Bean v. Pac. Coast Elevator Corp.
Citation | 234 Cal.App.4th 1423,185 Cal.Rptr.3d 63 |
Decision Date | 10 March 2015 |
Docket Number | D064587 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Daniel William BEAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PACIFIC COAST ELEVATOR CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant. |
Endemen, Lincoln, Turek & Heater, Kenneth C. Turek ; Taylor & Company Law Offices and Joshua R. Benson, San Francisco, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Tucker Ellis & West and Rebecca Ann Lefler, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.
Eric Lazear, an employee of appellant Pacific Coast Elevator Corporation (Pacific Coast), ran his vehicle into respondent Daniel William Bean's truck while Bean was stopped at a red light. Bean suffered serious injuries as a result of the accident and sued Pacific Coast. A jury found Pacific Coast negligent and awarded Bean $1,271,594.74 in damages, including $126,594.74 in economic damages, and $1,145,000 in noneconomic damages. The trial court denied Pacific Coast's motion for new trial, granted Bean's motion for prejudgment interest, and awarded Bean $34,830 in costs. The court entered judgment in the amount of $1,306,424.74 in Bean's favor and ordered prejudgment interest to be calculated on the entire judgment.
On appeal, Pacific Coast contends that the jury's noneconomic damages award is excessive, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the basic speed law, and that Bean's counsel committed misconduct during the trial. Pacific Coast further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Bean's Code of Civil Procedure section 9981 pretrial offer to settle was reasonable and made in good faith. Finally, Pacific Coast claims that the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest on costs.
In the published portion of this opinion, we agree that the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest on costs, and in the unpublished portion of this opinion, we reject the remainder of Pacific Coast's claims. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment only insofar as it awards prejudgment interest on costs and remand the matter to the trial court with directions to recalculate prejudgment interest in a manner consistent with this opinion, and to enter an amended judgment. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.
A.–D.***
E. The trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest on costs
Pacific Coast contends that the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest on Bean's costs . Pacific Coast contends that, pursuant to Civil Code section 3291, prejudgment interest should have been awarded only on the damages that the jury awarded in its verdict. Because Pacific Coast's contention raises a question of statutory interpretation, we apply the de novo standard of review. (See, e.g., Doe v. Brown (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 408, 417, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 209 (Doe ).)
In Doe, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at page 417, 99 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, we explained that statutory interpretation begins with an examination of the text of a statute:
“
The Doe court also explained the principles of interpretation to be applied when considering a textually ambiguous statute:
Civil Code section 3291 provides in relevant part:
In Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 109, 863 P.2d 179 (Lakin ), the Supreme Court considered whether a party may recover prejudgment interest pursuant to Civil Code section 3291 on that portion of a jury's award attributable to damages other than for personal injury. The Lakin court concluded that “[Civil Code] section 3291... authorizes ‘prejudgment interest only for the personal injury portion of a more general total recovery.’ ” (Lakin, supra, at p. 658, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 109, 863 P.2d 179.) In reaching this conclusion, the Lakin court acknowledged that the second paragraph of Civil Code section 3291 could be read to suggest that prejudgment interest is to be awarded even on those components of a judgment that are not for personal injury damages:
(Lakin, supra, at p. 658, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 109, 863 P.2d 179.)
However, the Lakin court reasoned that, when read as a whole, the statute is best interpreted as permitting prejudgment interest to be calculated solely on personal injury damages:
(Lakin, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 659, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 109, 863 P.2d 179.)
In Hess v. Ford Motor Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 516, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 220, 41 P.3d 46 (Hess ), the Supreme Court considered whether “a plaintiff may recover interest on interest accrued [i.e. compound interest] under Civil Code section 3291 from the date of the section 998 offer to the date of judgment because this prejudgment interest must be included in the judgment pursuant to [former] rule 875 of the California Rules of Court.” (Hess, supra, at p. 523, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 220, 41 P.3d 46.) The Hess court concluded “the language and history20 of Civil Code section 3291 precludes inclusion of the prejudgment portion of the interest in the judgment for purposes of compounding the interest.” (Hess, supra, at p. 532, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 220, 41 P.3d 46.) The Hess court further stated, “Prejudgment interest accrued under Civil Code section 3291 is not part of the judgment, and a plaintiff may not obtain interest on this prejudgment interest.” (Hess, supra, at p. 533, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 220, 41 P.3d 46.)
Bean has not cited any case, nor has our independent research uncovered any case, suggesting that Civil Code section 3291 prejudgment interest may be awarded on costs. Further, both the language and logic of Lakin support the conclusion that prejudgment interest may not be awarded on costs. The Lakin court “conclude[d] that [Civil Code] section 3291 authorizes courts to award prejudgment interest only on damages attributable to personal injury ” (Lakin, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 659, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 109, 863 P.2d 179, italics added), and stated that such a conclusion was consistent with the Legislative intent evinced in the first paragraph of the statute, which it found to be controlling. (Ibid. )
While Bean contends that the trial court properly awarded prejudgment interest on costs because “costs are part of a judgment,” his argument...
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