Beizer v. Goepfert

• Decision Date: 25 September 1992
• Docket Number: No. 10504,10504
• Citation: 613 A.2d 1336,28 Conn.App. 693
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Arnold L. BEIZER v. Michael GOEPFERT. Arnold L. BEIZER v. Michael GOEPFERT et al.

Page 1336

613 A.2d 1336

28 Conn.App. 693

Arnold L. BEIZER v. Michael GOEPFERT.

Arnold L. BEIZER v. Michael GOEPFERT et al.

No. 10504.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 7, 1992.

Decided Aug. 18, 1992.

Certification Denied Sept. 25, 1992.

Mark R. Leder, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

James F. Aspell, Hartford, for appellee (named defendant in each case).

Neil Johnson, pro se.

Before DALY, FREEDMAN and CRETELLA, JJ. DALY, Judge.

The plaintiff appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendants, Michael Goepfert and his attorney, Neil Johnson, rendered in accordance with the report of an attorney factfinder. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) referred these matters to an attorney factfinder, (2) denied his right to a trial by jury, (3) rendered judgment because the evidence was insufficient to support a judgment for the defendants, and, (4) rendered judgment without the benefit of the transcript from the proceedings before the attorney factfinder. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On July 4, 1986, Goepfert entered into an oral agreement for professional services with his friend, Johnson, an attorney, to handle Goepfert's personal injury claim against the town of Tolland on a 10 percent contingency fee. At the time of the agreement, Johnson was an associate for the law firm of Teitenberg and Wallace.

In December, 1986, Johnson began working for the plaintiff's law firm. On December 31, 1986, the defendants, Michael Goepfert and Neil Johnson, signed a professional services agreement between themselves using a standard form contract supplied by the plaintiff's law firm. Johnson crossed out the 33 1/3 percent contingent fee figure in the plaintiff's standard form professional services contract and inserted the 10 percent figure previously agreed to in July. In August, 1987, Goepfert's case was settled for $34,000 by Johnson with guidance from the plaintiff as to the proper settlement figure. Goepfert agreed to pay the 10 percent fee set forth in the contract, but refused to pay the plaintiff's standard fee of 33 1/3 percent. The plaintiff withheld his standard fee and brought suit claiming he was entitled to the full 33 1/3 percent.

On August 18, 1988, the plaintiff instituted a two count action against Goepfert seeking an award of the 33 1/3 percent fee for services rendered on the settlement of Goepfert's personal injury claim. The first count was based on breach of contract and the second count was based on quantum meruit. This complaint was signed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint dated December 30, 1988, adding Johnson to the action. The plaintiff's amended complaint alleged that Johnson changed the contingency fee agreement without authority. This amended complaint was signed by Martin B. Krulewitz, an associate of the plaintiff's law firm.

On July 28, 1989, the plaintiff commenced a second action asserting that the defendants conspired to defraud the plaintiff and that the defendant Johnson breached his employment contract and tortiously interfered with the contract relationship between the plaintiff and Goepfert. Goepfert filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff alleging breach of contract and wrongful refusal to pay him the disputed 33 1/3 percent of the $34,000. On February 27, 1989, the plaintiff claimed the first action for the trial list as a nonjury matter. The plaintiff claimed the second action for the trial list on November 20, 1990, and identified this action as a jury matter on the claim for the trial list. Neither party filed a jury docket claim slip pursuant to General Statutes § 52-215 ¹ nor did either party pay the $100 jury fee required by General Statutes § 52-258. ² The case was never placed on the jury docket.

The pleadings were subsequently closed. On February 20, 1990, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to consolidate both matters. The matters were referred to an attorney factfinder, Stephen B. Delaney. There were no objections to the referral of this matter.

The factfinder found that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof in both actions. He recommended that judgment be rendered for the defendants on both actions and in favor of the named defendant on count one of the counterclaim, which sounded in breach of contract and was based on the plaintiff's wrongfully holding onto the disputed portion of the settlement. The plaintiff filed objections to the factfinder's findings and the objections were overruled by the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants on the complaint and awarded Goepfert $7933 plus costs on the counterclaim. The plaintiff appealed.

I

The plaintiff claims that these matters should not have been referred to an attorney factfinder because the requirements of General Statutes § 52-549n were not satisfied. ³ Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to refer the case to an attorney factfinder because these matters involved tort claims and did not exclusively sound in contract. The plaintiff further contends that that referral was improper because he requested a jury trial.

A claim that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Seal Audio, Inc. v. Bozak, Inc., 199 Conn. 496, 499, 508 A.2d 415 (1986). "A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it." Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 185, 413 A.2d 819, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 801, 100 S.Ct. 20, 62 L.Ed.2d 14 (1979). We find that in this case the trial court's referral of this matter to an attorney factfinder was proper because the requirements of General Statutes § 52-549n were satisfied.

The phrase "any contract action" in § 52-549n does not require that every claim in a case be a purely contractual action, as the plaintiff contends. Section 52-549n allows "any contract action" to be referred to a factfinder if only money damages are claimed and if the amount in controversy does not exceed $15,000. "The objective of statutory construction is to give effect to the intended purpose of the legislature." State v. Delafose, 185 Conn. 517, 521, 441 A.2d 158 (1981). " 'When the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further than the words themselves because we assume that the language expresses the legislature's intent.' " Winslow v. Lewis-Shepard, Inc., 216 Conn. 533, 538, 582 A.2d 1174 (1990), quoting State v. White, 204 Conn. 410, 421, 528 A.2d 811 (1987). Where the language is ambiguous " 'this court is to be guided by the language, purpose and legislative history of the statute in question.' " Jutkowitz v. Department of Health Services, 220 Conn. 86, 102, 596 A.2d 374 (1991), quoting Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hospital, 204 Conn. 399, 405, 528 A.2d 805 (1987). The meaning of "any contract action" as used in this statute is not specifically defined.

The legislative history sheds no light on the intended construction of the phrase "any contract action." According to the statement of purpose of Public Acts 1982, No. 82-441, which became General Statutes §§ 52-549n through 52-549aa and which deals with both factfinders and arbitrators, the statute is intended "[t]o establish, in an effort to reduce the pending civil caseload, a system of fact-finders for certain non-jury cases and a system of arbitration for jury cases...." The statute was adopted to ease the backlog of cases with which the judiciary is plagued. 25 H.R.Proc., Pt. 24, 1982 Sess., p. 7665, remarks of Rep. Richard D. Tulisano. This does not lend itself to a narrow construction of the phrase "any contract action." The legislature intended to free the judiciary from the factfinding tasks in simpler, nonjury cases involving $15,000 or less. This indicates that the legislature preferred to include rather than to exclude cases.

The phrase "any contract action" also lends itself to a broad construction of what claims are included. "Any contract action" can be contrasted with "only contract actions." The former is much less restrictive. "Any" is defined as "one or some of whatever kind or sort ... one or some however imperfect used as a function word to indicate one that is selected with indifference to quality." Webster, Third International Dictionary. On the other hand, "only" is defined as "a single solitary fact or instance or occurrence: as just the one simple thing and nothing more or different: simply, merely, just." Id. "Any contract action" implies a broad concept of what constitutes a contract action. Furthermore, there is no language in the statute that limits "any contract action" to claims sounding exclusively in contract.

There are no other statutes that restrict the meaning of "any contract action" under § 52-549n. Section 52-549n does provide for arbitration in "any civil action in which the amount, legal interest or property in demand is less than fifteen thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs and in which a claim for trial by jury and a claim for the trial list have been filed." This statute provides greater jurisdiction to the arbitrator than the factfinder in that an arbitrator may hear "all civil actions," but it does not limit the language "any contract action" of § 52-549n to purely contractual cases. Given the purpose of § 52-549n and the meaning of "any contract action," this statute does not necessarily exclude cases with a mixture of claims based in contract and tort.

We now consider whether the claims in this case were contractual in nature. In J. Dunn & Sons, Inc. v. Paragon Homes of New England, 110 N.H. 215, 265 A.2d 5 (1970), the New Hampshire Supreme Court set forth the considerations for determining the nature of a claim. In J. Dunn & Sons, Inc., the court examined whether the pleadings sounded in contract for purposes of deciding if an...