Bellemead, LLC v. Stoker
Citation | 280 Ga. 635,631 S.E.2d 693 |
Decision Date | 26 June 2006 |
Docket Number | No. S05G1352.,S05G1352. |
Parties | BELLEMEAD, LLC et al. v. STOKER et al. |
Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Robert G. Brazier, Steven Gordon Hall, Seaton D. Purdom, Gambrell & Stolz, L.L.P., Atlanta, for Appellants.
Walter E. Harrington Jr., Warner Robins, William H. Larsen, John T. McGoldrick, Jr., Michael Norman White, Michael Morgan Smith, Martin, Snow, Grant & Napier, Macon, Shirley Rogers Watson, Warner Robins, for Appellees.
Appellees Jerry Stoker and the Stoker Group and appellants entered into several partnerships in connection with the residential development of various properties. When the parties decided to dissolve the partnerships but were unable to agree how to do it, they resorted to litigation. While the litigation was pending, appellee Jerry Stoker amended his complaint to include a claim for slander against appellant Edward Faircloth, which claim did not include a plea for special damages (see OCGA § 9-11-9(g)), making his claim one for slander per se. See McGee v. Gast, 257 Ga.App. 882, 885, 572 S.E.2d 398 (2002) ( ). A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment against Stoker and the Stoker Group on their claims of unjust enrichment, breach of oral contract, and breach of fiduciary duties, and a unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of Faircloth's motion for summary judgment on the claim of slander per se. Stoker v. Bellemead, LLC., 272 Ga.App. 817, 615 S.E.2d 1 (2005). The decision of the Court of Appeals spawned four petitions for a writ of certiorari, and this Court granted one petition in order to address an issue involving the disposition of the slander claim.
The slander claim was based on a remark allegedly made by Faircloth several months after appellants had filed their dissolution lawsuit. Stoker alleged that Faircloth approached Charles Gross, a longtime friend of Stoker who had purchased real estate lots for development through his connection with Stoker. When Faircloth asked Gross about purchasing certain lots for development from him and Gross told Faircloth any lots Gross purchased would be through Stoker, Faircloth purportedly said to Gross: Faircloth denied making the remark and sought summary judgment on the ground that, even if he had made the statement he had no liability for slander because the statement was one of opinion concerning a future event. In affirming the denial of summary judgment on the defamation claim, the Court of Appeals stated:
To determine whether a statement is slander per se, courts look to the plain import of the words spoken and will not enlarge their meaning by innuendo. [Cit.]. "The pivotal questions are whether the statements can reasonably be interpreted as stating or implying defamatory facts about plaintiff and, if so, whether the defamatory assertions are capable of being proved false." [Cit.].
Id., at 827, 615 S.E.2d 1. Applying this standard, the Court of Appeals concluded a claim of slander per se was viable since "the statements at issue could reasonably be interpreted as having the purpose of injuring Stoker's business by stating or implying that Stoker was going out of the development business in which he was still engaged and leaving the area, and that these assertions are capable of being proved false." This Court unanimously granted Faircloth's petition for a writ of certiorari in order to examine whether the test applied by the Court of Appeals was proper.
Oral defamation or slander consists in, among other things, "[m]aking charges against another in reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure him therein...." OCGA § 51-5-4(a)(3). With this type of slander, known as slander per se, special damages need not be proved because damage is inferred. OCGA § 51-5-4(b). Harper, James, and Gray, The Law of Torts, Vol. 2, pp. 101-102, § 5.12 (2nd ed. 1986). "Thus, a charge that a physician stole the land of a certain person does not defame the physician with reference to his profession [cit.], ... [while t]o say of a merchant whose credit is necessary to the operation of his business that he is insolvent or does not pay his bills on time would be libelous...." Charles R. Adams III, Georgia Law of Torts, p. 549, § 28-1 (2006 ed.).
As noted by the Court of Appeals, a court looks to "the plain import of the words spoken" in order to ascertain whether the words constitute slander per se. Palombi v. Frito-Lay, 241 Ga.App. 154(1), 526 S.E.2d 375 (1999). See also McGee v. Gast, supra, 257 Ga.App. 882(1), 572 S.E.2d 398. To be slander per se, the words "are those which are recognized as injurious on their face — without the aid of extrinsic proof." Macon Tel. Pub. Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga.App. 719(5), 302 S.E.2d 692 (1983). Should extrinsic facts be necessary to establish the defamatory character of the words, the words may constitute slander, but they do not constitute slander per se. Id. Thus, the court "may not hunt for a strained construction" in order to hold the words used as being defamatory as a matter of law (Webster v. Wilkins, 217 Ga.App. 194(1), 456 S.E.2d 699 (1995)), and the negative inference a hearer might take from the words does not subject the speaker to liability for slander per se. Palombi v. Frito-Lay, supra, 241 Ga.App. at 156, 526 S.E.2d 375. Furthermore, when words are defamatory per se, innuendo — which merely explains ambiguity where the precise meaning of terms used in the allegedly slanderous statement may require elucidation (Whitley v. Newman, 9 Ga.App. 89, 93, 70 S.E. 686 (1911)) — is not needed. Zarach v. Atlanta Claims, 231 Ga.App. 685(2), 500 S.E.2d 1 (1998). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was correct when it held it is inappropriate to rely on innuendo to determine if the words at issue constitute slander per se.
However, the questions posed in the second sentence of the standard employed by Court of Appeals in the case at bar (...
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