Benzant v. Jones

• Decision Date: 16 February 2018
• Docket Number: Case No. 16-Civ-20219-TORRES
• Parties: SAMUEL BENZANT, Petitioner, v. JULIE L. JONES, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

SAMUEL BENZANT, Petitioner, v. JULIE L. JONES, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 16-Civ-20219-TORRES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

February 16, 2018

ORDER ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

This matter is before the Court on Samuel Benzant's ("Petitioner") Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that seeks to vacate the state court judgment and sentence against him. [D.E. 1]. The Government responded in opposition on November 27, 2017 [D.E. 19] and Petitioner replied on January 18, 2018. [D.E. 23]. Therefore, the Petition is now ripe for disposition. After careful review of the record and the arguments presented, we conclude that the Petition as a whole is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged by indictment - alongside Henry Tomas Ramirez and Rudy Daniel Salazar - with first-degree murder and robbery with a firearm. Following a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty as charged and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment on count one and a term of forty-five years imprisonment on count two. On June 7, 2007, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment of conviction and sentence. On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the evidence that he had committed two unrelated crimes should have been redacted from his statement to the jury because the evidence was not inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses. The State filed an answer arguing that there was no abuse of discretion and the state appellate court issued a written opinion affirming the conviction and sentence on April 14, 2010. See Benzant v. State, 34 So. 3d 112, 113 (Fla. DCA 2010). A pro se motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc was filed on June 8, 2010, and denied on July 21, 2010.

On March 22, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief in state court. Petitioner raised four claims for relief and an evidentiary hearing was scheduled. On July 5, 2013, the trial court issued an Order denying the motion for post-conviction relief. Ground one was denied on the merits, finding that Petitioner's trial counsel conducted a sound legal strategy. Ground two was abandoned at the evidentiary hearing. Ground three was found to be without meritbecause Petitioner affirmed his acceptance of the jury panel. And ground four was denied on the merits because counsel's conduct constituted a sound trial strategy.

On July 31, 2013, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on the Order denying the post-conviction relief on July 5, 2013. Petitioner argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to strike a juror who could not accept false confessions in a case. The appellate court per curiam affirmed the lower court's ruling on December 31, 2014. See Benzant v. State, 155 So. 3d 357 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014). A mandate issued on January 16, 2015.

On January 19, 2016, Petitioner filed a writ for habeas corpus, raising the following four grounds for relief: (1) the state trial court erred in failing to grant defense counsel's motion to redact Petitioner's statement of evidence that he had committed a robbery that was unrelated to the crimes charged, (2) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to strike a juror, (3) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise on direct appeal that the state trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress Petitioner's statements to law enforcement, and (4) the cumulative effect of the errors in this case deprived Petitioner of a fair trial. We will discuss each of the arguments raised in turn.

II. ANALYSIS

Section 2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code, or the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), provides the habeas corpus remedyfor a state prisoner who is in custody in violation of the "Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). An application for habeas corpus relief in federal court must include reference to a specific constitutional guarantee as well as a statement of the facts that entitle the petitioner to relief. See Jimenex v. Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 481 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007).

A. Standard of Review

The AEDPA provides very limited circumstances for federal habeas corpus claims, and Section 2254(d) of AEDPA governs the federal court's review of claims that have already arisen in state court. See Perry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001); Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 890 (11th Cir. 2003) (showing that the AEDPA is clear that a federal court should give substantial deference to a state court's findings of fact); see also Cave v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 638 F.3d 739, 745 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Congress mandated that 'a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,' and that a habeas petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by 'clear and convincing evidence.'") (quoting 2254(e)(1)). The standard for federal habeas relief of a state prisoner is the following:

Habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in a state court unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see, e.g., Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 638-39 (2003); Clark v. Crosby, 335 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003).

The "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses set forth in the standard above are different bases for reviewing a state court's decision. Putnam v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1241 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05 (2000)). First, the "contrary to" clause applies if (1) the state court ruled in contradiction to governing law set forth by the Supreme Court, or (2) the state court arrived at a result different than that reached in a Supreme Court case with materially indistinguishable facts. Putnam, 268 F.3d at 1241.

Second, the "unreasonable application" clause applies if the state court's judgment was "objectively unreasonable." Id.; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002) (showing that it is the petitioner's burden to show the state court applied federal law to the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner). "An 'unreasonable application' of clearly established federal law occurs when the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case." Terrell v. GDCP Warden, 744 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). But it is important to recognize the difference between an "unreasonable" and an "incorrect" application of federal law. Id. Even a "strong case for relief" does notnecessarily mean that the state court's contrary conclusion was "unreasonable." Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011)); see, e.g., Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1220 (11th Cir. 2011) (habeas relief is not available if fairminded jurists could agree with the state court's decision).

Moreover, when a habeas case reaches the federal level, the state court's factual findings are presumed to be correct, and a petitioner must rebut this presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Henderson, 353 F. 3d at 890-91; see also Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (stating that Section 2254 "dictates a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings'") (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)). This presumption thus demands that state court decisions be given the "benefit of the doubt." Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24.

Finally, we also recognize that all that is required from a state court is a rejection of the claim on the merits, not an opinion that explains the rationale for the ruling. See Peoples v. Campbell, 377 F.3d 1208, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). Federal courts are thus "not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation." Bell, 543 U.S. at 455 (citations omitted).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

As a preliminary matter, the Court must consider whether Petitioner exhausted his state court remedies. A state prisoner must first exhaust all of hisfederal claims in the "ordinary appellate review procedure" in the state system before seeking federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 847 (1999). To exhaust his state court remedies, Petitioner must have already "fairly present[ed]" every issue raised in his federal petition either on direct appeal or collateral review in the state system, including the state supreme court with powers of discretionary review, to alert the court to the federal nature of the claim. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 352 (1989); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam). In other words, to properly exhaust these remedies, the state prisoner must "fairly present federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365). Because exhaustion is not a jurisdictional issue, the Government may waive the defense that the petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3) (providing that the State must make this waiver expressly).

The Government argues that two of Petitioner's claims - specifically in grounds one and three¹ - should not be considered on the merits because Petitioner failed to exhaust them in state...