Beard v. Mayfield

• Decision Date: 16 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90AP-1043,90AP-1043
• Citation: 596 N.E.2d 1056,73 Ohio App.3d 173
• Parties: BEARD, Appellant, v. MAYFIELD, Admr., et al., Appellees. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 173

73 Ohio App.3d 173

596 N.E.2d 1056

BEARD, Appellant, v. MAYFIELD, Admr., et al., Appellees. ^*

No. 90AP-1043.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided April 16, 1991.

Ronald J. Koltak, Columbus, for appellant.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., and Gerald H. Waterman, Columbus, for appellees Adm'r, Bureau of Workers' Compensation and Indus. Com'n of Ohio.

Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn, James E. Davidson and Susan Porter, Columbus, for appellee Rockwell Intern. Corp.

BOWMAN, Presiding Judge.

Appellant, Richard Beard, was employed by appellee, Rockwell International Corporation, as a quality assurance inspector beginning May 18, 1982. Throughout the course of his employment, appellant worked a schedule that required a minimum of sixty-six to seventy-seven hours of work per week.

In September 1986, appellant went to his personal physician, Dr. Edward Pollyea, because he was passing blood in his stool. Dr. Pollyea gave him a physical and, when he was informed that appellant was working a mandatory schedule of sixty-six hours per week, Pollyea informed appellant that he was not to work more than forty hours per week. Pollyea then gave appellant a note to that effect.

Appellant continued to work his regular work schedule and, on September 26, 1986, when he was finally able to see the company doctor, appellant presented the note from Pollyea to him. After checking appellant, the company doctor called Pollyea, who asked appellant to be at the emergency room that afternoon. The company doctor then placed appellant on medical leave and sent him to the hospital. While appellant was in the hospital, he was told that he had atrial fibrillation, an irregular heartbeat.

Appellant filed a claim with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation and, on September 14, 1988, a district hearing officer found that appellant did not sustain an injury in the course of and arising out of his employment and appellant's claim was not allowed. Appellant appealed this decision to the regional board of review and, by order dated February 16, 1989, the board affirmed the district hearing officer's order. Appellant appealed this decision to the Industrial Commission of Ohio and, by order dated May 1, 1989, the Industrial Commission refused to hear appellant's appeal.

On August 30, 1989, appellant filed a complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, seeking the right to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund. Appellant asserted that he suffered an injury while in the performance of duties incidental to, arising out of, and in the course of his employment with Rockwell. Rockwell, the Bureau of Workers' Compensation and the Industrial Commission answered the complaint and each denied appellant's right to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund.

On May 4, 1990, Rockwell filed a motion for summary judgment based on the complaint and answers, the deposition of appellant and its memorandum in support of the motion. On May 16, the Bureau of Workers' Compensation filed a memorandum in support of Rockwell's motion for summary judgment. On May 23, 1990, appellant filed a memorandum contra Rockwell's motion for summary judgment; however, the motion was not supported by any additional evidentiary materials. On July 23, 1990, the trial court sustained the motion for summary judgment and found that there was no genuine issue of material fact. Appellant now brings this appeal and asserts the following assignment of error:

"The trial court erred when it granted appellee Rockwell International's motion for summary judgment because there are genuine issues of material fact herein and therefore, the moving parties were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

"1. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Richard Beard incurred an injury as defined under the Ohio Workers' Compensation Act.

"2. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to the causal relationship between Richard Beard's employment and his injury."

It is appellant's contention that he suffers from atrial fibrillation resulting from the stress of his working conditions and that this condition in and of itself is a compensable injury. In response, Rockwell contends the stress suffered by appellant was no different from that of any other employee, and the Administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation contends atrial fibrillation is not an injury.

For purposes of workers' compensation, an "injury" is defined in R.C. 4123.01(C) as:

" 'Injury' includes any injury, whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment. * * * "

In Ryan v. Connor (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 406, 28 OBR 462, 503 N.E.2d 1379, paragraph one of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held:

"A physical injury occasioned solely by mental or emotional stress, received in the course of, and arising out of, an injured employee's employment, is compensable under R.C. 4123.01(C). (Szymanski v. Halle's [1980], 63 Ohio St.2d 195 [17 O.O.3d 120, 407 N.E.2d 502], and Toth v. Standard Oil Co. [1953], 160 Ohio St. 1 [50 O.O. 476, 113 N.E.2d 81], overruled.)"

While the court in Ryan...