Baytops v. Morrison
Decision Date | 28 October 2020 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:20-CV-12786 |
Parties | MILTON BAYTOPS, Plaintiff, v. ELIE MORRISON, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
Plaintiff Milton Baytops ("Plaintiff"), presently confined at the G. Robert Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan, filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was subject to fake news, libel, slander, and defamation in reports about his state criminal charges and proceedings in Alpena County, Michigan, which ultimately led to his confinement in prison. Plaintiff was convicted of two drug offenses and a related conspiracy offense in the Alpena County Circuit Court and was sentenced, as a fourth habitual offender, to concurrent terms of 5 to 20 years imprisonment in 2019. See Plaintiff's Offender Profile, Michigan Department of Corrections Offender Tracking Information System ("OTIS"), http://mdocweb.state.mi.us/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=637359.
Plaintiff names Alpena area media personnel Elie Morrison, Julie Riddle, and Brian Thompson, the Alpena County local news and its sponsors, and former Alpena County prosecutor Ed Black as the defendants in this action and seeks $12 million in monetary damages and any other appropriate relief. On October 21, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee for this action. ECF No. 4. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will DISMISS Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 and on the basis of immunity.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 ("PLRA"), the Court is required to sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court is similarly required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees which is frivolous or malicious, fails tostate a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," as well as "a demand for the relief sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). While this notice pleading standard does not require "detailed" factual allegations, it does require more than the bare assertion of legal principles or conclusions. Id. Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A complaint's factual allegations must be "enough to raise a right to relief above thespeculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (citations and footnote omitted).
To state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he or she was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); Harris v. Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009). Additionally, a plaintiff must allege that the deprivation of his or her rights was intentional. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333-36 (1986).
The Court finds that Plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and on the basis of immunity. First, Plaintiff's claims against defendants Morrison, Riddle, Thompson, the Alpena County local news, and its sponsors must be dismissed because they are private individuals and entities, not state actors subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) ( ); Rudd v. City of North Shores, Mich., ___ F.3d ___, 2020 WL 5905062, *5 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 2020) (citing American); Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 591 (6th Cir. 2003) ( ).
To state a claim against a defendant under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct which caused his or her alleged injury is "fairly attributable to the State." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Conduct which deprives a party of a federally protected right can be said to be fairly attributable to the state when: (1) the deprivation is caused by the exercise of a state-created right or privilege, by a state-imposed rule of conduct, or by a person for whom the state is responsible, and (2) the party charged with the deprivation may be fairly described as a state actor. Id.; see also Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 195 (6th Cir. 1995) ( ).
Here, Plaintiff attempts to meet this requirement by alleging that the private parties conspired with the only state actor named as a defendant in this case, the former Alpena County prosecutor Ed Black. Private parties who conspire with public actors to violate constitutional rights are considered to act "under color" of state lawfor purposes of § 1983. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980); Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 292 (6th Cir. 2007). To state a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) a single plan, (2) that the alleged co-conspirator shared in the general conspiratorial objective, and (3) that an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that deprived the plaintiff of his civil rights. Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Memphis, TN Area Local v. City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898, 905 (6th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff must plead the conspiracy with some specificity. See Marvaso v. Sanchez, 971 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 2011)); Pahssen v. Merrill Comm. Sch. Dist., 668 F.3d 356, 368 (6th Cir. 2012).
The Court finds that Plaintiff's conspiracy allegations in his complaint are speculative, vague, and conclusory. Conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a civil rights claim under § 1983, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007); Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998); Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2009), including a conspiracy claim, see Horton v. Martin, 137 F. App'x 773 (6th Cir. 2005); Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff fails to allege any plausible facts of a conspiracy among the defendants, or with defendantBlack in particular, to demonstrate state action by the private individuals named in his complaint. Plaintiff's claims against defendants Morrison, Riddle, Thompson, the Alpena County local news, and its sponsors must therefore be dismissed.
Second, Plaintiff's claims against defendant Black, as well as the other defendants, for libel, slander, and defamation are subject to dismissal because they are state law claims and do not involve the violation of any rights secured by the federal Constitution or the laws of the United States. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991) (); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976) ( ); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382, 1389 (6th Cir. 1972) (); Collier v. Austin Peay State Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 760, 775 (M.D. Tenn. 2009) ( ); see also Harper v. (Unknown) Arkesteyn, No. 19-1928, 2020 WL 4877518, *2 (6th Cir. April 28, 2020) (). Plaintiff's allegations of libel, slander, and defamation, while perhaps actionable under Michigan law, do not state claims upon which relief may be granted under § 1983.1
A federal court has discretion to entertain pendent jurisdiction over state law claims filed with and arising out of the same facts as a § 1983 action. Kitchen v. Chippewa Valley Schs., 825 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1987). The exercise of pendent...
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