Becker v. Calnan
| Decision Date | 26 April 1943 |
| Citation | 313 Mass. 625,48 N.E.2d 668 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | HYMAN BECKER v. FRANK C. CALNAN & others. |
December 9, 1942.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., DONAHUE, QUA DOLAN, & RONAN, JJ.
Voluntary Association. Labor and Labor Union. Officer. Equity Pleading and Practice, Bill, Demurrer, Appeal, Stipulation, Parties.
An appeal from a decree, sustaining a demurrer to a bill in equity on one of two grounds stated therein and overruling it on the other presents both grounds for consideration by this court, which will affirm the decree if the demurrer should have been sustained on the ground on which it was overruled in the lower court, regardless of the ground on which it was there sustained.
The truth of conclusions of fact and of law averred in a bill in equity but not supported by allegations of particular facts is not admitted by a demurrer to the bill.
A stipulation of counsel for the parties to a bill in equity, seeking to incorporate certain documents into the bill and filed after the entry of an interlocutory decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill and before an appeal therefrom and not signed by the trial judge, was ineffectual on the appeal.
There was no merit in a complaint by a member of an unincorporated labor union that a majority of its executive board which expelled him after a hearing had not been properly chosen in accordance with the constitution of the union, if it appeared that they actually had held office for about two years under purported appointments; in such circumstances they must be deemed officers de facto.
There is nothing contrary to natural justice in the mere fact that a member of a local labor union tribunal who has taken part in a decision resulting in expulsion of a member of the local sat also as a member of a higher labor union tribunal on an appeal from such decision.
Particular facts averred in a bill in equity were insufficient on demurrer to support a conclusion that a labor union board, hearing an appeal from a decision of a tribunal of a lower affiliated union expelling a member of that union, had not accorded him a fair hearing in good faith and in conformity to the governing laws of the unions, or to show that he was entitled to relief respecting a decision by such board affirming his expulsion.
A strict observance of all the proprieties of an established court of justice is not to be expected of tribunals of laymen set up by mutual agreement among the members of unincorporated labor unions. Per QUA, J.
A bill in equity against individuals as representatives of unincorporated labor unions should not be taken pro confesso against the unions where the individuals appeared and pleaded.
BILL IN EQUITY filed in the Superior Court on May 29, 1942. The plaintiff moved that the bill be taken pro confesso as against the unincorporated bodies of which the named defendants were representative.
The defendants filed demurrers to the bill on two grounds, namely, that "the matters alleged in the bill are not such as to entitle the plaintiff to relief in equity," and that the plaintiff had "failed to exhaust his remedies within the organization."
After hearing by Williams, J., interlocutory decrees were entered denying the motion that the bill be taken pro confesso, overruling the demurrers on the first ground and sustaining them on the second; and a final decree was entered dismissing the bill. The plaintiff appealed from all decrees.
E. T. Doherty, (D.
DeC. Donovan with him,) for the plaintiff.
H. R. Donaghue, for the defendants.
This suit is here after the sustaining by the Superior Court of demurrers to the plaintiff's amended bill. The demurrers were upon two grounds. Both grounds are open for consideration here, although the trial judge sustained the demurrers upon only one of them. Ratte v. Forand, 299 Mass. 185, 187. Walter v. McCarvel, 309 Mass 260 , 263.
We think the demurrers must be sustained on the general ground first set forth in each of them, which is in substance that the plaintiff has failed to state a case.
The bill contains numerous conclusions of fact and of law not supported by allegations of particular facts and at one or two points seems contradictory. It is difficult of precise analysis. However, in a general way, the case intended is that the named defendants are fairly representative of the Newspaper Chauffeurs, Distributors and Helpers Union No. 259 (also called Local 259), the Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Joint Council No. 10 of Boston and Vicinity, and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, all voluntary associations, whose members are "too numerous to be described and served"; that the plaintiff was a member of the Local; that in August, 1941, a dispute occurred between the Becker Transportation Company, in which the plaintiff was interested, and another local, No. 995; that the plaintiff believed that the Becker Transportation Company was right in this dispute and that he had a right temporarily to assist that company; that on or about August 15 the defendant Calnan preferred to the executive board of the plaintiff's own local, No. 259, charges against the plaintiff of violation of his oath of loyalty to the Local and to the International and of "gross disloyalty, or conduct unbecoming a member"; that the plaintiff, "after reserving his rights to the jurisdiction of said board," was tried before it, found guilty, and sentenced to expulsion for life from the Local; that he appealed to the Joint Council and, "again reserving his right to the jurisdiction," appeared before the executive board of the Joint Council, which ordered that he be suspended from membership for six months and fined $500; that the plaintiff, "still reserving his rights to the jurisdiction," appealed to the general executive board, and the local executive board also appealed; that the general executive board reversed the decision of the Joint Council and again expelled the plaintiff for life from membership in Local 259. There are allegations of loss of employment and prayers that the proceedings before the several boards be declared void, for injunctive relief, and for damages. The gist of the bill is alleged wrongful expulsion, or purported expulsion, from the Local.
The Local had a right to expel the plaintiff for the causes charged against him, provided that it acted in good faith, consistently with the principles of natural justice, and in accordance with the association's own governing laws. Snay v. Lovely, 276 Mass. 159 , 163, 164, and cases cited. Cohen v. Silver, 277 Mass. 230 , 235. Sullivan v. Barrows, 303 Mass. 197 , 201. See Clark v. Morgan, 271 Mass. 164 . Recognizing this principle, the plaintiff attacks the composition of the first two boards as not in accordance with the constitution of the International, and here appear two difficulties that pervade the entire bill: (1) there are no positive allegations of the relationship or affiliation between the Local and the Joint Council or between the Local and the International to show that the Local or its members were part and parcel of the International, or that the provisions of the constitution of the International set forth in the bill controlled the appeals described in the matters of which the bill complains (compare Walsh v. Reardon, 274 Mass. 530 , 534), and (2) it does not appear that the portions of the constitution set forth were all the provisions applicable to these several matters. An attempt to cure the latter difficulty by a so called "Stipulation on Appeal," signed by counsel, wherein they agree that the plaintiff "has made profert of all the Constitutions referred to in the pleadings and has filed the same in court" is not effective to incorporate these constitutions into the bill by reference, amendment, or otherwise. This paper appears to have been filed after the entry of the interlocutory decrees sustaining the demurrers. It is not signed by the judge, and so far as appears he never knew of it. Parties cannot make a new case for themselves in this manner after a ruling by the judge. Gorey v. Guarente, 303 Mass. 569 , 570, 571. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 308 Mass. 370 , 371. Compare G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, Section 7, Eleventh.
The two defects in the bill just mentioned might in themselves prove fatal to it. We prefer, however, to examine the bill further and to assume for the purposes of this...
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