Bell v. State

• Decision Date: 28 July 2017
• Docket Number: No. 06-17-00026-CR,06-17-00026-CR
• Parties: MONROE LATERRIO BELL, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

MONROE LATERRIO BELL, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

No. 06-17-00026-CR

Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

Date Submitted: May 15, 2017

July 28, 2017

On Appeal from the 124th District Court Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 44317-B

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess MEMORANDUM OPINION

During a traffic stop in Gregg County, Texas, State Trooper Jacob Muehlstein found more than 400 grams of cocaine in the trunk of Monroe Laterrio Bell's car. Bell moved to suppress the cocaine, arguing that the traffic stop was improperly prolonged. The trial court denied his motion to suppress, and Bell pled guilty to possession of 400 or more grams of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The trial court sentenced Bell to twenty years' imprisonment, pursuant to his plea agreement with the State.

On appeal, Bell contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to suppress, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

While patrolling Interstate 20 in Gregg County, Texas, Trooper Muehlstein saw a white Chevrolet Impala following another vehicle too closely. When Muehlstein accelerated to catch up to the Impala, it exited the interstate so abruptly that he was unable to exit with it. The abrupt exit left Muehlstein with the impression that the car was avoiding him. Muehlstein continued along Interstate 20 for a few miles, and "within just a couple of moments," he saw that the Impala was back on the interstate, and, once again, following another vehicle too closely. The second time, Muehlstein initiated a traffic stop.

Bell was the only person in the car. When asked, he gave Muehlstein his driver's license and rental agreement for the car. Muehlstein made several observations which he considered to be suspicious during his initial approach to Bell. First, the fact that the car was rented wassignificant because, according to Muehlstein, drug traffickers often transport drugs in rental cars to avoid forfeiture of their personal vehicles in the event drugs are discovered by law enforcement. Muehlstein also considered it significant that Bell was wearing a necklace containing a Santa Muerte charm. Muehlstein testified that the Santa Muerte charm, also known as the Saint of Death charm, is commonly associated with narcotics traffickers.¹ Finally, Muehlstein testified that Bell was unusually nervous during the stop.

At Muehlstein's request, Bell got out of his car and sat in the front seat of the patrol car while Muehlstein ran a computer check of Bell's car, driver's license, and criminal history. While waiting for the results from the computer check, Muehlstein asked Bell a few questions. First, he asked Bell the destination to which he was traveling. In response, Bell explained that he was traveling from his oilfield work in the Dallas area to Shreveport to visit his mother. He also said that he was driving a rental car because his vehicle had recently been in an accident.

Next, Muehlstein asked Bell if he had ever been arrested before. Bell said that, as a juvenile, he had been arrested for "some burglary charges, some minor . . . offenses." However, the criminal background check "came back with numerous other charges" against Bell, including weapons and narcotics charges that Bell had failed to mention. Finally, when Muehlstein asked Bell why he had exited the highway so abruptly earlier, Bell explained that he wanted a "fruit punch." Muehlstein noted that no gas stations or convenience stores were visible from the exit, and, in his opinion, the time between Bell's exit and his return to the interstate was too short for even a quick stop at a convenience store.

Muehlstein explained his suspicions of narcotics trafficking to Bell and asked for permission to search the car, but Bell refused. Muehlstein then called for a K-9 unit. Due to the location of the stop, it took about twelve minutes for the K-9 unit to arrive, but after arriving, the drug dog alerted to the presence of a controlled substance in the car. Muehlstein then searched the car and found what was later determined to be more than 400 grams of cocaine in the trunk.

Bell was indicted for possession of 400 or more grams of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.² At trial, Bell moved to suppress the evidence found during the stop, arguing that the stop was improperly prolonged beyond its purpose. When his motion to suppress evidence was denied, Bell pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and, pursuant to the plea bargain agreement, was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. Bell timely filed this appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.

II. Standard of Review

In his sole point of error, Bell contends that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence found in the car because the stop was improperly prolonged beyond its purpose without sufficient cause. The standard of review applicable to motions to suppress evidence is well-known.

"We review the trial court's decision to deny [a] motion to suppress evidence by applying a bifurcated standard of review." Young v. State, 420 S.W.3d 139, 141 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (citing Graves v. State, 307 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref'd); Rogers v. State, 291 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. ref'd)). "Because the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and judge of witness credibility at a suppression hearing, we afford almost total deference to its determination of facts supported by the record." Id. (citing State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). "We also afford such deference to a trial court's ruling on application of law to fact questions, also known as mixed questions of law and fact, if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor." Id. (citing Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).

We apply a de novo review to the trial court's application of the law and its determination of questions not turning on credibility. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Graves v. State, 307 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref'd). "Since all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, we are obligated to uphold the denial of [Fisher's] motion to suppress if it was supported by the record and was correct under any theory of law applicable to the case." Young, 420 S.W.3d at 141 (citing Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 328; State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). "In determining whether a trial court's decision is supported by the record, we generally consider only evidence adduced at the suppression hearing, because the ruling was based on that evidence, rather than evidence introduced later at trial." Id. (citing Rachal v. State, 917 S.W.2d 799, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).

Fisher v. State, 481 S.W.3d 403, 406-07 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref'd).

In Fisher v. State, we summarized the general rules regarding traffic stop detentions as follows:

"Police officers may stop and detain a person if they have a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation is in progress or has been committed." [Young, 420 S.W.3d at 141] (citing Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). "A traffic stop is a detention and must be reasonable under the United States and Texas Constitutions." Id. (citing Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Caraway v. State, 255 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.)). "To be reasonable, a traffic stop must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Evanoff v. State, Nos. 11-09-00317-CR & 11-09-00318-CR, 2011 WL 1431520, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 14, 2011, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 245)). "Reasonableness is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances." Young, 420 S.W.3d at 142 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996); Spight v. State, 76 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.)). "An investigative stop that is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment because ofexcessive intensity or scope." Id. (citing Davis, 947 S.W.2d at 243 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))).

In the course of a routine traffic stop, the detaining officer may request a driver's license, car registration, and insurance; use that information to conduct a computer check for outstanding arrest warrants; question the vehicle's occupants regarding their travel plans; and issue a citation. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 n. 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (citing United States v. Zabalza, 346 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 2003)); Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 245 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); Caraway v. State, 255 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, no pet.). "If, during that investigation, an officer develops reasonable suspicion that another violation has occurred, the scope of the initial investigation expands to include the new offense." Evanoff, 2011 WL 1431520, at *5 (citing Goudeau v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713, 719 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.)). "Reasonable suspicion must be founded on specific, articulable facts which, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead the officer to conclude that a particular person actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged

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