Becker v. Johnston
| Decision Date | 28 July 1967 |
| Citation | 430 P.2d 43,67 Cal.2d 163,60 Cal.Rptr. 485 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 430 P.2d 43 Frank BECKER, Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Respondent, v. Margaret Jean JOHNSTON, Defendant, Cross-Complainant and Appellant; County of Sacramento, Cross-Defendant and Respondent. Sac. 7799. In Bank |
Rust & Hoffman, David C. Rust, Sacramento, and Ellis J. Horvitz, Los Angeles for defendant, cross-complainant and appellant.
McGregor, Bullen & Erich and Michael M. McKone, Sacramento, for plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent.
McLaughlin, Russell, McCarthy & Kaelin and Jerome M. McLaughlin, Sacramento, for cross-defendant and respondent.
Harry S. Fenton, Robert F. Carlson and Kenneth G. Nellis, Sacramento, as amici curiae on behalf of cross-defendant and respondent.
This personal injury action arose out of a collision of automobiles at an intersection. Defendant and cross-complainant Mrs. Johnston appeals from a judgment of nonsuit in favor of cross-defendants Frank Becker and the County of Sacramento. 1
We have concluded that the county has successfully established the plan or design immunity found in Government Code section 830.6, 2 that the trial court correctly withheld from the jury the issue of Becker's liability, and that the judgment should be affirmed as to both cross-defendants.
The nonsuit was properly granted only if, disregarding conflicting evidence and giving cross-complainant's evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled and indulging in every legitimate inference which may be drawn in her favor, the result is a determination that there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in her favor. (Reuther v. Viall (1965) 62 Cal.2d 470, 474--475(3), 42 Cal.Rptr. 456, 398 P.2d 792, and cases there cited.)
The collision here involved occurred on a night in March 1963 in the County of Sacramento on Auburn Boulevard, a two-lane highway, near a Y intersection which Auburn forms with Sylvan Road. Appended is a diagram of the intersection (a reduced photostat of cross-complainant's Exhibit 2).
The car driven by Mrs. Johnston, southbound on Auburn, crossed into the northbound lane at the Y intersection at Sylvan and collided with the Becker car, which was traveling north on Auburn.
As against the county, Mrs. Johnston contends that the intersection was in a dangerous condition which proximately contributed to her injuries. The 1963 Tort Claims Act set forth in the Government Code applies. (Cabell v. State of California, Cal., 60 Cal.Rptr. 476, 430 P.2d 34.) Section 835 specifies the prerequisites to liability of a public entity for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property. The county urges that Mrs. Johnston has made no showing meeting such prerequisites. The county also relies upon the plan or design immunity provided by section 830.6. (See fn. 2 of Cabell, supra.)
Auburn Boulevard is a through highway which runs generally north to south. However, as Auburn proceeds to the south it curves to the right (southwesterly) as it approaches Sylvan Road, which cuts into Auburn in a south to north path. Sylvan Road traffic is controlled by a stop sign at this intersection. Auburn comprises the stem and right arm of the Y. At the stem Auburn runs in a north-south direction, with the base of the stem being north of the intersection. At the intersection, the gradual curve of Auburn to the right in a southwesterly direction creates the right arm of the Y. The left arm is Sylvan. The speed limit was 40 miles per hour. There was no stop sign regulating northbound traffic on Auburn as it entered the intersection, nor was there a stop sign regulating southbound traffic on Auburn as it entered and proceeded through the intersection, regardless of whether such traffic curved to the right and remained on Auburn or continued in a straight line across the northbound lane of Auburn into Sylvan. The only stop sign at the intersection was that regulating northbound traffic on Sylvan.
On Auburn there were two standard highway signs facing southbound traffic. The first sign, about 750 feet north of the intersection, was yellow with a black arrow curving to the right, thus indicating that Auburn curved to the right. The other, approximately 350 feet north of the intersection, was a Y sign indicating the intersection. Auburn had a 'noticeable' super-elevation or bank in its curve to the right; i.e., Auburn was banked so that its east side would be higher than its west side. A double yellow line marked the center of Auburn except for a distance of 90 feet where Auburn intersects with Sylvan.
The night was dark, the weather was clear, and visibility was good. There was no stationary illumination at the intersection. However, a traffic officer who investigated the accident testified that 'at the beginning of the curve' a southbound driver had unobstructed visibility of Auburn to a point at least halfway around the curve, a distance of 400 to 450 feet.
At about midnight cross-complainant Mrs. Johnston was driving south on Auburn at 35 to 40 miles per hour in the direction of the Y intersection. She testified that she was not familiar with this area, had never been there before, and was not aware that Auburn curved to the right and that if she continued to drive straight ahead she would enter Sylvan Road. Her intention was to continue southbound on Auburn rather than to go on to Sylvan. She did not recall noticing any specific signs prior to entering the intersection, and she did not know that the place at which the accident occurred was in fact an intersection. It is thus apparent that she failed to observe or take notice of either the curve sign 750 feet north of the intersection or the Y sign some 350 feet therefrom.
Immediately before the accident Mrs. Johnston first saw a set of directly oncoming headlights on the other side of the road. At about the same time she saw the headlights on what proved to be Mr. Becker's car approaching her from what appeared to be a right angle. She kept his car in view at all times, but thought that it was approaching from a side road and would stop. It did not. She further testified that she did not see her car cross a double line at the intersection prior to the collision and that if she had driven her car across a double line, she would have seen it. However, as noted above, there was a double line marking the center of Auburn, except for a short distance (90 feet) where it intersected with Sylvan. (See the attached diagram.)
Cross-defendant Becker was driving north on Auburn around the curve at a speed of 35 to 40 miles per hour. He was familiar with the road and with the Y intersection. He testified that as he approached the intersection he saw Mrs. Johnston's headlights but no turning blinkers were turned on; and he assumed that she would continue around the curve on Auburn rather than proceed straight into Sylvan Road. He was unable to tell that her vehicle was crossing the northbound lane of Auburn until he was about 100 feet from the point of impact, at which time he was unable to avoid the collision. He further testified that he first saw Mrs. Johnston's car come across into the northbound lane in the area of the intersection where the double line is interrupted; he was then at the point marked at B 3 in the attached diagram. When asked if he applied his brakes at this point, he replied:
The Y intersection was constructed by the State of California in 1929. Until 1957, when the Sacramento-Roseville Freeway was opened, Auburn Boulevard, including the curve and intersection, was maintained by the state as Highways 40 and 99E, which was the main highway between Sacramento and Roseville and carried through traffic which was thereafter diverted to the freeway. The highway remained in essentially the same physical condition during that period of time. After the freeway was opened the state relinquished control of the highway to the county.
The county's traffic engineer, called by Mrs. Johnston as a witness under section 2055 Code of Civil Procedure, testified that in a hypothetical case a Y intersection with the hazard of head-on collisions is a classic example of bad engineering practice, and generally speaking is a dangerous condition in the absence of warnings. However, with respect to a particular intersection it depends on the physical condition and the traffic volume. In the intersection of Auburn Boulevard and Sylvan Road the 'area for head-on collisions existed' and the intersection was 'channeling' such collisions in 'the broad sense of the term 'channeling," but in determining whether to maintain it in the same condition 'the traffic volume is something that we have to take into consideration.' A traffic count 3 taken in 1961 showed an average of 11,800 vehicles a day (i.e., some four million per year) traveling on Auburn just north of Sylvan, but during the four-year period of 1959 through 1962 there were only eight accidents at the intersection, of which only three were head-on collisions. From a study of this history the witness did not conclude the intersection was dangerous or warranted change; in his opinion 'Under the conditions and past history it was operating satisfactorily (and) in a good engineering manner' in 1963 (when the collision here involved took place). The witness agreed that some motorists could become confused when entering the intersection, especially at night; however, warning signs are held to a minimum as the use of 'more than several' tends to confuse the motorist. Further, some motorists go through stop signs and some through red lights. 4
A consulting traffic engineer who was familiar with the intersection testified that 'this type of design, particularly...
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