Bednarowicz' Estate v. Vetrone

• Decision Date: 30 June 1960
• Parties: ESTATE of Helen P. BEDNAROWICZ, by Gertrude G. Bednarowicz, Admrx. and Gertrude G. Bednarowicz, Trustee ad litem, and Charles W. Fiero and Mary S. Fiero v. Joan B. VETRONE. Appeal of ESTATE of Helen P. BEDNAROWICZ, by Gertrude G. Bednarowicz, Admrx, and Gertrude G. Bednarowicz, Trustee ad litem. Appeal of Charles W. FIERO. Appeal of Mary S. FIERO.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

162 A.2d 687

400 Pa. 385

ESTATE of Helen P. BEDNAROWICZ, by Gertrude G. Bednarowicz, Admrx. and Gertrude G. Bednarowicz, Trustee ad litem, and Charles W. Fiero and Mary S. Fiero v. Joan B. VETRONE.

Appeal of ESTATE of Helen P. BEDNAROWICZ, by Gertrude G. Bednarowicz, Admrx, and Gertrude G. Bednarowicz, Trustee ad litem. Appeal of Charles W. FIERO. Appeal of Mary S. FIERO.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

June 30, 1960.

John M. Wolford, Erie, Philip Werner Amram Washington, D. C., for appellants.

Gifford Graham, MacDonald & Illig, A. Grant Walker, Erie, for appellee.

Before CHARLES ALVIN JONES, C. J., and BELL, MUSMANNO, BENJAMIN R. JONES, COHEN, BOK, and EAGEN JJ.

BELL, Justice.

Plaintiffs brought an action in trespass for the death of one guest passenger and severe injuries to another guest passenger in an automobile driven by the defendant. Plaintiffs alleged in their amended complaint that defendant, driving at a speed of from 40 to 50 miles an hour, suddenly drove her automobile off the road and struck a culvert 84 feet north of where the vehicle left the road with such force that the vehicle turned end ever end. Plaintiffs further alleged that defendant had the duty to operate the vehicle (a) with reasonable caution and care, and (b) within the confines of the highway. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendant's action in driving off the road 'constituted negligence and gross or wanton negligence'.

Plaintiffs and defendant were residents of Pennsylvania at the time of the accident; the accident occurred in Ontario, Canada. Defendant filed an answer in which she averred under new matter Section 50 of 'The Highway Traffic Act' of the Province of Ontario. Section 50 provides that 'the owner or driver of a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers for compensation shall not be liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of any person being carried in, or upon, or entering, or getting on to, or alighting from the motor vehicle.'

Plaintiffs filed a reply admitting the averments in the new matter, but denied the relevancy of the law of Ontario. The lower Court in an able opinion made absolute defendant's rule to show cause on her 'Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings' and entered judgment for defendant on the pleadings. From this judgment plaintiffs took this appeal.

In considering a judgment on the pleadings, it is Hornbook law that all the facts which are well pleaded by the adversary, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, are admitted, but conclusions therefrom and averments of law are not admitted: Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, Pa., 161 A.2d 1; Fawcett v. Monongahela Railway Co., 391 Pa. 134, 137 A.2d 768.

The lower Court held that this case was controlled by the principle of lex loci delicti; the plaintiffs contend (principally) that lex loci fori governs. The pivotal question is which of these two principles applies? If the accident had occurred in Pennsylvania plaintiffs undoubtedly would have averred a valid cause of action. However, the accident occurred in the Province of Ontario and under the law of Ontario a guest passenger has no cause of action for damages resulting from the negligence or wanton negligence of the driver or owner of the automobile. This question of lex loci delicti or lex loci fori has been repeatedly ruled, adversely to plaintiffs, by this Court, which has held that lex loci delicti applies. Randall v. Stager, 355 Pa. 352, 354, 49 A.2d 689; Mackey v. Robertson, 328 Pa. 504, 506, 195 A. 870; Rodney v. Staman, 371 Pa. 1, 3, 89 A.2d 313, 32 A.L.R.2d 976; Julian v. Tornabene, 171 Pa.Super. 333, 90 A.2d 346; Maxson v. McElhinney, 370 Pa. 622, 624, 88 A.2d 747; Limes v. Keller, 365 Pa. 258 74 A.2d 131; Carney v. Carney, 35 Pa.Dist. & Co.R. 221; Restatement, Conflicts of Law, §§ 378, 384; see also to the same effect: Kaiser v. North, 1939, 292 Mich. 49, 289 N.W. 325.

In Rodney v. Staman the plaintiff and defendant were both residents of Pennsylvania; the accident occurred in Ohio. The Court said (371 Pa. at page 3, 89 A.2d at page 315): 'The substantive rights of the parties are, of course, to be determined according to the law of Ohio--the place of the alleged tort. Mackey v. Robertson, 328 Pa. 504, 506, 195 A. 870 [supra].'

The Restatement, Conflict of Laws, well states the law on the points here involved:

'Section 378: 'The law of the place of wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury.

'Section 384: '(1) If a cause of action in tort is created at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other states. (2) If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in any other state.' Comment (b) following § 384: 'The statement in Subsection (2) is applicable although, in the state where the action is brought, a cause of action would have been created under the circumstances either by the common law or by statute.'

The general rule, recognized by Courts and text-writers alike, is that whether a tortious act is actionable must be determined by the law of the Country or the State where the act occurs.

Plaintiffs contend: (1) That procedural rights are governed by the principle of lex loci fori. However, the question here involved is not a matter of procedure, but a question of substantive rights.

(2) We should change or overrule our prior decisions because the Restatement is considering changing the principle it has...