E.A.R. v. State

• Decision Date: 30 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. SC08-506.,SC08-506.
• Citation: 4 So.3d 614
• Parties: E.A.R., a child, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

4 So.3d 614

E.A.R., a child, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC08-506.

Supreme Court of Florida.

January 30, 2009.

Rehearing Denied March 2, 2009.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Elisabeth Porter, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach FL, for Petitioner.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Melanie Dale Durber, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.

LEWIS, J.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal has certified conflict between its decision in E.A.R. v. State, 975 So.2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in M.S. v. State, 927 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). See E.A.R., 975 So.2d at 613; see also A.T. v. State, 983 So.2d 679, 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (certifying conflict on the same issue), notice invoking discretionary review filed, No. SC08-1159 (Fla. June 12, 2008). We now exercise our discretionary jurisdiction to resolve this inter-district impasse. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. The precise issue at the center of this conflict is whether chapter 985, Florida Statutes (2007),¹ requires juvenile courts to justify departures from the Department of Juvenile Justice's ("DJJ") recommended dispositions² by explaining a judge's "reasons" for a departure in terms of the characteristics of the imposed restrictiveness level vis-à-vis the rehabilitative needs of the child (i.e., a utilitarian comparison between (1) the type of custodial confinement that the juvenile will experience, and (2) the most appropriate dispositional services for the child given his or her individual needs and treatment plan).³

At first blush, this issue may appear to be simple, somewhat esoteric, and purely procedural but is, in actuality, very practical and fundamental to the statutory role that a juvenile court must fulfill during a disposition hearing. See § 985.03(21), Fla. Stat. (2007). As we have previously observed, the Legislature created the juvenile justice system as a separate, distinct rehabilitative alternative to the more punitive, incapacitation-oriented criminal justice system. See V.K.E. v. State, 934 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Fla.2006); State v. J.M., 824 So.2d 105, 114 (Fla.2002); P.W.G. v. State, 702 So.2d 488, 490-91 (Fla.1997); In re C.J.W., 377 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla.1979); cf. N.C. v. Anderson, 882 So.2d 990, 994 (Fla. 2004) ("The State has `a parens patriae⁴ interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,' which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial." (citation omitted) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982))). Thus, Florida's treatment of juvenile delinquency is largely sui generis. Here, we conclude that these distinctions are readily identifiable and inherent in the dispositional process, which has been comprehensively addressed by our Legislature under chapter 985.

For the reasons expressed in our analysis, we quash the decision of the Fourth District in E.A.R. v. State, 975 So.2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), disapprove A.T. v. State, 983 So.2d 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008), and conclude that chapter 985 — read in pari materia — compels the adoption of a version of the restrictiveness-level-needs-of-the-child standard articulated by the First, Second, and Fifth District Courts of Appeal. See, e.g., N.B. v. State, 911 So.2d 833, 835-36 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); M.S. v. State, 927 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); J.M. v. State, 939 So.2d 1138, 1139 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). Our only modifications of the standard announced and applied by these courts stem directly from the statutory scheme, which, in addition to focusing upon rehabilitation, individualized treatment, and the juvenile court's exercise of appropriate discretion, explicitly states that "with respect to juvenile justice and delinquency prevention," it is the intent of the Legislature to "protect the public from acts of delinquency," section 985.02(3), Florida Statutes (2007), and also provides that it is the duty of the juvenile court to provide "the most appropriate dispositional services [for the child] in the least restrictive available setting." § 985.03(21), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis supplied). As we explain below, these twin goals of the juvenile justice system (rehabilitation and protection of the public) are not necessarily irreconcilable but are, in fact, complementary⁵ and, further, mandate the type of "reasons" that the juvenile court must provide to justify a departure disposition under section 985.433(7)(b), Florida Statutes (2007).

I. BACKGROUND

During fiscal year 2007-08, the circuit courts of this state committed 6,616 juveniles to residential treatment facilities. See Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Five Year Juvenile Delinquency Trends and Conditions, http://www.djj. state.fl.us/Research/Trends.html (last accessed Jan. 27, 2009). Consequently, identifying the proper standard and elements by which juvenile courts may permissibly depart from the DJJ's recommended dispositions is enormously important to the futures of thousands of children per year (not to mention the future of Florida). The treatment programs and services available to committed juveniles vary between commitment facilities. Therefore, once the DJJ has identified the restrictiveness level — and thereby the commitment facilities — that are most appropriate in terms of the child's individual rehabilitative needs, treatment plan, and the goal of protecting the public, it would defeat the legislative scheme of chapter 985 to allow the juvenile court to depart from the DJJ's professional disposition recommendation for just any "reason" that may be present in the materials previously provided and already considered by the DJJ. Such a rule of law would thwart legislative intent, invite judicial capriciousness, and promote the inconsistent application and development of legal doctrine. Section 985.433(7)(b) does provide the juvenile court a measure of discretion to depart from the DJJ's recommended disposition when the DJJ has overlooked, failed to sufficiently consider, or misconstrued a significant characteristic of the child's programmatic, rehabilitative needs along with the risks that the unrehabilitated child poses to the public; however, it does not grant the juvenile court a license to promote procedural arbitrariness whenever the court simply disagrees with the DJJ. Any other approach would further ignore the Legislature's command in the last clause of section 985.433(7)(b) to provide meaningful appellate review of such departure dispositions.

A. E.A.R.'s Juvenile Offenses

E.A.R., the juvenile offender involved in this case, is currently a seventeen-year-old held in State custody. He was somewhat younger at the time he committed the offenses that led to his eventual placement in a high-risk DJJ residential-commitment program. E.A.R. committed the first relevant offense, trespass to a structure (a second-degree misdemeanor if prosecuted as an adult),⁶ between October 7 and 12, 2005. At that time, he and another male juvenile entered the home of an individual who was vacationing abroad. Once inside, the boys damaged the interior and fixtures of the home and then fled. E.A.R. was fourteen at the time he committed this offense.

Later, on November 5, 2005, E.A.R. committed the second relevant offense, burglary of an unoccupied conveyance while unarmed (a third-degree felony if prosecuted as an adult).⁷ He and a male accomplice attempted to break into a parked automobile. E.A.R. stood as a lookout while his accomplice unsuccessfully attempted to gain access to the interior of the automobile. The victim did not report any missing items or damage to the vehicle. E.A.R. was one day short of his fifteenth birthday when he committed this offense.

On August 15, 2006, E.A.R. pled guilty to these two offenses in exchange for withheld adjudication and juvenile probation. As part of this plea bargain, E.A.R. agreed to testify against his accomplice(s). On January 29, 2007, E.A.R.'s probation officer and an assistant state attorney filed an affidavit and petition for violation of probation alleging that E.A.R. failed to comply with the requirements of his probation by missing school, breaking curfew, disobeying his legal guardian, and changing his residence without his probation officer's permission.

Contemporaneously, during late January of 2007, E.A.R. stole his legal guardian's checkbook and ran away from home. On the afternoon of January 30, 2007, E.A.R. committed the third relevant offense, uttering a forged instrument (a third-degree felony if prosecuted as an adult),⁸ by entering a check-cashing business and attempting to exchange one of the stolen checks for $400. E.A.R. was taken into custody and placed in secure detention⁹ pending his adjudication¹⁰ and disposition. On February 8, 2007, the State amended its petition for violation of probation to include E.A.R.'s new law violation.

B. DJJ Intake, Assessment, and Recommended Disposition

Once E.A.R. was in custody, law-enforcement and DJJ personnel began the intake process, which involves

the initial acceptance and screening by the [DJJ] of a complaint or a law enforcement report or probable cause affidavit of delinquency ... to determine the recommendation to be taken in the best interests of the child, the family, and the community. The emphasis of intake is on diversion and the least restrictive available services.

§ 985.03(27), Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis supplied); see generally ch. 985, part III, Fla. Stat. (2007) (addressing juvenile custody and intake). The DJJ accomplishes intake screening within "a case management system," through which DJJ personnel

assess the child's needs and risks and ... determine the most appropriate treatment plan and setting for the child's programmatic needs and risks. The intake process shall result in choosing the...