAN, d.b.a. Baughman's Salvage, Appellant, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY MOTOR VEHICLE SALVAGE, Appellee. Fourth District, Scioto County
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 564

118 Ohio App.3d 564

693 N.E.2d 851

BAUGHMAN, d.b.a. Baughman's Salvage, Appellant, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY MOTOR VEHICLE SALVAGE, Appellee.

No. 96CA2410.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,

Fourth District, Scioto County.

Decided March 7, 1997.

John R. Haas, Portsmouth, for appellant.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Matthew L. Sagone, Assistant Attorney General, Columbus, for appellee.

STEPHENSON, Presiding Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Scioto County, Ohio, affirming an adjudication order issued by the Motor Vehicle Salvage Dealers' Licensing Board ("MVSDLB") revoking a salvage dealer's license held by Jeffrey Baughman, d.b.a. Baughman's Salvage, plaintiff below and appellant herein. The following errors are assigned for our review:

I. "The trial court erred by failing to find a violation of appellant's right to due process."

II. "Section 4738.03(A) of the Ohio Revised Code is inoperative and void for uncertainty of meaning and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution or in the alternative, the trial [court] erred in its interpretation of R.C. 4738.03."

III. "The trial court erred by denying Baughman's motion for admission of additional evidence."

The record reveals the following facts pertinent to this appeal. Appellant received his salvage dealer's license in 1993 and, on January 1, 1994, began operation of a salvage business on Cockrells Run Road in Scioto County, Ohio. Several months thereafter, a "complaint" was received by the office of "Dealer Licensing Division" with respect to that business. There would appear to have been some degree of controversy below over the identity of the complainant. At first, the complaint was said to have been lodged by an "anonymous" party. It was later revealed, however, that the complainant was Robert Lambert. Lambert is an executive officer of a salvage dealers' association and is a registered lobbyist for the industry. He apparently files complaints on a regular basis against other salvage dealers claiming that they do not qualify for their licenses.

In any event, the complaint prompted several investigations of appellant's salvage business and eventually culminated with him being notified that he was in violation of standards set forth in the motor vehicle salvage laws of R.C. Chapter 4738. A hearing was held on February 23, 1995, at which time Timothy Hughes (an investigator of the Field Operations Division of the Bureau of Motor Vehicles) testified regarding his inspection(s) of Baughman's Salvage. The witness stated that the office of the salvage yard appeared to be "unused" and that the records for the business were kept at a "used car dealership" that appellant owned. Hughes also recounted that, on both visits to the salvage yard, the property had been locked up and there was "no publicly posted hours of operation." There was little in the way of inventory at the premises and sale invoices reviewed by Hughes demonstrated only $100 in salvage part sales. ¹ This figure represented less than one percent of the total sales of appellant's business. ² On the basis of these figures, as well as his observations of the salvage yard, Hughes concluded that appellant was not engaged "primarily" in the retail sale of salvage motor vehicle parts as required by law.

Appellant testified on his own behalf and explained that the business was a new operation and that he was trying to increase the sale of salvage parts. He also clarified that the salvage yard was kept locked up, and the records stored elsewhere, because of theft problems in the area. These explanations were apparently insufficient for the board members hearing the case. On March 7, 1995, an "Adjudication Order" was issued by the MVSDLB finding that appellant "was not primarily engaged in the business of selling at retail salvage motor vehicle parts" in violation of Ohio law. His salvage dealer's license was then ordered revoked.

On March 16, 1995, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the adjudication order to the court below. He also filed a motion requesting that the trial court permit him to "obtain and offer newly discovered evidence." The impetus for the motion lay with Lambert who, as previously discussed, was the individual who lodged the complaint against Baughman Salvage. Lambert is an officer of a salvage dealers' association and it was alleged that at least two of the three board members of the MVSDLB might also be members of the same association. If that were the case, appellant contended, then those board members should have recused themselves and not sat in judgment on the merits of the complaint against him as such action would violate his due process rights. Appellant indicated in his motion that he had no evidence to substantiate that the board members in question belonged to the same organization as Lambert. However, he requested permission to "obtain" the testimony of those board members to ascertain if this was the case. ³ A judgment was entered by the lower court on August 28, 1995, denying this request.

Both sides filed briefs and the matter was submitted to the court thereon. A ruling was issued by the trial court on January 17, 1996, finding that the adjudication order of the MVSDLB was "supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and * * * [was] in accordance with the law." The order was, therefore, affirmed and this appeal followed.

We begin our analysis by noting that the cause sub judice is governed by the provisions of R.C. 119.12, which allow for a party to appeal a ruling of an administrative agency to the court of common pleas. In reviewing an administrative appeal, the common pleas court is not permitted to either try the issues de novo or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency. Smith v. Sushka (1995), 103 Ohio App.3d 465, 470, 659 N.E.2d 875, 878-879; Cook v. Maxwell (1989), 57 Ohio App.3d 131, 135, 567 N.E.2d 292, 296-297; Steinbacher v. Louis (1987), 36 Ohio App.3d 68, 71, 520 N.E.2d 1381, 1384. The role of the common pleas court in an administrative appeal is limited to determining whether the judgment of the administrative agency is support by reliable, probative and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. See R.C. 119.12; see, also, Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 748, 750-751; In re Williams (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 85, 86, 573 N.E.2d 638, 639. An appellate court is then typically restricted to ascertaining whether the common pleas court abused its discretion in reaching that determination. See Rossford Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Bd. of Edn. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 705, 707, 590 N.E.2d 1240, 1241. ⁴ With this standard in mind, we turn our attention to the merits of the case before us.

Appellant argues in his first assignment of error that he was denied "due process" of law during the course of the administrative proceedings. The basis for this argument is his continuing assertion that several members of the MVSDLB were members of a trade association of which Lambert was an officer. Appellant concludes that he was not given a "fair" and "impartial" hearing because those members and Lambert belonged to the same organization. We are not persuaded. There is nothing in the records to substantiate that any of the three individuals on the MVSDLB who voted to revoke appellant's salvage dealer's license were members of the same organization as Lambert. Even assuming arguendo that they were members, we are still not convinced that this was sufficient to disqualify them per se from sitting in judgment at the administrative level. The Ohio General Assembly has dictated that two members of the MVSDLB must have previously operated in the salvage business. See R.C. 4738.09. One might expect that those individuals may have some affiliation, or some previous affiliation, with an industry association. We are not prepared to rule that such members may not serve on the MVSDLB and sit in judgment of complaints filed against other dealers.

There is no doubt that due process requires administrative hearings to be conducted in a fair and impartial manner. See 2 American Jurisprudence 2d (1994) 315, Administrative Law, Section 302. However, there is nothing in the record of the cause sub judice which convinces us that appellant's hearing was conducted otherwise. We have reviewed the transcript of the administrative hearing and have found no discernable bias or prejudice on the part of the MVSDLB members. To be sure, there was some degree of conflict between appellant's counsel and board members over the direction of cross-examination. Counsel sought to pursue a line of questioning directed at the motives of Lambert in lodging a complaint against appellant. The MVSDLB found this line of inquiry to be irrelevant and tried to steer the proceedings back to the substance of those allegations in the complaint. We need not and do not determine whether the MVSDLB erred in the manner by which it conducted these proceedings. It does not appear that any of the board members present at the hearing had any legal background and, in any event, the procedure to be followed before administrative agencies is not as strict and inflexible as that prescribed for ordinary civil actions. See 2 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1977) 251, Administrative Law, Section 83. There is no indication of any egregious procedural violation by the board and, as stated previously, we find no evidence of bias or prejudice toward appellant. For all these reasons, the first assignment of error is overruled.

We now proceed out of order to the third assignment of error wherein appellant contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion for admission of additional evidence below. It should be noted at the outset that admission of additional evidence during an...