Benson, In re
Citation | 172 Cal.App.3d 532,218 Cal.Rptr. 384 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Decision Date | 24 September 1985 |
Parties | In re Sharon Elizabeth BENSON on Habeas Corpus. The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Sharon Elizabeth BENSON, Defendant and Respondent. G001738. |
Thomas E. Beck, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.
Rutan & Tucker, Leonard A. Hampel and Heather A. Mahood, Costa Mesa, and R.K. Fox, City Atty., for defendant and respondent.
The City of Fullerton challenges a judgment of the superior court granting a writ of habeas corpus declaring two municipal anti-gaming ordinances unconstitutional and enjoining further prosecutions under the ordinances. 1 Neither ordinance is constitutionally infirm and we reverse the judgment finding them void.
* * *
A complaint was filed in the municipal court charging Sharon Elizabeth Benson with violating sections 7.130.010 ( ) and 7.125.010 (playing the game of panguingue for money) of the Fullerton Municipal Code.
Benson demurred to the complaint on the grounds the code sections were unconstitutional. The municipal court overruled her demurrer and she sought relief by petitioning for writ of habeas corpus in the superior court. After briefing and argument, the superior court agreed the two ordinances were unconstitutional, issued its writ of habeas corpus and enjoined the city from prosecuting others under the same code sections.
In its order granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus, the superior court concluded each section was
Our analysis of each ordinance is founded on a basic principle of statutory construction: We are required to presume the constitutionality of the ordinances. " " (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 453, 75 Cal.Rptr. 1, 450 P.2d 296; Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 481, 484, 171 P.2d 21.)
We recognize due process requires criminal statutes give "fair notice" of what conduct is prohibited. (Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257, 270-271, 198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732.) (People v. Demery (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 548, 556, 163 Cal.Rptr. 814.)
In interpreting the meaning of the ordinances in question, we are also guided by the principle that an apparent ambiguity can be resolved by resorting to " 'any demonstrably established technical or common law meaning of the language in question.' " (Italics omitted, ibid., quoting from People v. Belous (1969) 71 Cal.2d 954, 960, 80 Cal.Rptr. 354.)
Fullerton Municipal Code section 7.130.010 provides:
The municipality's police power includes the right to regulate gambling, unless preempted by state law. (In re Hubbard (1964) 62 Cal.2d 119, 124, 41 Cal.Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809, overruled on other grounds in Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 63, fn. 6, 81 Cal.Rptr. 465; Ex parte McClain (1901) 134 Cal. 110, 111, 66 P. 69.) Fullerton Municipal Code section 7.130.010 specifically excludes those games governed by the state legislation and therefore is a legitimate exercise of local police power not preempted by state law. (See In re Murphy (1900) 128 Cal. 29, 60 P. 465; In re Farrant (1960) 181 Cal.App.2d 231, 5 Cal.Rptr. 171.)
Benson does not attack either ordinance on preemption grounds. Rather, she argues the city may not create new gambling offenses which are not recognized by the general body of state law; specifically, games which are skill-determinative rather than chance-determinative. She argues the local police power to regulate gambling is limited to the regulation of chance-determinative games.
We find no authority to support this argument. Each of the cases cited by Benson interpret ordinances which, on their face, expressly regulate games of chance. But that phraseology is not grounded in the law. The local police power extends to regulating any gambling--monetary wagers--on any game, regardless of the game's result being dependent on chance or skill.
Nevertheless, the superior court found Fullerton Municipal Code section 7.130.010 to be broader than the city's police power, interpreting it to include more than illegal gambling. The court found the ordinance prohibited playing any game for money. It stated, as an example, the ordinance would prohibit professional athletes from playing their sport in Fullerton. We disagree and refuse to ignore the obvious intent of the city council. We find the ordinance appropriately prohibits only gambling games. The reference to "game" in Fullerton Municipal Code section 7.130.010, in the context of the rest of the sentence, "played, ... for money," has a common law meaning: gambling. The phraseology is clearly understood from the ordinance and gives fair notice to all persons of what conduct is prohibited. (See People v. Nunn (1956) 46 Cal.2d 460, 467, 296 P.2d 813.)
Moreover, limiting the ordinance to gambling is a reasonable interpretation which is consistent with the Constitution. (See Welton v. City of Los Angeles (1976) 18 Cal.3d 497, 505, 134 Cal.Rptr. 668, 556 P.2d 1119.) The regulation of gambling is an appropriate exercise of local police power when not preempted by state law. (In re Hubbard, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 124, 41 Cal.Rptr. 393, 396 P.2d 809.) This particular ordinance expressly excludes the statewide legislation to avoid preemption problems. By so doing, the ordinance also evidences its intended meaning to regulate all other gaming within the local police power. We conclude...
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