Bender v. Jamaica Hospital

Decision Date26 October 1976
Citation40 N.Y.2d 560,388 N.Y.S.2d 269,356 N.E.2d 1228
Parties, 356 N.E.2d 1228 James C. BENDER et al., Appellants, v. JAMAICA HOSPITAL, Defendant, and J. B. Manley et al., Respondents.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Paul D. Rheingold, New York City, for appellants.

W. Bernard Richland, Corp. Counsel, New York City (Irving Cohen and L. Kevin Sheridan, New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

GABRIELLI, Judge.

The issue before this court is whether the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation is a municipal corporation within the meaning of section 50--d of the General Municipal Law. In May, 1969 the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation was created to provide the financial and managerial flexibility necessary for the proper care and treatment of the ill and infirm within New York City, particularly those who can least afford it (L.1969, ch. 1016, as amd); and the legislation establishing this organization declared it to be 'a body corporate and politic constituting a public benefit corporation' (New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation Act, § 4, subd. 1; L.1969, ch. 1016, as amd). The plaintiffs instituted the instant malpractice actions against the respondent doctors for alleged negligent treatment at Queens General Hospital, a hospital operated by the corporation. The doctors raised as an affirmative defense that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the provisions of sections 50--d and 50--e of the General Municipal Law in that plaintiffs did not file a notice of claim on the doctors as required. Section 50--d provides that every municipal corporation shall assume the liability for malpractice of any physician who renders medical services without receiving compensation at public institutions maintained by that municipal corporation. Where section 50--d is applicable, ultimate financial responsibility rests not with the treating physician but with the appropriate municipal corporation and, under subdivision 2 of that section, no action will lie unless a notice of claim is served in compliance with section 50--e of the General Municipal Law. In this case, no notice of claim was served on the individual doctors. Plaintiffs moved to strike the affirmative defense on the ground that defendants were not employed by a public institution maintained by a municipal corporation as defined under the statute.

We hold that the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation is not a municipal corporation within the meaning of section 50--d of the General Municipal Law and, thus, the affirmative defense must fail. Section 2 of the General Municipal Law defines a municipal corporation for purposes pertinent to our inquiry as including 'only a county, town, city and village.' The New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, established as a public benefit corporation obviously does not fit within this definition. Where the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face the legislation must be interpreted as it exists (McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 76; New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, 3 N.Y.2d 1, 163 N.Y.S.2d 626; Meltzer v. Koenigsberg, 302 N.Y. 523, 99 N.E.2d 679). Absent ambiguity the courts may not resort to rules of construction to broaden the scope and application of a statute (New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker, supra; Matter of Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn. of City of Buffalo v. City of Buffalo, 50 A.D.2d 101, 376 N.Y.S.2d 291) and must apply the plain import of the statute (Matter of Trustees of N.Y. & Brooklyn Bridge, 72 N.Y. 527). Although it may well be that the Legislature intended to confer on the corporation the status of a municipal corporation within the meaning of section 50--d, as respondents argue, no rule of construction gives the court discretion to declare the intent of the law when the words...

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    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • July 8, 1998
    ..."if any unsought consequences result, the Legislature is best suited to evaluate and resolve them" (Bender v. Jamaica Hosp., 40 N.Y.2d 560, 562, 388 N.Y.S.2d 269, 356 N.E.2d 1228). Thus, we conclude that, because the MOE statute and regulations do not authorize reallocation of State-wide BD......
  • Jacob, Matter of
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • November 2, 1995
    ...that "if any unsought consequences result, the Legislature is best suited to evaluate and resolve them" (Bender v. Jamaica Hosp., 40 N.Y.2d 560, 562, 388 N.Y.S.2d 269, 356 N.E.2d 1228, citing Bright Homes v. Wright, 8 N.Y.2d 157, 203 N.Y.S.2d 67, 168 N.E.2d 515; see, Matter of Robert Paul P......
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    ...court upon the legislative domain" (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 76, Comment at 168; see Bender v. Jamaica Hosp., 40 N.Y.2d 560, 388 N.Y.S.2d 269, 356 N.E.2d 1228 ).In requiring a court to entertain the merits of a plaintiff's motion for an extension pursuant to CPLR 306–b......
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    ...the plain and ordinary usage and meaning of the statutory language" ( id. at 107, 969 N.Y.S.2d 150 ; see Bender v. Jamaica Hospital, 40 N.Y.2d 560, 388 N.Y.S.2d 269, 356 N.E.2d 1228 ; McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 76, Comment ["The function of the courts is to enforce s......
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