Spickler v. Greenberg
Decision Date | 11 July 1994 |
Parties | Robert D. SPICKLER v. Leo GREENBERG, et al. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Robert D. Spickler, pro se (orally).
Jonathan W. Brogan (orally), Russell B. Pierce, Jr., Norman, Hanson & Detroy, Portland, for defendant.
Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, CLIFFORD and RUDMAN, JJ.
Leo Greenberg and the Harbor Shop (Greenberg) appeal from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Lipez, J.), following a jury trial in which Greenberg was found liable for perjury pursuant to Maine's unique civil perjury statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 870 (1980). 1 Because Spickler failed to establish the elements necessary for recovery pursuant to the statute, we vacate the judgment.
This case is the culmination of almost fourteen years of litigation between the parties. The pertinent facts may be taken from Spickler v. Greenberg, 586 A.2d 1232, 1233 (Me.1991), as follows:
In 1979, Maine Coast Properties, Inc., a business brokerage firm, entered into a listing agreement with the Harbor Shop, Inc., for the sale of a women's apparel store in Portland. [Robert and Olive Spickler] were the sole shareholders and officers of Maine Coast Properties; Greenberg was the president of the Harbor Shop. As a result of Robert Spickler's efforts, the Harbor Shop entered into a purchase and sale contract with Robert and Virginia Flynn. However, Greenberg and the Flynns subsequently met without Spickler's knowledge and agreed to rescind their contract. Maine Coast Properties sued Greenberg and the Harbor Shop to recover a broker's commission of $20,000. After a jury-waived trial in 1984, the court ruled that Maine Coast Properties was not entitled to recover a broker's commission or to retain any part of the Flynns' $10,000 earnest money deposit because Spickler had not procured a buyer who was willing and prepared to purchase the property on Greenberg's terms.
The trial court in 1984 entered judgment against both Maine Coast Properties and the Spicklers on the Flynns' counterclaim. Spickler, but not Maine Coast Properties, appealed that judgment. See Spickler v. Flynn, 494 A.2d 1369 (Me.1985) (per curiam) ( ).
In July 1985 the Spicklers, as Maine Coast Property's assignees, brought the present action against Greenberg, the Flynns, and Greenberg's lawyers, based on the alleged perjury of Greenberg and Flynn at the previous trial. The court entered a series of summary judgments between 1986 and 1989 in favor of all defendants. 2 On appeal in 1991, we vacated the judgment in favor of Greenberg, but affirmed the judgment in favor of the others. Spickler v. Greenberg, 586 A.2d 1232. At the trial after the remand, the jury found in favor of Spickler. Greenberg's timely appeal followed.
During the trial of the present action, Greenberg sought a jury instruction on a heightened standard of proof. Because the statute is silent as to the proper standard of proof, the trial court denied his request and applied the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. The importance of correctly determining that perjury occurred in the original trial, however, leads us to impose a "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof in civil perjury actions. See Taylor v. Commissioner of Mental Health, 481 A.2d 139, 144 (Me.1984) ( ). Because of the need to preserve prior judicial orders and adjudications, the burden should be on the plaintiff to show that it is "highly probable" that the witness both lied and knew that his testimony was false. Id. at 154; see McCracken v. McCracken, 617 A.2d 1034, 1035 n. 3 (Me.1992) ( ); 2 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 60.8 (1970 & Supp.1981) (in all cases where fraud is asserted the standard is "clear and convincing evidence").
Moreover, the issue should not be submitted to a new factfinder solely on the same record as in the original trial. Cf. State v. Farrington, 411 A.2d 396, 401 (Me.1980) ( ); 7 John H. Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 2042 (Chadbourn rev. 1978 & Supp.1991) (same). As we have previously stated, Cole v. Chellis, 122 Me. 262, 264, 119 A. 623 (1923). A higher standard of proof and corroborating evidence will aid discovery of the former while preventing the latter.
At the close of the evidence, Greenberg unsuccessfully moved for a judgment as a matter of law, arguing that Spickler had not established a prima facie case of perjury. The court later denied his renewed motion for a judgment, brought on the same ground. Greenberg concedes that he did not specifically raise the fact that he had been called as a witness by Spickler in the original trial. Although we usually would not address this issue raised for the first time on appeal, the dispositive fact is undisputed. In this instance where the judgment must be vacated on other grounds, we will decide the issue in the interest of judicial economy and substantial justice. Hawke v. Hawke, 395 A.2d 449,...
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