Benson v. Alverson
| Decision Date | 23 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | A11-811 |
| Parties | Douglas Benson, et al., Appellants, v. Jill Alverson, in her official capacity as the Hennepin County Local Registrar, Respondent, State of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2010).
Filed January 23, 2012
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Hennepin County District Court
Peter J. Nickitas, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Daniel P. Rogan, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Jill Alverson)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Alan I. Gilbert, Solicitor General, Jason Pleggenkuhle, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent state)
Jason Adkins, Minnesota Catholic Conference, St. Paul, Minnesota (for amici curiae Minnesota Catholic Conference, Greater Minnesota Association of Evangelicals, and Upper Midwest Merkos-Chabad Lubavitch)
Jordan W. Lorence, Alliance Defense Fund, Washington, D.C. (for amicus curiae Minnesota Family Council) Marshall H. Tanick, Mansfield, Tanick & Cohen, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for amicus curiae Minnesota Atheists)
Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Stoneburner, Judge; and Worke, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellants challenge the dismissal of their claims against the state and the Hennepin County Registrar for failure to issue marriage licenses, arguing that the Minnesota Defense of Marriage Act (MN DOMA) violates their Minnesota constitutional rights. Appellants also argue that the district court erred by determining that the state is not a proper party. We affirm the district court's determination that the state is not a proper party, and we affirm the district court's determination that MN DOMA does not violate the single-subject and freedom-of-association provisions of the Minnesota Constitution. But because the district court inappropriately dismissed the matter at this early stage of litigation, we reverse and remand the remaining claims.
Appellants Douglas Benson, Duane Gajewski, Jessica Dykhuis, Lindzi Campbell,1 Thomas Trisko, and John Rittman filed a complaint against respondent Jill Alverson, in her official capacity as the Hennepin County Local Registrar, alleging that she refused to accept their applications for marriage licenses based solely on the fact that the three couples are comprised of same-sex individuals. Appellants claimed that respondentAlverson violated their due-process, equal-protection, freedom-of-conscience, and freedom-of-association rights under the Minnesota Constitution, and the single-subject provision of the Minnesota Constitution. Appellants amended their complaint, adding respondent State of Minnesota as a party.2 Respondents moved to dismiss appellants' complaint pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The state also moved to dismiss on the ground of misjoinder. The district court dismissed the state and granted respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed 409 U.S. 810 (1972) is binding precedent, holding that MN DOMA is constitutional. This appeal follows.
State as a proper party
Appellants argue that the district court erred in dismissing the state as a party, claiming that the state was properly joined under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. A declaratory-judgment action must present a justiciable controversy or a district court lacks jurisdiction to declare rights under the act. Onvoy, Inc. v. ALLETE, Inc., 736 N.W.2d 611, 617 (Minn. 2007). A justiciable controversy exists if "the claim (1) involves definite and concrete assertions of right that emanate from a legal source, (2) involves a genuine conflict in tangible interests between parties with adverse interests, and (3) is capable of specific resolution by judgment rather than presenting hypotheticalfacts that would form an advisory opinion." Id. at 617-18. This court reviews de novo whether a justiciable controversy exists between the parties, and whether a district court has jurisdiction over a declaratory-judgment action. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Franck, 621 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Minn. App. 2001).
Minn. Stat. § 555.11 (2010) (emphasis added). Thus, the attorney general must be served and is entitled to be heard. But the state's participation or degree of involvement is discretionary with the state.
Appellants seek the issuance of marriage licenses. The local registrar is responsible for maintaining registration of vital statistics, including marriages. Minn. Stat. §§ 144.212, subds. 9, 10, .223 (2010). The local registrar issues marriage licenses. Minn. Stat. § 517.07 (2010). A justiciable controversy exists between appellants and respondent Alverson. The state does not issue marriage licenses. Thus, while the state was entitled to be heard because there is a constitutional challenge, it was within the state's discretion whether to exercise that right. The district court, therefore, appropriately dismissed the state.Rule-12 dismissal
The district court dismissed the matter pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). "When reviewing a case dismissed pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the question before this court is whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief." Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. 2008) (citing Barton v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1997)). "The reviewing court must consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 2003) (citing Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn. 1978)). Our standard of review is de novo. Id.
Single subject
We first address appellants' argument that MN DOMA violates the Single Subject Clause of the Minnesota Constitution. Under the Single Subject Clause, "[n]o law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title." Minn. Const. art. IV, § 17. This requirement prevents the combining of unpopular laws and including them in an unrelated, but more popular, law. Townsend v. State, 767 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Minn. 2009) (). A law will not violate the Single Subject Clause as long as all of its provisions "fall under some one general idea, be so connected with or related to each other, either logically or in popular understanding, as to be parts of, or germane to, one general subject." Id. (quotation omitted).
The challenged bill was:
A bill for an act relating to human services; appropriating money; changing provisions for health care, long-term care facilities, children's programs, child support enforcement, continuing care for disabled persons; creating a demonstration project for persons with disabilities; changing provisions for marriage; accelerating state payments; [and] making technical amendments to welfare reform[.]
S.F. 1908, third engrossment (1997). The district court determined that these provisions generally relate to families. We agree that these provisions fall under one general idea; it cannot be said that these are "wholly unrelated matters." See Unity Church of St. Paul v. State, 694 N.W.2d 585, 594 (Minn. App. 2005) (), review dismissed (Minn. June 9, 2005). Therefore, the district court did not err in determining that MN DOMA does not violate the Single Subject Clause of the Minnesota Constitution.
Freedom of conscience
We next address appellants' argument that MN DOMA violates their freedom-of-conscience rights under the Minnesota Constitution, claiming that they are not able to fully exercise their religion because even if they marry in a church, the state does not recognize their marriages. The district court determined that "the Minnesota Supreme Court has not offered guidance on the issue of religious freedom as it relates to same-sex marriage." Not relying on precedent, the district court then determined that "[t]he State's choice to recognize opposite-sex marriages performed in churches, but not same-sex marriages is a decision within the purview of the State's power to prohibit certain marriages without unconstitutionally interfering in religious freedoms."
Under the Minnesota Constitution, "interference with the rights of conscience [shall not] be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishment or mode of worship." Minn. Const. art. I, § 16. The Minnesota Constitution provides stronger protection for freedom of conscience than the United States Constitution. Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 864-65 (Minn. 1992). Minnesota courts apply a four-part test to examine claims that state action violates a right to conscience. Id. at 865. This test considers whether the (1) belief is sincere; (2) state action burdens the belief; (3) state interest is overriding or compelling; and (4) state uses the least restrictive means. Id.
The district court's determination that appellants' beliefs are sincere is not challenged. The issue is whether the state action—the prohibition of same-sex marriage—burdens that belief. At least one...
To continue reading
Request your trial