Smith-Price v. Charter Behavioral Health

Decision Date18 May 2004
Docket NumberNo. COA99-1523.,COA99-1523.
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesCynthia SMITH-PRICE, Plaintiff, v. CHARTER BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SYSTEMS, d/b/a Charter Hospital, and Jay Laws, joint and severally, Defendants.

Gray, Newell, Johnson & Blackmon, LLP, by Angela Newell Gray, Greensboro, for plaintiff-appellant.

Smith Moore LLP, by Julie C. Theall, Greensboro, for defendant-appellee Charter Behavioral Health Systems.

Haynsworth Baldwin Johnson & Greaves LLC, by Lucretia D. Guia, Greensboro, for defendant-appellee Jay Laws.

MARTIN, Chief Judge.

In her amended complaint in this action against defendants Charter Behavioral Health Systems ("Charter"), Jean Hubbard ("Hubbard"), Charter's Director of Nursing, and Jay Laws ("Laws"), a mental health specialist at Charter, plaintiff alleges claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation and retaliation for reporting illegal, unprofessional and immoral conduct. Plaintiff also alleged claims against defendant Charter for negligent supervision and negligent retention of three of its employees. All defendants filed answers in which they denied the material allegations of plaintiff's amended complaint and asserted affirmative defenses. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed the action against Hubbard with prejudice, and defendants Charter and Laws moved for summary judgment.

Materials before the trial court at the hearing on defendants' motions for summary judgment disclose that plaintiff, a registered nurse, and Laws worked in the children's unit at Charter's Greensboro facility. Although Laws was under the direct supervision of plaintiff, she had no administrative authority. As early as November 1997, plaintiff complained about Laws' tardiness, abuse of phone privileges, failure to follow policy, insubordination and his inappropriate sexual relationship with a co-worker. She also expressed dissatisfaction with Charter's under-staffing, but Charter took no corrective action.

On 5 February 1998, Laws arrived late at work, which, according to plaintiff, was not uncommon. After plaintiff confronted Laws about his tardiness, excessive phone calls, taking "off orders" and his attitude at work, he angrily walked away from plaintiff. Laws returned a few minutes later, claiming taking "off orders" was not his job, and threw a packet of papers containing a job description at plaintiff, hitting her in the chest. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that the impact caused her little physical pain, but the incident was emotionally traumatic. After this episode, plaintiff enlisted the help of the assistant director of nursing, Kathy Williams, who agreed that defendant Laws should be sent home for the day for insubordination. At the request of Williams, plaintiff prepared a written statement of the events to submit to Hubbard the following day.

Although Laws was not scheduled to work the following day, he came into Charter and submitted a report claiming plaintiff had sexually harassed him. An investigation of the allegation was promptly initiated by Charter. Some employees corroborated Laws' complaints while others expressed no knowledge of inappropriate behavior by plaintiff. However, because of the allegations, plaintiff was moved to the adult unit of the hospital while Laws remained on the children's unit. On or about 10 February 1998 plaintiff took a medical leave due to the stress caused by the accusations.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants and plaintiff gave notice of appeal. On 16 February 2000, Charter filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. By order dated 3 March 2000, this Court stayed all further proceedings in this case until notified that the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362 had been lifted. Such notification was received by this Court on 16 July 2003.

Plaintiff's Appeal as to Defendant Charter

On 22 October 2001, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware disallowed plaintiff's claims against Charter in full. Charter has moved to dismiss plaintiff's appeal of the order granting summary judgment in its favor on the grounds that plaintiff's claim against Charter has been disallowed by the Bankruptcy Court, rendering the issues between plaintiff and Charter in this appeal moot.

Whenever, during the course of litigation it develops that the relief sought has been granted or that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are no longer at issue, the case should be dismissed, for courts will not entertain or proceed with a cause merely to determine abstract propositions of law.

In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 147, 250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 99 S.Ct. 2859, 61 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979). "An appeal which presents a moot question should be dismissed." Dickerson Carolina, Inc. v. Harrelson, 114 N.C.App. 693, 698, 443 S.E.2d 127, 131 (1994). The order of the Bankruptcy Court disallowing plaintiff's claim against Charter has rendered moot the issue of whether Charter was entitled to summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims. Charter's motion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal is, therefore, allowed.

Plaintiff's Appeal as to Defendant Laws
I.

"[T]he standard of review on appeal from summary judgment is whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Bruce-Terminix Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 130 N.C.App. 729, 733, 504 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1998). Summary judgment is appropriate when "viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant," Id., "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2003). The moving party must establish the lack of any triable issue of material fact "by proving that an essential element of the opposing party's claim is non-existent, or by showing through discovery that the opposing party cannot produce evidence to support an essential element of his claim or cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim." DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 355 N.C. 672, 681-682, 565 S.E.2d 140, 146 (2002) (citation omitted). The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to "produce a forecast of evidence demonstrating that the [nonmoving party] will be able to make out at least a prima facie case at trial." Id. (citation omitted). Although summary judgment is seldom granted in negligence cases, it may be granted where the evidence shows "a lack of any negligence on the part of the defendant." Surrette v. Duke Power Co., 78 N.C.App. 647, 650, 338 S.E.2d 129, 131 (1986).

II.

Initially, defendant Laws argues that plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed because plaintiff has not followed the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure which require each assignment of error to "state plainly, concisely and without argumentation the legal basis upon which error is assigned." N.C.R.App. P. Rule 10(c). "An assignment of error is sufficient if it directs the attention of the appellate court to the particular error about which the question is made, with clear and specific record or transcript references." Id.

Each of plaintiff's assignments of error state, "The trial court erred by granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff's claim of...." An appeal from an order granting summary judgment raises only the issues of whether, on the face of the record, there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the notice of appeal suffices as an assignment of error directed to the order of summary judgment. Ellis v. Williams, 319 N.C. 413, 415, 355 S.E.2d 479, 481 (1987); Vernon, Vernon, Wooten, Brown & Andrews, P.A. v. Miller, 73 N.C.App. 295, 297, 326 S.E.2d 316, 319 (1985). Plaintiff's assignments of error are clearly sufficient.

III.

Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by granting defendant Laws' motion for summary judgment as to her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The negligent act upon which plaintiff's claim is grounded is that Laws "communicat[ed] false and misleading information regarding the Plaintiff's employment behavior and job performance to the defendant company."

To establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove that "(1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct, (2) it was reasonably foreseeable that such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress ..., and (3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress." Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics, 327 N.C. 283, 304, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97, reh'g denied, 327 N.C. 644, 399 S.E.2d 133 (1990). "In order to establish actionable negligence, plaintiff must show (1) that there has been a failure to exercise proper care in the performance of some legal duty which defendant owed to plaintiff under the circumstances in which they were placed; and (2) that such negligent breach of duty was a proximate cause of the injury." Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equipment Co., 310 N.C. 227, 232, 311 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1984).

In this case, plaintiff presented no evidence to establish that defendant Laws owed her a duty of care or that he breached such a duty. Therefore, an essential element of plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress is unsupported by the evidence and summary judgment was properly allowed. See Guthrie v. Conroy, 152 N.C.App. 15, 25, 567 S.E.2d 403, 411 (2002)

.

IV.

Plaintiff next contends the trial court erred by granting defendant Laws' motion for summary judgment as to her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The elements for the tort...

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