Baystate Moving Systems, Inc. v. Bowman

• Decision Date: 07 May 1991
• Docket Number: No. 8961,8961
• Citation: 590 A.2d 462,24 Conn.App. 531
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: BAYSTATE MOVING SYSTEMS, INC. v. Peter C. BOWMAN, et al.

Page 462

590 A.2d 462

24 Conn.App. 531

BAYSTATE MOVING SYSTEMS, INC. v. Peter C. BOWMAN, et al.

No. 8961.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 13, 1990.

Decided May 7, 1991.

John J. Quinn, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Paul T. Nowosadko, with whom were Louis B. Blumenfeld and, on brief, Lorinda S. Coon, Hartford, for appellees (named defendant et al.).

Before DALY, EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL and FOTI, JJ.

FOTI, Judge.

The plaintiff intervenor in this personal injury action, Michael Dupont, appeals from the judgment in the amount of $10,500 that was rendered in his favor after a jury trial. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) allowed the defendants to offer evidence of workers' compensation benefits in violation of the collateral source rule, (2) did not permit the plaintiff to testify as a rebuttal witness to rehabilitate his own credibility, (3) did not permit Jonathan Reik to testify as a witness, and (4) charged the jury regarding the plaintiff's duty to mitigate damages. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury could have reasonably found the following facts. The plaintiff Michael Dupont was employed by Baystate Moving Systems, Inc. (Baystate), as a packer. On September 14, 1984, the plaintiff was driving a truck owned by Baystate in the performance of his duties when the truck was struck from the rear by a vehicle operated by the defendant Garry S. Krutkin. Krutkin's vehicle had been struck from behind by a pickup truck that was operated by the defendant Peter C. Bowman and owned by the defendant Peter E. Bowman. The plaintiff was injured in the accident and was treated by several physicians. The plaintiff never returned to work at Baystate, and made a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The plaintiff received benefits totaling over $20,000.

Baystate commenced this action pursuant to General Statutes § 31-293 in August, 1986, to recover previous payments. Dupont intervened by motion and joined the action as a coplaintiff. In 1988, Baystate withdrew its complaint, and the plaintiff continued to litigate the matter. This case was tried in January and February, 1990, to a jury that returned verdicts on February 2, 1990. The jury found the issues for the defendant Garry Krutkin, and for the plaintiff as against the defendants Peter C. Bowman and Peter E. Bowman. The jury found damages of $10,500. The court accepted the verdicts and judgment was rendered. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment in his favor against Peter C. Bowman and Peter E. Bowman.

The plaintiff's first claim is that the trial court improperly permitted the defendants to introduce evidence of the plaintiff's receipt of workers' compensation benefits in violation of the collateral source rule. The plaintiff objected to the following question: "Also during the year 1985, did you receive benefits from workers' compensation?" This question was asked during the defendants' cross-examination of the plaintiff regarding his past financial condition. This line of questioning seems to have been calculated to educe testimony from the plaintiff that was inconsistent with statements he had made during direct examination, and thereby to impeach his credibility. The plaintiff argues that this question violated the collateral source rule even if it was offered to impeach his credibility rather than as substantive evidence of a collateral source.

" 'The basis of our well-established collateral source rule is that a wrongdoer shall not benefit from a windfall from an outside source.' " Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 489-90, 572 A.2d 978 (1990), quoting United Aircraft Corporation v. International Assn. of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 101-102, 285 A.2d 330 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016, 92 S.Ct. 675, 30 L.Ed.2d 663 (1972); Regan v. New York & New England R.R. Co., 60 Conn. 124, 130, 22 A. 503 (1891).

Ordinarily, the fact that the plaintiff has received benefits from a third party would be irrelevant and inadmissible under the collateral source rule. Acampora v. Ledewitz, 159 Conn. 377, 384, 269 A.2d 288 (1970). Here, however, testimony that would otherwise have been irrelevant and inadmissible under the collateral source rule became relevant because of the plaintiff's prior statements. The plaintiff testified on direct examination concerning the gravity of his financial situation in 1985. ¹ Evidence that he had received substantial workers' compensation benefits during this period is certainly relevant to the issue of the plaintiff's credibility.

Our Supreme Court has held that when evidence of income from a collateral source is relevant to the issue of the credibility of a witness it shall be admissible for that purpose. Id. Indeed, that court stated that "it was reversible error not to have allowed the defendants to have pursued the matter on cross-examination." Id.

The plaintiff argues that this case can be distinguished from Acampora because the controverted testimony in this case was educed from the plaintiff, whereas in Acampora it was educed from a third party witness. We see no reason why this difference should change the outcome, and find the plaintiff's argument unpersuasive.

The plaintiff further argues that the trial court did not properly balance the probative value of the testimony regarding the issue of credibility against the potential prejudice that could arise from improper use of the testimony by the jury. The plaintiff maintains that if the court had engaged in the proper balancing of these concerns the evidence would not have been admitted. We disagree.

"As to the prejudicial effect of the testimony, the trial judge, in the exercise of judicial discretion, must decide whether the probative value of the testimony outweighs the prejudice likely to result from its admission. State v. Ralls, 167 Conn. 408, 417, 356 A.2d 147 [1974]; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 597, 325 A.2d 199 [cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 291, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973) ]." State v. Martin, 170 Conn. 161, 166, 365 A.2d 104 (1976). The determination of relevance, moreover, must be made according to reason and judicial experience. Robinson v. Faulkner, 163 Conn. 365, 371, 306 A.2d 857 (1972). This determination requires the exercise of the court's discretion. State v. Blyden, 165 Conn. 522, 531, 338 A.2d 484 (1973).

The principles by which we judge the propriety of the trial court's ruling on the relevance of evidence educed on cross-examination are well settled. The scope of cross-examination is a matter properly left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Ghere, 201 Conn. 289, 303, 513 A.2d 1226 (1986); State v. Briggs, 179 Conn. 328, 333, 426 A.2d 298 (1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 912, 100 S.Ct. 3000, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). " 'Every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of the court's ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.' " State v. Ghere, supra, quoting State v. Briggs, supra.

Applying this limited standard of review to this case in light of our Supreme Court's holding in Acampora, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in any way by admitting evidence of the plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits to impeach his credibility.

The plaintiff's second claim is that the trial court improperly denied him the opportunity to be recalled as a witness to rebut the defendants' attack on his credibility. The plaintiff argues that after the defendants' cross-examination elicited evidence of workers' compensation benefits that impeached his credibility, he should have been permitted to be recalled as a witness.

After the defendants' cross-examination, the plaintiff was given a full and fair opportunity for redirect examination to probe the issues raised on cross-examination. The plaintiff conducted brief redirect examination that did not touch on the issue of the workers' compensation benefits. Later, the court denied the plaintiff's request to be recalled as a witness. It was the denial of this request to be recalled that the plaintiff challenges.

"The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to permit a witness to be recalled." State v. Arroyo, 13 Conn.App. 687, 692, 539 A.2d 581, cert. denied, 208 Conn. 805, 545 A.2d 1103 (1988); see State v. Vandemark, 77 Conn. 201, 206, 58 A. 715 (1904). In this case, the trial court chose not to permit the plaintiff to be recalled to address the issue of workers' compensation benefits after the plaintiff neglected to address this issue on redirect examination. We cannot say that the plaintiff has shown that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit him to be recalled to offer direct testimony to rehabilitate his credibility after he had chosen not to address that issue during prior redirect examination.

The plaintiff further argues that he should have been permitted to testify as a rebuttal witness to rehabilitate his credibility. We disagree.

"The trial court is vested with considerable discretion in the matter of rebuttal evidence." State v. Wood, 208 Conn. 125, 139, 545 A.2d 1026, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 895, 109 S.Ct. 235, 102 L.Ed.2d 225 (1988); State v. Lisella, 187 Conn. 335, 337, 445 A.2d 922 (1982). Ideally, rebuttal evidence refutes evidence presented as part of the defendant's case-in-chief. See State v. Wood, supra; DiMaio v. Panico, 115 Conn. 295, 298-99, 161 A. 238 (1932); Hathaway v. Hemingway, 20 Conn. 191, 195 (1850).

We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in this case by limiting the plaintiff's rebuttal testimony to issues raised in the defendants' case-in-chief when the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to address these issues during redirect examination.

The plaintiff's next claim is that the trial court improperly excluded the testimony of Jonathan Reik. The plaintiff offered Reik's testimony to challenge the evidence of workers' compensation benefits and thereby to...