New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Stecker

• Decision Date: 16 May 1957
• Citation: 3 N.Y.2d 1,163 N.Y.S.2d 626,143 N.E.2d 357
• Parties: , 143 N.E.2d 357 NEW AMSTERDAM CASUALTY COMPANY, Respondent, v. Emanuel STECKER et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 626

163 N.Y.S.2d 626

3 N.Y.2d 1, 143 N.E.2d 357

NEW AMSTERDAM CASUALTY COMPANY, Respondent, v. Emanuel STECKER et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 16, 1957.

Robert Morris and Burton Ritter, New York City, for appellants.

Clarence E. Mellen, Frederick Mellor and Daniel J. Coughlin, New York City, for respondent.

CONWAY, Chief Judge.

In this declaratory judgment action we are called upon to review the correctness of the Appellate Division determination that the plaintiff, New Amsterdam Casualty Company, which issued, in New York, an automobile liability policy to defendant, Molly Stecker, a New York resident, is not obligated (1) to defend the said insured in an action instituted against her in Connecticut by her husband, defendant Emanuel Stecker, as the result of an automobile accident occurring in that State, or (2) to pay any judgment obtained by the insured's husband against her in such suit.

The facts are not in dispute. On July 24, 1954, Molly Stecker was driving her car in the vicinity of Willington, Connecticut, when an accident occurred. Her husband, Emanuel, a passenger in the automobile, received injuries. The husband subsequently commenced an action in the Superior Court of Connecticut to recover damages, naming his wife and the driver of the other car as codefendants. That action is presently pending in such court. Both defendants are residents of New York. At the time of the accident Molly Stecker had a policy of insurance issued by plaintiff, New Amsterdam Casualty Company, which policy was written in New York. The policy is of a type commonly known as 'Automobile Policy Basic Liability Form'. There is no express provision included therein concerning the liability of Amsterdam for injuries to the spouse of an insured. The policy obligates Amsterdam 'To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury * * * caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile' if the accident occurs 'within the United States of America, its territories or possessions, Canada or Newfoundland'.

Subdivision 3 of section 167 of the New York Insurance Law, Consol.Laws, c. 28, provides that 'No policy or contract shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured because of death of or injuries to his or her spouse or because of injury to, or destruction of property of his or her spouse unless express provision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy.' (Emphasis supplied.) There is no comparable statute in Connecticut. Consequently, insurance carriers in that State are obligated to defend any negligence action brought by one spouse against another, and to pay any judgment obtained in any such action. The question presented on this appeal is whether subdivision 3 of section 167 of the New York Insurance Law excludes coverage not only of the liability between spouses arising out of accidents occurring in New York State, but also of the liability between spouses arising out of accidents occurring in any other State. This question has been answered in the negative by Special Term and in the affirmative by the Appellate Division. We are in agreement with the conclusion reached by the Appellate Division.

The defendants correctly state that the policy as issued covers the liability of the insured no matter where it attaches, be it anywhere in the United States, its territories or possessions, Canada or Newfoundland. However, our inquiry does not end there, for we must determine the extent to which the contract of insurance is affected by subdivision 3 of section 167 of the New York Insurance Law.

Defendants contend that since the accident took place in Connecticut subdivision 3 of section 167 is inapplicable. They argue that the place where the accident occurs is the place of performance and that, therefore, the law of Connecticut applies which contains no restriction on the insurer's liability to an insured who has negligently injured his or her spouse. The error which defendants commit is in assuming that the question here involves performance of a contract. There is no issue here as to how performance was to be accomplished, or the sufficiency of the performance, but whether or not there is to be any performance at all. Is the defendant Molly Stecker insured? Has Amsterdam agreed to indemnify her for the loss here anticipated? What was the contract the parties made? What were the right and obligations which flowed from the document they drew? These are questions, the answers to which are governed solely by the lex loci contractus New York State (Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101; Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 135, 141, 19 N.E.2d 992, 995; United States Mtge. & Trust Co. v. Ruggles, 258 N.Y. 32, 38, 179 N.E. 250, 251, 79 A.L.R. 802; Union Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 169 N.Y. 538, 543, 62 N.E. 672, 673, 57 L.R.A. 513; Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 332). Indeed, to apply the law of Connecticut in determining what the contract of the parties was would be to give extraterritorial effect to the laws of that State, a result which is proscribed by esablished principles of law and exhorted against by the defendants themselves. To illustrate, let us assume that in the case before us subdivision 3 of section 167 were not part of the law of New York, but that there was an equivalent provision in Connecticut. In such a situation, the parties would have contracted in New York for coverage of the insured's liability without regard to the marital relation of the insured to the one injured. Manifestly, the hypothetically posed Connecticut statute could not act upon, or seek to affect the coverage under, the contract made in New York. The same result must follow in the reverse situation presented in the case at bar. Subdivision 3 of section 167 governs all automobile liability insurance policies issued in this State without regard to where the accident occurs. It is mandated into and made a part of every policy of automobile liability insurance issued in this State. The only question remaining is what the Legislature intended by this statute.

The pertinent statutory language is: 'No policy or contract shall be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured * * * to his or her spouse * * * unless express provision relating specifically thereto is included in the policy.' (Emphasis added.) The language employed by the Legislature is clear, succinct and unequivocal. 'Certainly there is no ambiguity in the word 'no.' It is as complete a negative as it is possible to express, and similarly the word 'any' is as inclusive as any other word in the English language.' General Fire & Accident Assur. Corp. v. Ganser, 2 Misc.2d 18, 23, 150 N.Y.S.2d 705, 710. This court has declared on numerous occasions that where the language of a statute is without ambiguity, and the meaning unequivocal, there is no necessity for resort to rules of construction (see, e. g., Meltzer v. Koenigsberg, 302 N.Y. 523, 525, 99 N.E.2d 679; Matter of Rathscheck's Estate, 300 N.Y. 346, 350, 90 N.E.2d 887, 888; Tishman v. Sprague, 293 N.Y. 42, 50, 55 N.E.2d 858, 860; People ex rel. New York Central & H. R. R. R. Co. v. Woodbury, 208 N.Y. 421, 425, 102 N.E. 565, 566; McKinney's Cons.Lows of N. Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 76). As was long ago stated in McCluskey v. Cromwell (11 N.Y 593, 601): 'It is not allowable to...