Bell v. State

• Decision Date: 07 March 1984
• Docket Number: No. 40619,40619
• Citation: 313 S.E.2d 678,252 Ga. 267
• Parties: BELL v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 678

313 S.E.2d 678

252 Ga. 267

BELL v. The STATE.

No. 40619.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 7, 1984.

David Markus, Atlanta, for James Edward Bell.

James L. Webb, Sol. Gen., Christina Craddock, Asst. Sol., Atlanta, for the State.

Michael R. Hauptman, amicus curiae.

GREGORY, Justice.

The defendant was convicted under OCGA § 16-11-36 (Code Ann. § 26-2616) for "loitering and prowling." The evidence at trial showed that the arresting officer, a veteran patrol officer in the downtown Atlanta area, observed, near midnight, the defendant and another man squeezing between the wall and a locked gate of the Davison's parking garage in order to exit the garage. When the officer attempted to question the men, the defendant's companion fled. The defendant immediately halted and gave no resistance. After the defendant's companion was apprehended, the arresting officer advised both men of their rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), but did not place them under arrest. The officer then inquired whether they would like to explain why they were exiting the parking garage by squeezing through a locked gate. The defendant responded they were taking a shortcut through the garage.

The arresting officer testified that he believed this to be an unreasonable explanation as the defendant would have had to enter the garage from Carnegie Street, walk 150 feet to the stairwell, go down two flights of steps, then walk another 250 feet to the point where he could squeeze by the locked gate. The officer expressed his opinion that this path did not amount to a short-cut, but, in fact, required far greater effort on the part of the defendant than if he had simply travelled the sidewalk to his intended destination. The officer then placed the defendant and his companion under arrest. The officer testified the arrest was made due to his concern for the safety of the vehicles parked in the Davison's garage. ¹

1. The defendant makes a facial attack on OCGA § 16-11-36 (Code Ann. § 26-2616), arguing initially that it is void for vagueness. The pertinent sections of this statute provide:

"(a) A person commits the offense of loitering or prowling when he is in a place at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.

"(b) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether alarm is warranted is the fact that the person takes flight upon the appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object. Unless flight by the person or other circumstances make it impracticable, a law enforcement officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this Code section, afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate concern which would otherwise be warranted by requesting the person to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct. No person shall be convicted of an offense under this Code section if the law enforcement officer failed to comply with the foregoing procedure or if it appears at trial that the explanation given by the person was true and would have dispelled the alarm or immediate concern.

"(c) A person committing the offense of loitering or prowling shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."

The defendant maintains the phrases "loiter," "prowl" and "in a place at a time or in a manner" are "elastic standards which fail to provide sufficient guidelines to ordinary people so that they can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute."

In construing the constitutionality of a statute, we must examine it in its entire context. The legislature enacted OCGA § 16-11-36 (Code Ann. § 26-2616) in 1980, patterning it after the Florida loitering statute, § 856.021, and Section 250.6 of the Model Penal Code. ² With the exception of minor distinctions, OCGA § 16-11-36 (Code Ann. § 26-2616) is drafted in language identical to that of the Florida statute and Model Penal Code. ³

In upholding the Florida statute against a void-for-vagueness attack, the Florida Supreme Court concluded the statute could be interpreted in a constitutional manner to proscribe only loitering or prowling which amounts to a threat to the safety of persons or property, conduct which persons of common intelligence may readily appreciate. State v. Ecker, et al., 311 So.2d 104 (SC Fla.) (1975), cert. den., Bell v. Florida, 433 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 455, 46 L.Ed.2d 391 (1975). The Comments to § 250.6 of the Model Penal Code support the interpretation that the conduct sought to be prohibited is only that loitering which creates a danger to persons or property. "As a threshold matter, the section requires at least some manifestation of aberrant behavior [and] ... the circumstances must be such that this behavior warrants alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity." Comments, § 250.6 Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft of the American Law Institute, p. 390 (1962).

We agree with these observations and find them applicable to our analysis of the constitutionality of OCGA § 16-11-36 (Code Ann. § 26-2616). But see, City of Portland v. White, 9 Or.App. 239, 495 P.2d 778 (1972); City of Bellevue v. Miller, 85 Wash.2d 539, 536 P.2d 603 (1975). ⁴ While the meanings of certain isolated terms are arguably elusive, the statute, when read as a whole, passes constitutional muster in advising persons of ordinary intelligence of the conduct sought to be prohibited. The statute also defines the offense in terms which discourage arbitrary enforcement. Due process requires no more. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Monroe v. State, 250 Ga. 30, 295 S.E.2d 512 (1982). The offense of loitering is committed only when the actor engages in conduct "not usual for law abiding individuals" which creates "a reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity." While as defendant suggests, perspectives may differ as to what conduct is "usual" for law-abiding citizens, the statute narrows the construction of this phrase by making it clear the conduct must be that which would alarm a reasonable person that danger exists to person or property. The statute further provides guidelines for determining whether this alarm is justified, thus avoiding the possibility of arbitrary enforcement.

Initially the investigating officer must determine whether the suspect's conduct poses a danger to persons or property. Section (b) offers guidelines to assist the officer in making this determination. However, these guidelines do not require the officer to make an arrest, even if one or more of the situations suggested therein is present. If, drawing on all his professional experience, the officer concludes the suspect presents a danger to persons or property in the vicinity and arrests him for loitering or prowling, it is then a matter for the trier of fact to determine whether, under all the circumstances revealed by the evidence, the suspect's conduct gave rise to reasonable alarm for the safety of persons or property. In resolving this issue the jury may also consider the guidelines of Section (b). The statute does not require a conviction if one or more of the listed circumstances is found. We point out that while there are useful guidelines, they do not represent an exhaustive list of factors which may be used in assessing whether the suspect's conduct reasonably warrants alarm. We also point out that under Section (b), no violation occurs if the investigating officer fails to afford the suspect an opportunity to dispel otherwise reasonable alarm by explaining his conduct.

Following the Florida Supreme Court we hold that the words " 'under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity' mean those circumstances where peace and order are threatened or where the safety of persons or property is jeopardized." 311 So.2d at 109.

Defendant's reliance on Bullock v. City of Dallas, 248 Ga. 164, 281 S.E.2d 613 (1981) is misplaced. In that case we struck a municipal ordinance ⁵ which provided no guidelines by which "a citizen who desired to conform his conduct to this provision would be [able] to discern whether he risked criminal responsibility." 248 Ga. at 167, 281 S.E.2d 613. As pointed out above, OCGA § 16-11-36 (Code Ann. § 26-2616) does not suffer from this defect. ⁶

2. Defendant complains OCGA § 16-11-36(b) (Code Ann. § 26-2616) violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by requiring a suspect to identify himself as well as explain his presence and conduct.

We agree with the defendant "that while police have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes, they have no right to compel them to answer." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1860, n. 9, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727, n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969). However, the State correctly points out that OCGA § 16-11-36 (Code Ann. § 26-2616) does not require a suspect to provide information, but, rather, guarantees him the opportunity to explain his conduct, thereby possibly dispelling the officer's concern for the safety of persons or property before any official action is allowed. We conclude the proffering of this opportunity does not abrogate the right against self-incrimination. The statute permits the officer to make a threshold inquiry to evaluate the situation confronting him. The statute does not permit an interrogation of the suspect for the purpose of gathering evidence to establish guilt. See Shy v. State, 234 Ga. 816, 823, 218 S.E.2d 599 (1975).

The defendant misreads the statute in arguing that an accused may be convicted in any...