Baysden v. State
| Decision Date | 15 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. COA11–395.,COA11–395. |
| Citation | 718 S.E.2d 699 |
| Parties | Walter Sutton BAYSDEN, Plaintiff v. The STATE of North Carolina, Defendant. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 11 February 2011 by Judge Lucy N. Inman in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 September 2011.
Dan L. Hardway Law Office, Angier, by Dan L. Hardway, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General John J. Aldridge, III, for the State.
Plaintiff Walter Sutton Baysden appeals from an order rejecting his challenge to the constitutionality of the Felony Firearms Act, N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–415.1 et seq. , both facially and as applied to the facts surrounding his personal situation. More specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Felony Firearms Act violates his right to bear arms as guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution as made applicable to the States by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 19 and 30 of the North Carolina Constitution; the prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder set out in Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the North Carolina Constitution; and the equal protection guarantees afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution. After careful consideration of Plaintiff's challenges to the trial court's judgment in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's judgment should be reversed and that this case should be remanded to the Wake County Superior Court for the entry of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff.
On 8 November 1972, Plaintiff was convicted in Virginia Beach, Virginia, for the felonious possession of an unlawful weapon (a sawed-off shotgun). At that time, Plaintiff was 22 years old. Plaintiff had discovered the shotgun, which was “rusted up and inoperable,” under a house on the beach. Plaintiff never engaged in any violent conduct while in possession of the sawed-off shotgun.
On 26 April 1977, Plaintiff was convicted for the felonious sale of marijuana in Norfolk, Virginia. Although Plaintiff admitted having experimented with marijuana when he was young, he denied having ever sold marijuana or having used or possessed illegal drugs since 1977.
In 1982, the Governor of Virginia restored the firearms-related rights that Plaintiff had forfeited as a result of these two convictions. A year later, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms of the United States Department of the Treasury granted Plaintiff's application for relief from federal firearms disabilities pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
Plaintiff has resided in a house that he owns with his wife of 32 years in Onslow County since 1995. Since his conviction for selling marijuana in 1977, Plaintiff has not been charged with or convicted of any criminal offense other than minor traffic violations. In addition, Plaintiff has never been accused of engaging in acts of domestic violence or been the subject of either a protective order issued pursuant to Chapter 50B of the General Statutes or a no-contact order issued pursuant to Chapter 50C of the General Statutes.
Plaintiff was employed by the United States Department of Defense from 1981 until his retirement in 2007. During the course of his employment by the Department of Defense, Plaintiff maintained aircraft for the United States Navy. While employed by the Department of Defense, Plaintiff passed the background checks required for him to obtain necessary government security clearances and was decorated for exemplary service during a tour of duty in Iraq.
After the restoration of his right to use and possess firearms, Plaintiff owned firearms, which he used for self-defense purposes. In addition, Plaintiff collected guns and frequently participated in shooting matches. Plaintiff's possession and use of firearms after the restoration of his gun-related rights in 1983 never resulted in a complaint of any nature.
Upon moving to North Carolina in 1995, Plaintiff limited his possession of firearms to his home and business premises, consistent with North Carolina law as it existed at that time. After the enactment of the 2004 amendments to the Felony Firearms Act, which precluded convicted felons from possessing firearms at any location and under any set of circumstances, Plaintiff “dispossessed himself of all firearms.” Plaintiff has never been charged with violating North Carolina's firearms statutes.
On 6 May 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the Felony Firearms Act is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to him. On 1 June 2010, the State filed an answer denying the material allegations of Plaintiff's complaint. On 23 August 2010, after obtaining leave of court to do so, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint which reflected the 2010 amendments to the Felony Firearms Act enacted by the General Assembly and reiterated his request for a declaration that the Felony Firearms Act, as amended, violated his federal and state constitutional rights, both facially and as applied. On 13 September 2010, the State filed an amended answer denying the material allegations of Plaintiff's amended complaint.
On the same date, the State filed a motion seeking, alternatively, the dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6), or the entry of summary judgment in the State's favor pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 56. On 13 October 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking the entry of summary judgment in his favor. After providing the parties with an opportunity to be heard at the 5 January 2011 civil session of the Wake County Superior Court, the trial court entered an order denying the State's dismissal motion and Plaintiff's summary judgment motion and granting the State's summary judgment motion on 11 February 2011. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's order.
A motion for summary judgment is properly granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 56(c). “A defendant may show entitlement to summary judgment by: ‘(1) proving that an essential element of the plaintiff's case is nonexistent, or (2) showing through discovery that the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his or her claim, or (3) showing that the plaintiff cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim.’ ” Carcano v. JBSS, LLC, 200 N.C.App. 162, 166, 684 S.E.2d 41, 46 (2009) (). As a result, “[a]n appeal from an order granting summary judgment solely raises issues of whether on the face of the record there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Carcano, 200 N.C.App. at 166, 684 S.E.2d at 46 (citing Smith–Price v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys., 164 N.C.App. 349, 352, 595 S.E.2d 778, 781 (2004)). A trial court's order granting or denying summary judgment is reviewed by this Court on a de novo basis, so that we “ ‘consider [ ] the matter anew and freely substitute[our] own judgment’ for that of the lower tribunal.” Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 342, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2009) (quoting In re Appeal of The Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P'ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)). As a result of the fact that, while “the parties disagree on the legal significance of the established facts, the facts themselves are not in dispute[,]” Musi v. Town of Shallotte, 200 N.C.App. 379, 381, 684 S.E.2d 892, 894 (2009) (), “the only issue that we need to address is the extent, if any, to which the trial court erred,” Smith v. County of Durham, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 714 S.E.2d 849, 855 (2011), by concluding that the Felony Firearms Act did not violate any of Plaintiff's state or federal constitutional rights, either facially or as applied to a person in Plaintiff's position.
According to Article I, Section 30 of the North Carolina Constitution:
A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; and, as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained, and the military shall be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power. Nothing herein shall justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons or prevent the General Assembly from enacting penal statutes against that practice.
As a result of the fact that “North Carolina decisions have interpreted our Constitution as guaranteeing the right to bear arms to the people in [both] a collective sense ... and also to individuals” and that “the right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation,” State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 546, 159 S.E.2d 1, 10 (1968) (citing Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846)), we are required to Britt v. State, 363 N.C. 546, 549, 681 S.E.2d 320, 322 (2009).
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