Berard v. State
Decision Date | 26 February 1980 |
Docket Number | 3 Div. 25 |
Citation | 402 So.2d 1044 |
Parties | Jerome Vincent BERARD, v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
John L. Capell, III, of Capell, Howard, Knabe & Cobbs, Montgomery, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., Mary Jane LeCroy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Murder in the first degree wherein two or more human beings are intentionally killed; sentence: death by electrocution. Section 13-11-2(10), Code of Ala.1975.
The State's evidence proved beyond any reasonable doubt that in the early morning hours of April 15, 1978, eighteen-year-old Jerome Vincent Berard unlawfully, intentionally, and with malice aforethought killed Jeffery D. Smith and John D. Thompson, ages fourteen and sixteen respectively, by shooting them with a .45 caliber pistol at the Skatehaven roller skating rink in Montgomery. Both victims were employed by Skatehaven on the night in question, and Jeffery Smith was the appellant's best friend.
The appellant had been employed at Skatehaven, but had quit two months prior to this incident. According to Mr. Nick Stratas, the owner of Skatehaven, On the afternoon of April 14, the appellant told a friend, Tonya Bird, that he planned to rob Nick Stratas and "kill him if possible." He told another friend, Kelly Turner, that "he was going to flatten Nick Stratas' car tire, wait till he was changing it and knock him out from behind and take his money."
By the appellant's own confession, he loaded a .45 pistol at his house, placed it down in his belt, and walked to the Pizza Hut to have a coke. Later, as the appellant was walking up the highway, a female friend drove by and saw him. From the confession:
The appellant offered no explanation for his murderous actions. He stated that he next grabbed the keys to Thompson's car, jumped in the car, and was about to leave when he realized things did not "seem right." He went back inside, "popped open the cash drawer and kicked in some doors, to make it look like it was a robbery or something." He then drove the car away, "ditched it," and walked home.
The appellant maintains that the trial court erred in excusing four jurors for cause contrary to the guidelines set out in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). We disagree.
In the case sub judice only those prospective jurors were excluded who indicated they would not return the death penalty under any circumstances regardless of the evidence. On no less than four occasions during the qualification of the venire did the trial court instruct the prospective jurors concerning their views on capital punishment:
(1) "The question that is being presented to you now is this: If you have a moral belief which says that you do not believe in capital punishment, if you believe that capital punishment should not be inflicted under any circumstances, if you simply do not believe in capital punishment, you should stand at this time."
(2) "If the fact that you do not believe in the death penalty would keep you from finding the Defendant guilty regardless of the evidence, please stand ...."
(3) "If the fact that you do not believe in the death penalty would keep you from finding the Defendant guilty regardless of the evidence, please remain standing."
(4) "Now, do you feel like that since you do not believe in capital punishment, regardless of what the evidence would be, do you feel like you could render a verdict of guilty? ....
"If you feel that you could not, just raise your right hand ...."
In addition, it was carefully explained that under Alabama's capital felony statute the only punishment which the jury could impose would be death if the appellant was found guilty.
In response to the court's instructions, thirteen prospective jurors stood. Each juror was questioned individually to make sure he understood the instructions and to ascertain his individual convictions regarding the death penalty. Of the thirteen who had originally stood, only four stated unequivocally that they "could not pronounce guilt under those circumstances." Those four were challenged for cause. The remaining nine were not. We hold as a matter of law that the challenges were proper. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 97 S.Ct. 399, 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976); Witherspoon, supra. See also: Liddell v. State, 287 Ala. 299, 251 So.2d 601 (1971).
The appellant contends that the trial court erred to reversal in allowing color photographs and photographic slides of the victims to be shown to the jury and in admitting into evidence the shirts of the two victims showing blood stains and bullet holes. Appellant argues that such evidence Through the testimony of five police officers and a state toxicologist, thirty-nine photographs were admitted into evidence. Approximately thirty of those photographs were of the two victims. A slide presentation of approximately ten slides by the state toxicologist and approximately thirty slides by one of the police officers was also made before the jury. The presentation utilized by the toxicologist was to facilitate his testimony explaining the victims' cause of death. The presentation made by the police officer was to expedite his testimony explaining the appellant's movements at the time he committed the offense. At least nine of those slides were of the scene and the two bodies. The slides were not admitted as exhibits, but were marked for the record. 1 The two shirts, one belonging to each victim, were introduced to prove the number of wounds and to establish the approximate distance of the pistol at the time of discharge.
was repetitious and that its cumulative effect was to inflame the jury. A brief discussion of that evidence is appropriate.
Beginning with the shirts, the supreme court in Flannagin v. State, 289 Ala. 177, 266 So.2d 643 (1972), stated:
In the instant case the victim's clothing clearly tended to show the character, location, and nature of the fatal wounds. Thus, the shirts were properly admitted into evidence. Jones v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 362 So.2d 1303 (1978); Gould v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 332 So.2d 402 (1976).
With respect to the photographs and slide presentations of the victims, we find no merit in appellant's argument. As is stated in Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence, § 207.01(2), (3d ed. 1977):
The trial judge's discretion is not reviewable except for gross abuse. McKee v. State, 253 Ala. 235, 44 So.2d 781 (1949); Cook v. State, 52 Ala.App. 159, 290 So.2d 228 (1974). We have carefully examined the photographs which were admitted and have considered the impact of the slide presentation. We find no abuse of discretion in this case.
Lewis v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 339 So.2d 1035 (1976), cert. denied, Ala., 339 So.2d 1038.
The appellant contends that the trial court admitted his taped and signed confession, taken on April 16 at 1:31 p. m., in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. We have...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Capote v. State
...before the jury. Smith, supra. ’ " Murrell v. State, 377 So. 2d 1102, 1107 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979). See alsoBerard v. State, 402 So. 2d 1044, 1047 n.1 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (‘Although the slides were not formally admitted, the fact that they were used in connection with the giving of testim......
-
Magwood v. Culliver
...also held that § 13-11-6 lists the only aggravating circumstances that could be considered by the sentencing judge. Berard v. State, 402 So.2d 1044 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980); Tomlin v. State, 443 So.2d 47 Cr.App.1979). These decisions, combined with a plain reading of the text of § 13-11-4, belie ......
-
Bush v. State
...circumstances listed in § 13A-5-49 in fixing the death penalty. Clisby v. State, 456 So.2d 99 (Ala.Cr.App.1983); Berard v. State, 402 So.2d 1044 (Ala.Cr.App.1981). In this case, the trial court found the existence of three statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) that the defendant had prev......
-
Bryant v. State, No. CR-98-0023 (AL 4/29/2005)
...have been for the trial judge to simply follow the verbiage of the statute in negating aggravating circumstances.' Berard v. State, 402 So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980)." 545 So. 2d at 144. VIII. Bryant next makes a general argument that Alabama's death penalty is unconstitutional, stat......