Bautista v. State
Decision Date | 04 December 2003 |
Docket Number | No. SC02-2121.,SC02-2121. |
Citation | 863 So.2d 1180 |
Parties | David BAUTISTA, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and David John McPherrin, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, West Palm Beach, and Daniel P. Hyndman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.
We have for review Bautista v. State, 832 So.2d 122 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal certified the following question as one of great public importance:
DOES THE "A/ANY" TEST ADOPTED IN GRAPPIN V. STATE AND STATE V. WATTS AS THE METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE UNIT OF PROSECUTION FOR THE COMMISSION OF MULTIPLE PROSCRIBED ACTS IN THE COURSE OF A SINGLE EPISODE, PRECLUDE MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS FOR DUI MANSLAUGHTER WHERE MORE THAN ONE DEATH OCCURS IN A SINGLE ACCIDENT AS APPROVED IN MELBOURNE V. STATE?
Bautista, 832 So.2d at 125.1 We have rephrased the question to be:
DOES THE "A/ANY" TEST ADOPTED IN GRAPPIN V. STATE AND STATE V. WATTS PRECLUDE MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS OF DUI MANSLAUGHTER WHERE MULTIPLE DEATHS OCCUR IN A SINGLE DUI CRASH?
For the reasons stated below, we answer the certified question in the negative and hold that multiple convictions of DUI manslaughter may arise from multiple deaths in a single DUI crash.
David Bautista was driving under the influence of alcohol when his vehicle collided with another car, fatally injuring its two occupants.2 He was convicted on two counts of DUI manslaughter. Bautista appealed, arguing that since the DUI manslaughter statute penalizes the killing of "any human being" rather than "a human being," the statute does not authorize multiple convictions based on two deaths arising from a single DUI incident. Relying on Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1996), where this Court held that multiple convictions arising from a single DUI incident did not violate double jeopardy principles, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions. The district court concluded that Bautista's claim, although not based on the principle of double jeopardy, was nonetheless foreclosed by this Court's language in Melbourne.
The DUI manslaughter statute, section 316.193(3)(c)(3), Florida Statutes (2002), provides:
....
Relying on the "a/any" test developed in Grappin v. State, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984), and State v. Watts, 462 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1985), Bautista argues that because the adjective "any" modifies "human being" in the statute, the killing of multiple persons in a single DUI incident constitutes a single offense of DUI manslaughter.
To properly resolve the certified question, we must first trace the history and purpose behind the "a/any" test. In Grappin, we were confronted with a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal that was in direct conflict with decisions from two other district courts of appeal. The issue presented was the Legislature's intended unit of prosecution for the theft of a firearm under subsection (2)(b)(3) of Florida's general theft statute. § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (1979). Employing what it called "a common sense reading of the plain language of section 812.014(2)(b)," the Second District determined that such a reading demonstrates "that the legislature unmistakably intended for the simultaneous unlawful taking of more than one firearm to be subject to a separate prosecution." State v. Grappin, 427 So.2d 760, 763 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (emphasis added), approved, 450 So.2d 480 (Fla.1984).
Section 812.014(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), read as follows:
(Emphasis added.) The Second District noted that the Legislature's enactment Grappin, 427 So.2d at 762-63. The Second District believed the Legislature's differing use of "a" and "any" was intentional. It stated:
We do not believe that the legislature inadvertently inserted different articles in parts 2 through 4 and 5 through 7. In our view, the legislature's use of the article "a" in parts 2 through 4 reveals its recognition of the distinction in meaning between the articles "any" and "a" for purposes of establishing the permissible unit of prosecution. In other words, its use of different articles signifies its intent, with respect to simultaneously pilfered firearms ... to treat separately each stick in the bundle.
Grappin, 427 So.2d at 763 (footnote omitted)(emphasis added). The Second District buttressed its determination of legislative intent in two ways. First, it looked at the overall statutory scheme relative to firearms. It found that firearms are subject to strict, comprehensive statutory regulation and that in light of the "strong policy considerations" within this statutory scheme, "it is unreasonable to presume that the legislature intended to make simultaneously stolen firearms (or motor vehicles or testamentary instruments) cheaper by the dozen." State v. Grappin, 427 So.2d at 763. Secondly, the Second District looked at related cases. It cited several federal cases interpreting the intended unit of prosecution under federal firearm statutes that used either "a" or "any."
We acknowledged the Second District's use of a common-sense approach in its interpretation of this statute and approved its decision. In fact, we employed the same common-sense approach in our own interpretation. We acknowledged that the Legislature must fix the punishment for violation of statutes clearly and without ambiguity. If there is ambiguity, we said that the rule of lenity applies to resolve the ambiguity against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses. But we also stated that "[w]here legislative intent as to punishment is clear ... the rule of lenity does not apply." Grappin, 450 So.2d at 482. To reach a common sense interpretation of the legislatively intended unit of prosecution, we used the same basic analysis as the Second District. First, we looked at the various uses of "a" and "any" within the statute itself. Next, we looked at our prior interpretation of the same statute in State v. Getz, 435 So.2d 789 (Fla.1983). Lastly, we looked at decisions of other courts. We looked at federal court cases faced with similar questions of statutory interpretation. As did the Second District, we found that our construction was consistent with federal circuit court decisions construing similar federal statutes that used either "any" firearm or "a" firearm. Ultimately, by applying this common-sense approach to statutory interpretation, we found "that the use of the article `a' in reference to `a firearm' in section 812.014(2)(b)3 clearly shows that the legislature intended to make each firearm a separate unit of prosecution." Grappin, 450 So.2d at 482.
Eight months after Grappin, we applied the a/any test in Watts and held that a prisoner could only be charged with one count of possession of contraband based on his possession of two prison-made knives discovered in his cell at the same time. Watts, 462 So.2d at 814. The contraband statute in Watts prohibited possession by an inmate of "[a]ny firearm or weapon of any kind." 462 So.2d at 814 (quoting section 944.47, Florida Statutes (1981)).3 In the Watts opinion, even though a completely different statute was at issue, there is no discussion of the common-sense approach to statutory interpretation employed in Grappin to determine the legislatively intended unit of prosecution. The Watts opinion simply extrapolates the a/any distinction specifically derived from section 812.041(2)(b) to a wholly unrelated statute. The prison contraband statute contained no variant uses of "a" or "any" before the prohibited items of property. Section 944.47 consistently used "any" before each item listed. So, unlike section 812.041(2)(b), within section 944.47 itself there was no clear expression of legislative intent as to the unit of prosecution. Unlike the Grappin decision, the Watts opinion does not discuss either the overall statutory scheme relative to contraband, the public policy behind the statute, or how other courts have interpreted similar statutes.
Therefore, when the Watts opinion stated that it was "applying the rationale of Grappin to" section 944.47, it actually was only applying a portion of the Grappin rationale. Watts, 462 So.2d at 814. There was no effort to find the legislatively intended unit of prosecution. Only the syntactical distinction between "a" and "any" was used to find ambiguity and thus apply the rule of lenity. Consequently, applying only the a/any rationale of Grappin, we held that the use of "any" created an ambiguity as to the intended unit of prosecution and this ambiguity precluded the State from charging multiple counts based on the defendant's simultaneous possession of multiple items of contraband. Watts, 462 So.2d at 814.
Twelve years later in Wallace v. State, 724 So.2d 1176 (Fla.1998), we held that a defendant who resisted two...
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